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Abstract
This thesis examines three dimensions of monetary policy: its implementation through
exchange rates, its role in price level determination and its interaction with fiscal
policy.
Following a sudden stop, real exchange rates can adjust through a nominal
exchange rate depreciation, lower domestic prices, or a combination of both. Chapter
1 makes four contributions to understand how the type of adjustment shapes the
response of macroeconomic variables, in particular productivity, to such an episode.
First, it documents that aggregate TFP systematically collapses after a sudden stop
under a flexible exchange rate arrangement while it moderately improves within a
currency union. Second, using firm-level data for two sudden stops in Spain, it shows
that the difference in the productivity response is largely driven by firm entry and
exit dynamics. Third, it proposes a small open economy DSGE framework with firm
selection into production and endogenous markups to explain the empirical findings.
Fourth, it uses a quantitative version of the model to revisit the relative performance
of exchange rate policies after a sudden stop.
Different theories of the price level are too often presented in terms of opposing
camps and conflicting policymakers. As a result, most economists resort to under-
graduate monetarist insights to explain inflation, even though for the most part they
do not apply to modern advanced economies. Chapter 2 investigates how central
banks control inflation in terms of one unified theory that allows for different policy
choices by the central bank.
Chapter 3 examines the incentives that shape monetary policy in the context of
dual mandates. I present a simple model of optimal monetary policy based on a
multitask principal-agent problem framework with two agents. I show there is risk
of excessive hawkishness if the compensation scheme is not appropriately designed.
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Chapter 1
Sudden Stops, Productivity and
the Exchange Rate
1.1 Introduction
The procyclicality of productivity is a well-established empirical fact in macroe-
conomics; productivity rises in booms and falls in recessions (Basu and Fernald
(2001)).1 This is not only an essential feature of closed-economy business cycle mod-
els, but a crucial ingredient in balance of payment crises. The disruption of economic
activity that accompanies unexpected reversals in capital flows, also known as sud-
den stops, is associated with declines in aggregate total factor productivity (TFP).2
The recent European sovereign debt crisis challenges this interpretation: in this in-
stance, productivity improved moderately as the external adjustment unfolded. The
fact that it took place within a currency union, another singularity of this episode,
emerges as a potential explanatory factor and raises the following question: what
is the relationship between sudden stops, productivity and the prevailing exchange
rate regime? How does accounting for this complement the inherited wisdom on
fixed versus floating regimes?
This paper studies how the type of real exchange rate realignment shapes the
response of macroeconomic variables, in particular productivity, to a sudden stop.
It shows that it shows that the difference in the productivity response is largely
driven by firm entry and exit dynamics. Internal devaluations, as opposed to nomi-
nal depreciations, lead to greater exit of unproductive firms, contributing to positive
aggregate TFP growth through a so-called cleansing effect. This implies that incor-
porating firm dynamics and allowing for demand effects in an otherwise standard
open economy framework is key to capturing the observed cyclicalities under dif-
ferent exchange rate regimes. The result is that the type of external adjustment,
1Several authors have argued that the cyclicality of total factor productivity and labor produc-
tivity relative to inputs has reduced or even reversed since the mid-1980s in the US; see Galí and
Van Rens (2014) and Fernald and Wang (2016).
2This paper uses the terms productivity and TFP interchangeably.
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whether nominal or real, affects macroeconomic performance even in the absence of
nominal rigidities.
Section 1.3 provides systematic evidence on the behavior of macroeconomic vari-
ables during a sudden stop for both developed and developing economies during the
1990-2015 period. I use a new criterion to identify sudden stops that captures both
the episodes discussed previously in the literature as well as the recent Southern-
European cases. I classify sudden stops according to the prevalent exchange rate
regime and evaluate the response of macroeconomic variables in each regime using
an event study approach. Two regularities stand out: first, aggregate TFP systemat-
ically collapses under flexible exchange rate arrangements, while it improves, albeit
moderately, within currency unions. Second, in a currency union, there is a larger
decline in employment and a greater contraction in consumption as a share of GDP
following a sudden stop. In order words, the increase in aggregate TFP comes at the
expense of a greater domestic contraction.
To disentangle the drivers of aggregate TFP performance, Section 1.4 presents
micro evidence in the form of firm-level data from the manufacturing sector. More
specifically, I exploit survey data during two sudden stop episodes that occurred
in Spain: the 1992-93 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis and the 2009-13 European
sovereign debt crisis. During the former, the national currency, the peseta, depre-
ciated on multiple occasions and TFP fell by over 10 percent. During the second
episode, Spain was a member of a currency union and could only regain competi-
tiveness by lowering wages. In this case, TFP increased by 10 percent.
The firm-level analysis of these two episodes uncovers the following empirical
findings. First, changes in productivity are concentrated in the lower tail of the
firm productivity distribution in both episodes. Second, while productivity was
declining at the firm-level during both crises, unproductive exiting firms contributed
substantially more to TFP growth in the 2009-2013 sudden stop. Third, the 2009-13
sudden stop had a cleansing effect on productivity while the 1992-93 sudden stop did
not. Finally, there is suggestive evidence that links heterogeneity in price markups
with changes in allocative efficiency throughout the full sample.
Based on the previous evidence, Section 1.5 develops a dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model with a micro-structure borrowed from Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) to study the behavior of productivity, output and employment
during a sudden stop. The model features a small open economy with quasi-linear
quadratic preferences and firm heterogeneity in productivity. This gives rise to firm
selection into production and endogenous variable markups. I extend this model by
including leisure in the consumer’s utility function, thereby deriving the labor supply
decision. This provides a new channel through which the wage level and individual
firm profits interact.
To allow a role for policy, I introduce nominal rigidities in the wage setting
process. The central bank chooses the nominal exchange rate as its main policy tool
11
and two extreme regimes are discussed: a currency union, characterized by a credible
commitment to keep the nominal exchange rate constant; and a strict wage inflation
targeting regime, where the flexible wage equilibrium is always implemented. A
sudden stop is an exogenous shock to the risk premium component of the interest rate
that domestic consumers pay for international borrowing. By increasing the return
on foreign denominated bonds, the domestic economy is forced to save internationally
and increase net exports through a real exchange rate depreciation.
Section 1.6 uses a partial equilibrium version of the model to build intuition on
how it is able to generate the observed TFP patterns following a sudden stop. The
key insight is that aggregate productivity is proportional to the domestic productivity
threshold. The threshold represents the minimum productivity level at which a firm
can generate positive profits and, thus, select into the domestic market. It therefore
suffices to understand how the threshold moves after a sudden stop to learn about
its effect on aggregate productivity.
In equilibrium, the domestic threshold is entirely determined by the number of
active firms in the market and the wage level. Therefore, there are three mechanisms
through which a shock can affect productivity. First, the threshold increases with
the number of active firms, as greater competition lowers profit margins for all firms
and then requires a higher level of productivity to remain profitable. This is the
pro-competitive channel. Second, higher wages increase the costs of production for
all firms, lowering again their profit margin and calling for a higher productivity
level. This is the cost channel. Third, higher wages also increase the demand for
overall consumption by increasing households’ labor income. This, instead, increases
the firm profit margin and relaxes the productivity requirement. This is the demand
channel.
The effect of a sudden stop on the domestic productivity threshold will hinge on
the relative strength of these conflicting forces. This, in turn, depends on how the
real exchange rate adjustment is conducted. More precisely, whether it takes place
through the depreciation of nominal exchange rates or a lower wage level. Consider
the two polar cases, in the first case the nominal exchange rate bears the full brunt
of the adjustment: only the pro-competitive channel works, fewer firms import, and
productivity falls unambiguously. In contrast, when the nominal exchange rate is
fixed, the wage adjusts completely and all three channels operate, resulting in a
quantitatively ambiguous overall effect. The model delivers conditions under which
the demand channel dominates, allowing a sudden stop to generate a productivity
improvement in a currency union.
Section 1.7 extends the analysis to general equilibrium by calibrating the model
using Spanish macroeconomic data as well as the firm-level evidence presented in
Section 1.4. I simulate the response of the economy to an unexpected exogenous
increase in the country risk premium component of the interest rate under the two
alternative exchange rate policy regimes. The model predictions mimic a sudden
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stop episode: the economy runs a current account surplus and the real exchange rate
depreciates. The responses of macroeconomic variables match the empirics along
many dimensions: GDP and consumption fall, with a more pronounced drop of the
latter under the currency union regime. Moreover, relative employment dynamics
are correctly captured by the generated impulse response functions with the cur-
rency union experiencing greater volatility, although the model does not generate an
absolute decline in employment under a floating regime.
The baseline general equilibrium framework fully captures the empirically docu-
mented TFP fact: productivity falls when the real exchange rate depreciation trans-
lates one-to-one into a nominal depreciation, while it increases as the devaluation
takes place through wages instead. This result is not only robust to alternative pa-
rameterizations of the model, but also to a range of extensions to the baseline set-up
presented in Section 1.8.
Finally, to evaluate the overall performance of exchange rate regimes following a
sudden stop, Section 1.9 studies how TFP improvements translate into welfare gains
by computing the cumulative output loss under a currency union and a floating
arrangement. These findings show that while higher nominal rigidities are more
harmful in a currency union, at low levels of wage stickiness, the floating arrangement
performs worse. The latter effect is driven by the opposing effect of lower wages and
appreciated exchange rates on the cost of entering the market, which can partly
compensate for the drop in domestic demand in the currency union.
The results contrast with the standard view that both exchange rate regimes
would lead to similar economic outcomes in the event of an external adjustment in a
perfectly flexible world. To better understand this finding, I explore further how the
relative performance of regimes depends also on the labor income share, the degree of
firm heterogeneity and the complementarity of foreign and domestic labor inputs. I
also show that results are robust to evaluating performance either by the cumulative
consumption loss or by a utility-based welfare measure.
1.2 Relation to the literature
This paper combines several strands of the literature at the intersection of interna-
tional finance, trade theory and firm dynamics.
First, it focuses on sudden stops, as defined by Calvo (1998), abrupt and un-
expected reversals in foreign capital inflows. It follows the empirical research that
documents regularities among historical sudden stop episodes including Calvo et al.
(2004), Guidotti et al. (2004), Calvo and Talvi (2005) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) and
contributes to their previous analysis in three ways: by modifying the Calvo sudden
stop identification methodology to account for gradualism, by expanding the time
frame and the set of economies traditionally considered, and by classifying episodes
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according to the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate.3 The results show that
previous findings - current account adjustment, depreciation of the real exchange
rate and fall in output and TFP - apply to economies with flexible exchange rates
but not fully to currency unions.
Related, several articles propose amendments to the standard open economy neo-
classical model with flexible exchange rates in order to reconcile theoretical predic-
tions with the observed behavior of macroeconomic variables, especially TFP, during
a sudden stop. For example Meza and Quintin (2007) allow for endogenous factor
utilization, Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Christiano et al. (2004) and Mendoza (2006)
introduce advanced payments of inputs and Mendoza (2010) directly assumes that
exogenous productivity shocks trigger the collateral constraints that drive sudden
stops. I bring an alternative explanation to the table: selection into production.
Second, while the goal of the paper is not the normative analysis per se, the
implications of the model link to the floating versus fixed exchange rate debate initi-
ated by Friedman (1953). Cúrdia (2007), Braggion et al. (2009) and Fornaro (2015),
among others, argue that policy rules that target inflation are superior in terms of
welfare to those that prioritize exchange rate stability. More recently, Farhi et al.
(2013) Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) and Galí and Monacelli (2016) have empha-
sized the interaction of wage flexibility and the exchange rate regime. Accounting for
firm dynamics preserves the importance of nominal rigidities in evaluating the rela-
tive performance of policy rules, while it allows for different outcomes across regimes
even in their absence.
The third strand of the literature to which this paper closely relates is trade
models of heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003), which emphasize firm selection
into domestic and international markets by featuring fixed production and exporting
costs.4 Even though the main focus of these papers is on the welfare effects of trade
liberalizations, the real exchange rate depreciation that results from a balance of
payment crisis resembles an asymmetric trade liberalization.5 This makes the New
New Trade Theory framework a suitable starting point for this analysis.
Unlike the canonical Melitz (2003) model, I do not restrict attention to com-
petition in the labor market and incorporate pro-competitive effects of trade by
departing from constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. In doing so, I
follow Bernard et al. (2003), Feenstra (2003), Behrens and Murata (2006) and, more
specifically, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), to feature endogenous variable markups.
This allows me to defuse, at least in the short-run, the negative dependence be-
tween domestic and exporting cutoffs that drives the baseline result in the Melitz
3This is not, however, the first paper to classify the massive reversals that Southern-European
countries experienced between late 2009 and 2011 as sudden stop episodes (see Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012) and Gros and Alcidi (2015) for an earlier discussion).
4For a review of the literature, refer to Melitz and Redding (2014).
5More precisely, a real exchange rate depreciation can be modelled as a simultaneous increase in
import tariffs and export subsidies.
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(2003) model. I preserve, however, the role that wages play in such model within the
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework. My approach is to modify the quasi-linear-
quadratic preferences proposed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) and assume that leisure is
the homogeneous good. The result is that the demand for differentiated varieties is
no longer independent of labor income and a new demand effect of wages emerges.
While most of the standard trade models are static, this paper is closer to the
subset within the trade literature interested in firm dynamics and business cycles.6
The most notable reference is Melitz and Ghironi (2005), which embeds the steady-
state version of the Melitz (2003) model into a two country DSGE setting. To gain
tractability, however, Melitz and Ghironi (2005) assume that all firms that enter
the market generate positive profits and, thus, firm exit is exclusively determined
by exogenous death shocks.7 In addition, because their focus is on the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, the main driver of the business cycle is an aggregate productivity
shock. My paper, instead, incorporates selection into production and studies the
effects of exogenous current account shocks on productivity.8 Moreover, it is, to the
best of my knowledge, the first study to incorporate nominal rigidities and, thus, to
be able to discuss the role for monetary policy in a similar setting.9
Finally, this paper is connected to the literature that studies the contribution of
reallocation to TFP growth. Two theoretical arguments have been put forward to
date. On the one hand, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that increases in allocative
efficiency that involve closing gaps in the return of inputs increase aggregate pro-
ductivity. On the other hand, Caballero et al. (1994)’s interpretation of Schumpeter
et al. (1939)’s creative destruction emphasizes the role of reallocation among new and
incumbent firms as an important factor of growth. The paper presents a model based
on the second current, emphasizing the cleansing effect of internal devaluations, but
discusses both conjectures in the empirical analysis.
The pre-crisis slowdown of productivity in Southern Europe has prompted an
increasingly popular narrative that links declining TFP and enhanced misallocation
with capital inflows. Papers on this topic are often grouped according to the margin
of misallocation suggested: Benigno and Fornaro (2014) considers a model of mis-
allocation between a tradable and a non-tradable sector; Dias et al. (2016), García-
Santana et al. (2016), Reis (2013) and Gopinath et al. (2017) show, and formalize in
the latter two cases, that resources were also misallocated within sectors. My work
contributes to these hypotheses in two dimensions: from the empirical side, I show
6Alternatively, models are commonly assumed to be dynamic but with a stationary equilibrium
featuring constant aggregate variables.
7As opposed to a framework in which the presence of fixed production costs drives firms gener-
ating negative profit out of the market.
8Bilbiie et al. (2012) and Ottaviano (2012), among others, already consider the effect of endoge-
nous entry and/or new product variety in a business cycle model. They do so, however, in a closed
economy setting.
9Bilbiie et al. (2008) and Bilbiie et al. (2014) introduce price adjustment costs in a closed-economy
DSGE model with endogenous entry and product variety to study optimal monetary policy.
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that the negative relationship between capital flows and TFP growth in Southern
Europe is symmetric, that is, productivity improved as the crisis hit and foreign cap-
ital retrenched. From the theoretical side, I provide an alternative framework that
reconciles both sets of papers by endogenizing firms’ decision to export and, thus,
the size of the exporting sector. In addition, I abstract from the theoretical emphasis
on capital that characterizes these papers and consider an alternative dimension of
misallocation: variable markups.
1.3 Aggregate productivity during a sudden stop
How do unexpected capital flow reversals affect macroeconomic performance? To
answer this question I proceed in three steps: (i) establishing a criterion to identify
sudden stops; (ii) classifying episodes by exchange rate regime; and (iii) character-
izing the behavior of several macroeconomic variables using a standard event study
approach.
1.3.1 Data and methodology
Following Cavallo and Frankel (2008), I define a sudden stop as an episode in which
there is a substantial decline in the capital account surplus together with a reduction
in the current account deficit and a simultaneous recession. I develop an algorithm
that classifies as a sudden stop a period that contains at least one year during which
(i) the financial account surplus has fallen at least one standard deviation below its
rolling average; (ii) there is a simultaneous decline in the current account deficit (or
an equivalent decline in foreign reserves); and (iii) GDP per capita contracts.10 The
start and end of each episode is marked by the first and last year within the period
in which the financial account surplus is half a standard deviation below the rolling
average.11
The two latter requirements ensure that the capital flow reversals captured by
the algorithm strictly qualify as sudden stops. First, by requiring that the financing
disruption is accompanied by an appropriate macroeconomic adjustment. Second,
by ruling out booming episodes that display similar characteristics, for example a
positive trade shock.
Annual data on the current and capital accounts for all available countries comes
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database (IFS) for the period 1990-
2015 and complemented with data on GDP per capita growth from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators Database.12
10This contrasts with Cavallo and Frankel (2008), who consider a reduction in the financial
account surplus that is two standard deviations above the mean standard deviation for the corre-
sponding decade.
11Refer to Appendix 1.11.1 for further details.
12I do not consider countries which are small, both in terms of population (below one million
inhabitants) and in terms of GDP (below one billion USD). The final sample covers 119 countries.
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The total number of episodes is 78, representing 5.2% of total available coun-
try/year observations in the sample.13 The criterion successfully captures all tradi-
tional sudden stop episodes previously discussed by the literature - mostly occurring
around the 1994/5 Tequila crisis, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 1998 Rus-
sian default - as well as the most recent balance of payment crisis in the peripheral
economies of the European Union.14
I build on Ilzetzki et al. (2017) updated de facto coding system as opposed to
relying on declared exchange rate regime reported to the IMF in order to classify
episodes. In my baseline results, I consider as prevalent the exchange rate regime
that is in place during the last year of the sudden stop. There are four different
cases: a currency union, a hard peg, a soft peg and a floating arrangement.15 Out of
the 78 episodes identified, 11 occur within a currency union (8 in the Euro Area and
3 in the West African Economic and Monetary Union), 14 in a hard peg system, 26
in a soft peg regime and 25 in a floating arrangement.
To characterize the behavior of the macro-economy as a sudden stop unfolds I
use data on GDP, final private consumption, employment, total factor productivity,
current account deficit and real exchange rate. All variables are compiled from the
World Development Indicators except for Total Factor Productivity, TFP, that is
collected from the Conference Board’s Total Economy Database and the current
account deficit from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the mean and median path of each of these aggre-
gate variables during the episodes conditional on their exchange rate classification
together with standard error bands. In order to capture the buildup and end phase
of each episode, the plot depicts six-year windows that begin two years before the
start of each reversal and marks the start and the average duration of a sudden stop
with vertical lines. As is standard in much of the literature, I focus on the cyclical
component of most of the variables by looking at its percentage deviation from an
extrapolated pre-crisis linear trend.16
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Figure 1.1: Sudden stops in a floating arrangement
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
-2 0 2 4
Output
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
-2 0 2 4
Consumption
-1
0
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
-2 0 2 4
Employment
-1
0
-5
0
5
-2 0 2 4
Productivity
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-2 0 2 4
Current account
70
80
90
10
0
11
0
12
0
-2 0 2 4
RER
mean median SE bands
Notes: This figure plots the response of macroeconomic variables to a sudden stop under a floating
arrangement. The black and red solid lines depict the mean and median path of the corresponding
variables while the black dashed lines represent standard error bands. The two vertical lines show
the start and end of an average episode. Output, consumption, employment and productivity
are expressed in terms of percentage deviations from an extrapolated linear trend calculated from
periods t− 5 to t− 2. Current account is expressed as a share of GDP and the real exchange rate
(RER), calculated as an index, is expressed in levels.
Source: IFS, WDI, Total Economy Database and own calculations.
1.3.2 Results
Figure 1.1 illustrates how domestic variables respond to an unexpected reversal of
capital flows when the exchange rate is allowed to adjust freely. First, a sudden
13The total number of episodes is 105. However, I drop one-year long episodes that start in 2009
as these are explained by the global trade collapse rather than by a country-specific reversal of flows.
The full list of episodes per country, plus exchange rate classification, can be found in Appendix
1.11.1.
14The methodology does not account for changes in TARGET2 balances in the Eurozone and,
thus, prevents me from measuring private capital flows accurately. However, this is not problematic
for my purposes as the algorithm already identifies the GIIPS episodes.
15In terms of the Ilzetzki et al. (2017) fine classification, I deviate as follows: (1) I manually
divide code 1 into currency union and no separate legal tender, (2) I group codes 2 to 4 under the
hard peg category, (3) I group codes 5 to 11 under the soft peg category, (4) I group codes 12 to 14
under the floating arrangement and (5) I rename group 15 as 5 i.e. other categories.
16The current account deficit, expressed as a share of GDP, and the real exchange rate index,
with base t-2, are the exception.
18
stop is associated with a contraction in output and consumption, with most of the
decline occurring on impact or shortly after. There is also a smooth decline in
employment levels, measured as the number of employed workers, and a significant
collapse in total factor productivity. The last two graphs capture the response of the
external sector: capital outflows coincide with a depreciation of the real exchange
rate, represented by a decline in the index plotted in Figure 1.1. The current account
deficit is reduced sharply, almost reaching trade balance as soon as one year after
the start of the episode. Finally, the average duration is slightly less than two years.
The results for a currency union are summarized by Figure 1.2. The response of
all variables but TFP is similar, in qualitative terms, to that depicted in the flexible
exchange rate case. The unexpected reversal of flows is associated with a decline in
output, consumption and employment. There is a gradual reduction in the current
account deficit that yet persists four years after the onset of the crisis. In line with
this result, the real depreciation is more gentle than in the previous case and the
episodes last longer, on average, two and a half years.
The most notable difference across the plots is the behavior of TFP: whereas
productivity clearly falls in the first case, in line with the findings of the literature,
it remains unchanged or, if anything, improves slightly within currency unions.17 A
closer look into individual episodes shows that sudden stops in currency unions are
preceded by periods of worsening TFP performance which, at least, slow down as
the capital flows reversal materializes. In contrast, periods of capital inflows in free-
floating regimes are characterized by increasing TFP records that completely flip as
soon as the sudden stop hits the economy.
There are additional, although arguably minor, differences in responses across
regimes that are worth highlighting. Although a quantitative comparison is be-
yond the scope of this exercise, the decline in employment is more pronounced in
Figure 1.2. This holds in both absolute and relative to GDP terms. Moreover, con-
trolling for the size of output contraction, the fall in private consumption is larger
in the currency union.
1.3.3 Robustness
I conduct a battery of robustness checks to evaluate the consistency of these find-
ings.18 Regarding the exchange rate classification, I consider alternative de facto
coding systems, such as Shambaugh (2004) and Klein and Shambaugh (2008), that
allow for regime changes in higher frequency. I also redo the analysis taking as given
the exchange rate regime prevalent at the start of the sudden stop. This is moti-
vated by the fact that, although in most cases countries abandoned pre-existing pegs
17Given the reduced sample size in Figure 1.2, standard error bands are admittedly large to be
able to conclude that TFP increases significantly.
18Results available upon request.
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Figure 1.2: Sudden stops in a currency union
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Notes: This figure plots the response of macroeconomic variables to a sudden stop under a currency
union. The black and red solid lines depict the mean and median path of the corresponding variables
while the black dashed lines represent standard error bands. The two vertical lines show the start
and end of an average episode. Output, consumption, employment and productivity are expressed
in terms of percentage deviations from an extrapolated linear trend calculated from periods t−5 to
t−2. Current account is expressed as a share of GDP and the real exchange rate (RER), calculated
as an index, is expressed in levels.
Source: IFS, WDI, Total Economy Database and own calculations.
because of a sudden stop, there are cases in which failed currency pegs led to capital
outflows. Moreover, I remove episodes in which the exchange rate regime changed
more than once as this is exclusively due to missing data. None of the alternative
methods change the main conclusions discussed above.
Regarding the event study, I explore different ways of detrending the data includ-
ing a one-sided HP filter and alternative pre-crisis sample lengths. I also measure
labor input as total hours worked instead of employment. To control for changes
in the composition of the sample, I redo the analysis including only episodes for
which all six years of data are available. Finally, I control for the degree of economic
development and show that results are not driven by advanced versus developing
structural differences. Results hold for all of these specifications too.
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1.4 Firm-level productivity during a sudden stop
What lies behind the observed difference in TFP performance across exchange rate
regimes? This section resorts to micro-evidence to document the role of selection
into production and firm-level TFP in explaining aggregate productivity patterns.
1.4.1 Spain: a tale of two sudden stops
Given limited availability in firm-level data, I use a case study approach to study
firm dynamics during a sudden stop. In order to control for country fixed effects,
it is preferable to compare episodes occurred within the same economy. Based on
the results in Section 1.3, Spain emerges as a natural candidate. It has experienced
two sudden stops in its recent economic history under the two exchange rate regimes
of interest: the first coincides with the 1992-93 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
crisis and the second with the 2009-2013 European sovereign debt crisis.19 More-
over, the Spanish economy has been previously analyzed within the misallocation
debate (see Gopinath et al. (2017)) and, thus, makes for an interesting benchmark
for comparison.
There are clear parallels between the two episodes regarding the onset. Both
were preceded by periods of increasing capital inflows, declining international com-
petitiveness and widening current account deficits. Capital inflows were abruptly
reverted following a confidence shock affecting the European integration project: the
negative outcome of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in the first
case, and the Greek announcement of substantial upward revisions in the govern-
ment budget deficit more recently. The flight of international investment led to an
urgent correction of misaligned real exchange rates and a boost in exports in order
to close the trade gap.
The response of exchange rate policy to these events, however, diverted signifi-
cantly. While the peseta was devalued in three occasions during the 1992-93 crisis,
Spain already shared a common currency with its largest trading partners by 2009
and underwent a process of internal devaluation.20 Consistent with my previous re-
sults, TFP fell following the nominal depreciation in 1992, while it increased during
the 2009-13 period. I take these episodes as representative of sudden stops under
floating arrangements and currency unions, respectively, and use firm-level data to
explore what is driving the observed aggregate TFP pattern.21
19There are two other countries which have experienced sudden stops under different exchange
rate regimes: Finland and Italy. The episodes also correspond to the ERM and the European
sovereign debt crisis. The focus on Spain is partly driven by data availability.
20In 1992, the peseta was first devalued by 5% on September 17th, known as Black Wednesday,
when the pound and the lira abandoned the ERM altogether. A further 6% was devalued on
November 23rd, with a third devaluation taking place in May 1993.
21It can be argued that Spain does not strictly classify as a floating exchange rate regime in
1992-93 as it remains a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, a multilateral party grid of
exchange rates established in 1979. However, the repeated realignments of its central rate against
21
1.4.2 Data
I use firm-level data from the Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre Es-
trategias Empresariales, ESEE, in Spanish) managed by the SEPI Foundation, a
public entity linked to the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations.
The ESEE surveys all manufacturing firms operating in Spain with more than 200
workers and a sample of firms between 10 and 200 workers, providing a rich panel
dataset with over 1,800 firms for the period 1990-2014.22 It covers around 35 per-
cent of value added in Spanish manufacturing and provides information on each
firm’s balance sheet together with its profit and loss statement.
The main advantage of ESEE, especially over the ORBIS dataset compiled by
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD), is that it closely captures the extensive
margin of production.23 This is particularly true for the exit of firms as the dataset
clearly differentiates between firms that decide not to collaborate in a given year,
firms that exit the market and firms that are affected by a split-up, a merger or
an acquisition process. In addition, firms that resume production or collaboration
with the survey are re-included in the sample and properly recorded. As for entry,
new firms are incorporated every year in order to minimize the deterioration of the
initial sample. These include all entrants with more than 200 workers and a random
selection representing 5% of those with 10 to 200 workers.
There are other advantages of the ESEE dataset that are also worth highlighting.
It is the only dataset with reliable financial information going back as early as the
beginning of the 1990s, allowing me to study the 1992-93 episode. It also provides
firm-level records of the value of exports which is most often subject to stringent
confidentiality rules in Spain.24
Finally, I drop the entire firm record, instead of the corresponding firm-year
observation, when conducting standard consistency checks on the data. The reason
is that I want to prevent firms disappearing (and maybe then reappearing) in the
the deutsche mark implied that the overall devaluation of its currency was even larger than that of
the floating currencies such as the pound. In order words, despite the formal membership of the
ERM, the exchange rate effectively behaved as flexible.
22Large firms will be overrepresented in my sample. Given that firms that enter are typically small
while those that exit range from small to medium-sized, this could potentially weaken the role of
extensive margin in my analysis. Keeping this caveat in mind, my findings should be interpreted
as a lower bound.
23The other existing firm-level dataset, as used in García-Santana et al. (2016), is the Central
Balance Sheet Data (Central de Balances Integrada, CBI, in Spanish) owned by the Bank of Spain
and only accessible to in-house economists. This alternative dataset, however, is built using the
same source of data that constitutes the Spanish input for ORBIS, annual financial statements
that firms are obliged to submit to the Commercial Registry, and, thus, is subjected to the same
criticism. Please check Almunia et al. (2018b) for more details.
24To the best of my knowledge, the only available dataset is the foreign transactions registry
collected by the Bank of Spain containing transaction-level data which can be aggregated to the
firm-level using the firm’s fiscal identifier as done in Almunia et al. (2018a). Given the administrative
nature of the dataset, however, only large operations are recorded. Moreover, the minimum report-
ing threshold changed from 12,500 to 50,000 euros in 2008, hindering the possibility of correctly
measuring the extensive margin of exports.
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sample strictly due to the cleaning procedure. This is important to correctly capture
entry and exit to the market. The efforts devoted to ensure consistency and accuracy
during the ESEE data collection process minimize the loss of observations resulting
from this requirement. I only leave out firms that report zero or negative values of
value added or capital stock.
1.4.3 Estimating firm-level TFP
I measure real output as nominal value added divided by an output price deflator.
Obtaining an appropriate industry-specific output price deflator series has proved
to be challenging for two reasons. First, the data needs to go back in time at
least until 1990, while Eurostat series, the standard source, only start around 2000.
Instead, I use the producer price index provided by the Spanish National Statistics
Institute (NSI). Second, the ESEE provides its own industry classification based on
the sum of the three-digit NACE Rev.2 codes to 20 manufacturing industries. Given
that the mapping is not strictly one-to-one, deriving corresponding industry-specific
deflators requires implementing a weighting strategy.25 My approach is to use sector
contribution to total manufacturing value added in 2018, also provided by the NSI,
as the relevant weight.26
I follow the literature in using the wage bill, deflated by the above price series, in-
stead of employment to measure the labor input, in order to control for heterogeneity
in labor quality across firms. To measure capital stock I use two different variables
given existing data restrictions: for the 1990-1999 period I use total real net capital
stock whereas for the 2000-2014 period I use the book value of fixed assets deflated
by the price of investment goods from the Spanish National Statistics Institute.27,28
The standard practice is to estimate industry output elasticities for capital and
labor by regressing value added on input choices and to compute firm-level pro-
ductivity as the Solow residual.29 When performing the first step, two potential
problems emerge. First, productivity is unobservable and strongly correlated with
input choices. A simple OLS regression will therefore deliver biased estimates of the
desired elasticities because of simultaneity. Second, there is a selection bias due to
25For example, manufacturing industry with ESEE code 7 (paper) corresponds to NACE Rev.2
codes 171 and 172.
26The NSI provides weightings for the 2010-2018 period only. I use 2018 figures, as opposed
to taking an average or an alternative year, because 2018 is the only year for which there are no
missing values.
27Total real net capital stock is defined as the value of the stock of total net capital at 1990
constant prices which I simply convert into base year (2015) prices.
28I conduct several robustness exercises in order to check whether the change in the capital
stock measure has an impact on the results. First, for the years for which the two series overlap,
1993-1999, I estimate that the correlation coefficient at the firm-level is 0.9. Second, for the 1993-
1999 period, I estimate the production function using the two series separately and then compare
resulting coefficients - for 18 out of 20 industries the differences are of magnitude ±0.5 on average.
Finally, I redo the analysis splitting the sample before and after 1999 such that the two series do
not interact in any way during the production function estimation stage.
29See Appendix 1.11.2 for a more detailed review of production function estimation techniques.
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the fact that firm survival is related to the unobserved productivity level: firms that
remain in the sample tend to be the most productive ones.
To overcome the former issue, I follow the proxy variable approach (see Olley and
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)) among the possibilities offered by the
literature.30 Intuitively, this method substitutes unobserved productivity by a proxy
variable in the original regression; where a proxy variable is an observable input
or choice variable for which the mapping with respect to productivity is assumed
to be invertible. Coefficients of the inputs that do not enter this mapping, mainly
labor, can be non-parametrically estimated using OLS in a first stage. The remaining
coefficients, capital, are estimated next by exploiting the zero correlation assumption
between the unexpected component of productivity and the input choice using GMM.
I use materials deflated by the output price deflator as the proxy variable. To account
for labor dynamics, however, I implement the refinement introduced by Ackerberg
et al. (2015) that consists of identifying all coefficients in the second stage by using
conditional (as opposed to unconditional) moments.31
To control for attrition, I include an intermediate stage in which the probability
of survival is estimated by fitting a probit model on materials, labor and capital in
the spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996). This probability is then included as a regressor
in the final stage.
1.4.4 Analysis
Aggregate TFP, defined as the labor-weighted average of firm-level TFP, decreased
by 10.87% during the 1992-1993 episode while increased by 10.02% in the 2009-2013
period.32 While consistent with the results of the event study, the granularity of the
data allows for a more detailed investigation regarding the drivers of productivity.
The lower tail I first document changes in the distribution of firm-level produc-
tivity before and after each of the crises. Figure 1.9 plots a kernel probability distri-
bution estimate of log TFP before and after a sudden stop for both the 1992-1993
and the 2009-2013 episodes. A number of patterns stand out. First, there is ample
heterogeneity in TFP levels among firms in any given year as already highlighted
30The other alternatives are fixed effects, instrumental variables, first order conditions and dy-
namic panel approach.
31In addition to accounting for labor dynamics, Ackerberg et al. (2015) improves on the
Wooldridge (2009)’s extension of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach by allowing for unob-
served serially correlated shocks to wages. Their framework also overcomes Gandhi et al. (2016)’s
concern regarding the non-identification result of the proxy variable approach by assuming a Leon-
tief production function in materials. As a robustness check, nevertheless, I show that these two
alternative methodologies generate firm-level TFP series which are highly correlated with my base-
line TFP.
32I consider labor, as opposed to value added, weights when aggregating TFP for two reasons. On
the one hand, I will be presenting a theoretical model with labor as the only factor of production
where labor shares are the appropriate weight. On the other, large firms in terms of employment
are overstated in my sample, as explained above, and, thus, labor weights are consistent with the
interpretation of my results as a lower bound.
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by the literature. Second, the shape of the distribution is reasonably similar and
remains unchanged throughout both crisis periods. Third, changes in TFP are not
explained by major shifts in the distribution. A visual inspection suggests that the
lower tail concentrates most, if not all, of the action: it lengthens as TFP decreases
in the former crisis while shortens considerably as TFP increases in the latter case.
Figure 1.3 summarizes graphically the predominant role of the lower tail by pre-
senting the mean change in log TFP per percentile of the distribution. On average,
the change in productivity is close to zero during both episodes across the entire
distribution, with the notable exception of the 1% percentile where TFP decreases
by 70% during 1991-1993 while increases by 73% during 2009-2013.33 Although
the standard errors are admittedly large for the 1% percentiles in both cases, the
difference relative to other percentiles is large enough to remain relevant.
Estimated moments of the distribution confirm the above hypothesis with higher-
order moments experiencing the largest swings.34 During the 1992-93 crisis firms
display lower productivity on average and the dispersion of log TFP increases. The
increase in dispersion, however, is asymmetric. The distribution of unproductive
firms expands while that of productive changes little with the coefficient of skewness
declining from -0.40 to -1.24. Moreover, increasing kurtosis, 7.04 versus 10.42, is
associated with fatter tails as the probability mass moves away from the shoulders
of the distribution. Although the behavior of TFP exactly reverses during the 2009-
2013 crisis - productivity increases while dispersion drops - it is still the tails, and
especially, the lower tail, that changes the most. In this case, skewness increases
from -2.37 to -0.89 while kurtosis shrinks from 27.92 to 7.13.
Decomposing TFP growth While the above findings already support a narrative
of shifting productivity cutoffs, there is yet room for skepticism. It is often the case
that firms at the lower end of the productivity scale are small in size and, thus, have
negligible effects on the aggregate. A more formal test of growth patterns would
therefore consider weighted measures. Moreover, it should aim to disentangle the
role of incumbent, entering and exiting firms in shaping TFP changes.
Define aggregate productivity, Zt, as a weighted average of firm-level TFP. Given
that the focus is on firm dynamics, I express overall aggregate productivity as the
weighted sum of the aggregate productivities of incumbents, ZCt , entrants, ZNt , and
exiters, ZXt ,
Zt ≡
∑
i∈Nt
si,tZi,t = s
C
t Z
C
t + s
N
t Z
N
t + s
E
t Z
E
t ,
where si,t is the labor share of firm i and Nt the total number of firms in the economy,
both at time t. In addition, sjt is the total labor share and Z
j
t ≡
∑
i∈j s
j
i,t Z
j
i,t is the
aggregate productivity of firms pertaining to group j, where j = {C,N,E}.
33In the former case, the 5% percentile also shrinks although by a smaller magnitude, 36%.
34Refer to Table 1.5 for further details.
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Figure 1.3: Average change in log (TFP) by percentile
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Notes: This graph plots the average change in log (TFP) by percentile of the distribution. It
compares the average TFP of firms in a given quantile before and after each of the two sudden
stops. As this is an unbalanced panel, firms are allowed to change quantiles and even exit the
sample during the transition. The corresponding base and end years are 1991 and 1993 for the
first episode; 2009 and 2013 for the second episode. To account for variability, the vertical lines
represent error bands.
Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
The variable of interest is the change in aggregate productivity from period t− 1
to period t, ∆Zt. It follows that the relevant groups for the analysis are: incumbents
in both periods, firms exiting at period t − 1 and firms entering in period t. This
implies that sEt−1 = sXt = 0. By exploiting the fact that sCt−1 + sXt−1 = 1 and
sCt + s
N
t = 1 and using the expression above, I can rewrite the change in aggregate
productivity as
∆Zt = Z
C
t − ZCt−1 + sNt
(
ZNt − ZCt
)
+ sXt−1
(
ZXt−1 − ZCt−1
)
.
The interpretation of the above decomposition partly coincides with that of Melitz
and Polanec (2015): entrants (exiters) contribute positively to TFP growth when
their average productivity is higher (lower) than the incumbents’ counterpart. These
contributions are weighted by the labor share of entrants, sNt , and exiters, sXt−1, re-
spectively.35 I abstract, however, from decomposing the contribution of incumbents
35This version differs from the widely used Foster et al. (2001) decomposition in allowing for
differences in the reference productivity for entrants, exiters and incumbents. Intuitively, the con-
tribution of entrants (exiters) is now equal to the change in productivity one would observe if entry
(exit) was elided. Moreover, it has a direct mapping into a theoretical model of firm productiv-
ity heterogeneity, circumventing the recent criticism to accounting exercises measuring reallocation
posed by Hsieh and Klenow (2017). Even so, results are robust to considering Foster et al. (2001)
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further using Olley and Pakes (1996)’s approach.36 Instead, I follow Dias and Mar-
ques (2018) in tracking individual incumbent firms over time so that I can distinguish
between the contributions of firm-level productivity growth and labor share reallo-
cation among them.
Given the definition of ZCt , the change in aggregate productivity can be further
decomposed as:
∆Zt =
∑
i∈C
si,t−1∆Zi,t +
∑
i∈C
Zi,t−1∆ si,t +
∑
i∈C
∆ si,t∆Zi,t
+sNt
(
ZNt − ZCt
)
+ sXt−1
(
ZXt−1 − ZCt−1
)
.
The contribution by incumbents maps exactly into that in Foster et al. (2016).
The first term measures the contribution of within-firm productivity changes of in-
cumbents weighted by their initial share. The second term captures the contribution
of market share reallocation. The third term is known as the cross-effect, it is the
covariance of market share and productivity changes for the individual firm.
Table 1.1: Decomposition of TFP growth
Episode
1992-1993 2009-2013
Productivity growth (%) -10.87 10.02
Shares of productivity growth
Incumbent firms share -11.20 3.05
Within firm share -9.69 -2.41
Between firm share 0.47 3.75
Cross-term share -1.98 1.71
Net entry share 0.33 6.96
Entrants’ share -0.77 -0.72
Exiters’ share 1.10 7.68
Notes: Productivity growth refers to accumulated growth for the considered period. Base and final years
are 1991 and 1993 for the first episode; 2009 and 2013 for the second episode. Incumbent and net entry
shares add up to productivity growth. Within firm, between firm and cross-term shares add up to incumbent
shares. Entrants’ and exiters’ shares add up to net entry share.
Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
The results of the TFP growth decomposition for the two sudden stops are sum-
marized in Table 1.1. The decline in TFP in the 1992-1993 crisis is entirely driven
and Griliches and Regev (1995) alternative decompositions.
36Olley and Pakes (1996) would simply set:
ZCt − ZCt−1 = ∆ Z¯Ct + ∆Cov
(
sCi,t, Z
C
i,t
)
.
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by incumbents. In fact, net entry contributes to positive growth, although the mag-
nitude is small. Among incumbents, there is some reallocation of market shares
towards more productive firms. However, it is far from enough to overcome the
pronounced fall in within-firm productivity and the cross-term.37
In contrast, the increase in TFP experienced during 2009-2013 is largely driven
by net entry, in particular, by unproductive firms exiting the sample. The size of
the effect is remarkable, especially given that small and medium firms are under-
represented in the sample. Delving deeper into the characteristics of exiting firms
shows that during the 2009-2013 episode, firms that exit the market were, on aver-
age, bigger in terms of labor market share (7.01% versus 2.78) and three times as
unproductive in relation to incumbents (27.16% versus 9.17%) than their 1992-1993
counterparts. Moreover, the annualized exit rate more than doubled from 4.47% to
9.19%.38
Back to Table 1.1, the contribution of incumbents, although half as important,
is also remarkable. It is still the case that average productivity of incumbents is
procyclical, yet the positive effect of the between and cross terms dominate overall.
The increase in resource reallocation and a stronger correlation between productivity
changes and market share, together with the positive contribution of exiting firms, is
consistent with a cleansing effect of the 2009-13 sudden stop which is absent in the
1992-93 episode. The cleansing hypothesis, as discussed by Caballero et al. (1994),
argues that crises are periods of accelerated productivity-enhancing reallocations,
especially as resources are freed by the exit of unproductive firms. I turn to formally
testing the firm-level implications of this interpretation in what follows.
The cleansing hypothesis According to the literature, there is a tight connection
between firm exit, input growth and productivity: models of firm dynamics predict
that exit is more likely among low productivity firms whereas high productivity
firms are expected to grow by more every period. The cleansing hypothesis suggests
that recessions accelerate these dynamics. One should therefore observe a stronger
correlation between survival, employment and capital growth and productivity levels
during crises. To test whether this is the case for the two sudden stop episodes
considered, I adjust the empirical specification proposed by Foster et al. (2016) and
Dias and Marques (2018) and run the following set of regressions:
yit = λ+ β tfpit + δ ss
1
t + γ ss
1
t ∗ tfpit + µ ss2t + θ ss2t ∗ tfpit + it ,
37Note that finding procyclical firm-level productivity is not surprising, especially, given that I
have no feasible way of controlling for variable capacity utilization.
38The corresponding averages for the entire sample are the following: the annualized exit rate is
7.71%, the labor share of exiting firms is 6.43% and the difference in TFP between exiting firms
and incumbents is 14.09%.
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where yit stands for a set of explanatory variables. It is a dummy variable with value
one when a firm reports activity in period t and no activity in period t + 1 in the
exit specification. It is a quantitative variable measuring employment and/or capital
growth in the regressions for input growth. The regressor ss1t is a dummy variable
for the 1992-93 sudden stop, ss2t is a dummy variable for the 2009-13 sudden stop
and tfpit captures the log of firm-level productivity.
For the exit specification, the relationship between survival probability and pro-
ductivity is expected to be positive and, thus, β < 0. Under the cleansing hypothesis,
this correlation should strengthen during a sudden stop episode and one would antic-
ipate γ < 0 and θ < 0. Note that the sign of parameters δ and µ provide additional
insights regarding the interaction terms. They capture the change in exit rate during
the sudden stops that is not correlated with productivity. When positive, it suggests
that the increase in exit rates during the crises is disproportionately larger for the
least productive firms. For the input growth specification, the exact opposite applies.
Results of these regressions are summarized in Table 1.2. The first column shows
the relationship between productivity and the probability of exit. Consistent with
earlier findings, firms that exit the market tend to feature lower productivity levels.
Focusing on the interaction terms, there is evidence of a cleansing effect only during
the second episode. Based on the estimates, 2009-2013 is a period of increasing exit
rates, especially among the less productive firms. Note that while the coefficients δ
and γ have the correct sign, they are smaller in magnitude than µ and θ and, more
importantly, not statistically different from zero.
The second and third columns support further the predictions of the cleansing
hypothesis for the 2009-13 episode. First, note that there is a positive impact of
productivity on labor growth as predicted by the literature. Of greater interest, this
correlation is even higher during the second sudden stop. Together with the negative
sign of coefficient µ, there is evidence that high productivity levels somewhat shielded
firms from shrinking during the crisis years. The fourth and fifth columns show the
capital growth specifications for completeness. Results, however, are uninformative
with estimated coefficients displaying no statistical significance.
To further understand the quantitative relevance of my results, Figure 1.4 plots
the implied differences in exit probability and labor growth between two firms with
productivity level one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the
sectoral mean during normal times, the 1992-93 sudden stop and the 2009-13 sudden
stop. The difference in exit rates is 3.7% in the baseline scenario and increases during
sudden stops. While the increase is minor during the 1992-93 episode, up to 4.3%,
the implied difference almost doubles in the latter case, 7.1%. The magnitudes of
the difference for labor growth follow a similar pattern. The baseline gap between
a high productivity and low productivity firm is only of 0.9%, increasing to 1.1%
during the first sudden stop and up to 2.6% over the second. Note that results for
labor growth are robust to considering the subsample of continuing firms.
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Table 1.2: Reallocation and TFP
Exit Labor growth Labor growth Capital growth Capital growth
(continuers & exiters) (continuers only) (continuers & exiters) (continuers only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant 0.063*** 7.619*** 7.769*** 7.865 6.663
(0.002) (0.291) (0.276) (18.446) (20.579)
tfpit -0.041*** 0.980* 1.060** -11.489 -13.861
(0.005) (0.488) (0.498) (12.414) (14.679)
ss1t 0.005 -0.582 -0.842 -8.362 -10.654
(0.005) (0.886) (0.883) (13.137) (14.147)
ss1t ∗ tfpit -0.005 0.146 0.087 31.244 34.017
(0.010) (1.095) (1.203) (19.993) (22.383)
ss2t 0.023*** -7.115*** -6.811*** 44.912 51.477
(0.005) (0.813) (0.800) (57.399) (65.758)
ss2t ∗ tfpit -0.031*** 1.637** 1.804** -22.326 -29.809
(0.008) (0.737) (0.815) (34.927) (45.192)
Observations 34,854 30,861 28,275 30,861 28,275
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regression for exit is a linear probability model where exit=1 if the firm reports positive activity in
period t and no activity in period t+ 1. Employment and capital growth are measured from period t− 1 to
period t. tfpit is the log firm-level TFP, ss1t is a dummy equal to one for years 1992-1993 and ss
2
t is a dummy
equal to one for years 2009-2013. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by industry; ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.10.
Allocative efficiency Finally, I evaluate an additional theoretical channel through
which reallocation may contribute to TFP growth - increased allocative efficiency.
Consider the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) framework with a final good featuring a
CES production function in differentiated intermediates goods that are imperfectly
substitutable. Intermediate good producers have standard Cobb-Douglas production
technologies, with capital share α, and are subject to firm-specific exogenous wedges
that distort (i) output, τyit, and (ii) capital relative to labor, τ
k
it. The individual
intermediate good producer optimization problem delivers the following first-order
conditions with respect to labor, lit, and capital, kit:
MRPLit =
(
1− α
µ
)(
pityit
lit
)
=
(
1
1− τyit
)
wt ,
MRPKit =
(
α
µ
)(
pityit
kit
)
=
(
1 + τkit
1− τyit
)
rt ,
where pityit is firm nominal value added, wt is the cost of labor, rt is the cost of
capital and µ is the constant markup of price over marginal cost.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) formally show that aggregate TFP in this economy is
highest when resources are allocated optimally. This is achieved only if firms face
equal distortions and marginal revenue products above are equalized.39 Therefore,
the degree of dispersion in firm-specific distortions is informative of the degree of
misallocation in the economy. As distortions are unobservable in practice, I measure
the standard deviation of marginal revenue products as a proxy of allocative efficiency
and study its evolution over time. Periods of higher TFP should be associated with
39See Appendix 1.11.2 for a brief review of their argument.
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Figure 1.4: Differences between high and low productivity firms
(a) Exit rate
(b) Labor growth (continuers & exiters)
(b) Labor growth (only continuers)
Notes: This figure depicts the predicted difference in probability of exit (panel A, low minus high)
and the predicted difference in labor growth rate (panels B and C, high minus low) between a
firm one standard deviation above the sectoral mean and a firm one standard deviation below the
sectoral mean. Figures are computed from models estimated in Table 1.2.
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periods of lower marginal revenue product dispersion and differences in the results
for capital and labor can be interpreted as evidence of the different types of wedges
that prevail.
I set the capital share to be equal to 0.35 and the constant markup equal to
1.5 as in Gopinath et al. (2017). I first obtain sector-level measures of dispersion
in logs which I then aggregate into an economy-wide labor-weighted average using
time-invariant weights corresponding to the 2000-2014 labor share average.
Figure 1.5 reports the within-sector standard deviations of marginal revenue
products of capital and labor relative to 1990, which is normalized to one. The
dispersion of log MRPK is declining over time until the late 1990s when the trend
clearly reverses. During the 2000s there is a gradual increase in dispersion, with the
more pronounced hikes taking place from 2005 onwards. This is somewhat inter-
rupted during the recent crisis during which dispersion is reduce slightly with the
trend reverting back to the pre-crisis level by the end of the sample. The overall
description holds for the dispersion of log MRPL too, although the latter depicts
much larger volatility.
The increase in the dispersion of log MRPK during the pre-crisis had already
been documented by both Gopinath et al. (2017) and García-Santana et al. (2016)
using different datasets for the Spanish manufacturing sector. This result justifies
their focus on the role of capital misallocation. The difference here is the pattern of
log MRPL; while the former papers had reported a relatively flat (or even declining)
path, I find that it follows a similar, yet more pronounced, trend to that of log MRPK.
According to the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) framework, this should be interpreted as
evidence of changing external distortions that affect both factors of production.40
I argue, however, that internal distortions, such as heterogeneity in price markups,
would generate observationally equivalent patterns. Moreover, this is a more realistic
interpretation given that the constant markup assumption has been long rebated
by the industrial organization literature (see Syverson (2004) and De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) as examples). 41
In sum, the above findings call for a theory of sudden stops that features het-
erogeneously productive firms, selection into production and endogenous variables
markups. All of these elements, together with the exchange rate dimension, are
featured in the theoretical model that I develop in the next section.
1.5 Theoretical model
Consider an infinite-horizon small open economy. Time is discrete and indexed by
t. The economy is populated by a representative household that consumes goods
40In the model this is represented by an output distortion.
41See Fernández et al. (2015) for evidence on the evolution of Spanish price-cost markups for the
1995-2012 period.
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Figure 1.5: Evolution of allocative efficiency measures
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Notes: This figure plots the within-industry dispersion of the marginal revenue products of capital
and labor over time. The numbers depicted are relative to 1990, which is normalized to one.
Marginal revenue products are measured at the firm-level according to the Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) framework. Standard deviations at the sector level are aggregated using time-invariant
labor weights.
Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
and leisure and engages in financial transactions with foreign investors. There is
also a large number of differentiated firms that produce consumption goods using
labor supplied by the households, and a monetary authority that sets the nominal
exchange rate as the policy instrument.
1.5.1 A representative household
The representative household derives utility from leisure and the consumption of a
set of differentiated goods, indexed by ω, and supplies differentiated types of labor
input, indexed by i. The lifetime utility is given by:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
qt (ω) , L
i
t
)]
, (1.1)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information set available at
time t, β is the discount factor, qt(ω) is the consumption level of variety ω and Lit is
the labor supply of type i. The period utility function is assumed to be:
U
(
qt (ω) , L
i
t
)
= α
ˆ Nt
qt (ω) dω−1
2
γ
ˆ Nt
qt (ω)
2 dω−1
2
η
(ˆ Nt
qt (ω) dω
)2
−
ˆ 1
0
Lit di ,
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where Nt is the number of differentiated varieties available in the economy.
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) preferences are appealing for three reasons. First,
they capture love of variety through γ, which determines the level of product differ-
entiation between consumption goods and is assumed to be strictly positive. As γ
increases, consumers place higher weight on the distribution of consumption across
varieties. Second, the quadratic form gives rise to a linear demand function which
ensures the existence of a choke price and an extensive margin of production even in
the absence of fixed costs of production. Third, they generate endogenous variable
markups, which capture the effect of market competition on firm sales (the so-called
pro-competitive effect) as opposed to standard CES preferences.
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) preferences also depict a second consumption good,
which is homogeneous and assumed to be the numeraire, with a linear production
technology that pins down the wage in the economy. As endogenous fluctuations
in the wage level are relevant in this analysis, this feature of the original functional
form is inconvenient. Moreover, in the context of an internal devaluation, it is
also interesting to capture any changes in demand patterns that may arise from
movements in wages. My approach is to explicitly model the labor supply decision
by assuming preferences that are linear in leisure.42 The demand parameters α and
η therefore measure the substitutability between the consumption of differentiated
goods and leisure and are also assumed to be strictly positive.
The budget constraint of the representative agent in terms of domestic currency
can be written as:
ˆ Nt
pt (ω) qt (ω) dω + tBt =
ˆ 1
0
W itL
i
t di+ Πt + tRt−1Bt−1 , (1.2)
where W itLit is the income derived from supplying differentiated labor input i, Πt is
profit received from firms and t denotes the nominal exchange rate, defined as units
of domestic currency needed to buy one unit of foreign currency.
The representative household can only engage in financial transactions with for-
eign investors by trading in risk-free foreign denominated bonds Bt, which pay a
debt elastic rate of return:
Rt = R
∗
t + φ
(
eB¯−Bt − 1
)
+
(
eξt−1 − 1
)
, (1.3)
where R∗t is the world interest rate and B¯ is the steady state level of debt.43,44 The
only source of uncertainty is ξt, which is interpreted as a country risk premium shock,
42Given the quasi-linear functional form, there is no income effect for differentiated varieties.
However, changes in wages will affect demand through the substitution effect.
43 This debt-elasticity of the interest rate is assumed to ensure a stationary solution to the model
after detrending following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
44Households are not allowed to trade in domestic bonds in the baseline model for the sake of
simplicity. However, extending the model to include domestic bonds would be trivial as these would
be in zero net supply.
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similar to that of Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) and Drechsel and Tenreyro (2017), and
assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs. A sudden stop in the model is a positive
realization of ξt: an unexpected increase in the cost of international borrowing that
forces the domestic economy to deleverage internationally by expanding net exports.
Labor supply is differentiated: there is a unit continuum of labor types which
are imperfect substitutes between them. Firms can aggregate labor types according
to Lt = (
´ 1
0 L
i
t
θ−1
θ di)
θ
θ−1 , where θ measures the elasticity of substitution. I assume
that the representative household supplies all the differentiated labor inputs as in
Woodford (2011).45 Suppose, for example, that each member of the household spe-
cializes in one occupation. The representative household has monopoly power to set
the wage for each labor type, W it .
Each period the household chooses qt(ω), Bt, Lit andW it to maximize the expected
present discounted value of utility, equation (1.1), subject to the budget constraint,
equation (1.2), and the demand for type i labor input, which is given by:
Lit =
(
Wt
W it
)θ
Lt .
Optimality conditions Given quadratic preferences, it may be the case that not
all differentiated goods are demanded by the household. However, when a particular
good ω is consumed, its inverse demand is determined by:
α− γqt (ω)− ηQt = λtpt (ω) , (1.4)
where Qt is the consumption level over all varieties and λt is the time t Lagrangian
multiplier. Consumption of a given variety decreases with price, the marginal utility
of wealth and total consumption.
The optimal decision for the purchase of the foreign asset, Bt, delivers a standard
Euler equation:
λt = βRtEt
[
t+1
t
λt+1
]
. (1.5)
A higher interest rate and expectations of nominal exchange rate depreciation both
increase the returns from foreign investment and, thus, encourage consumer savings.
Solving for the optimal wage for labor type i gives:
W it =
θ
θ − 1
1
λt
. (1.6)
Intuitively, higher wages increase household’s wealth everything else equal. Given
diminishing marginal utility, the Lagrangian multiplier falls. Equation (1.6) also
implies that the optimal flexible wage is equalized across labor types i.e. Wt = W it .
45This is equivalent to assuming that each household specializes in the supply of one type of labor
input as long as there are equal number of households supplying each type.
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Finally, note that the representative household will be willing to satisfy firms’
labor demand as long as the real wage covers the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure:
Wt
Pt
≥ 1
(α− ηQt)Nt − γQt .
1.5.2 Firms
There is a continuum of measure M of domestic firms, each choosing to produce
a differentiated variety ω.46 Labor is the only factor of production and the unit
production cost is a concave function in the factor price i.e. Ct = W σt , where
0 < σ ≤ 1 is the labor income share.47 Firms only differ in the productivity level z
which is drawn from a Pareto distribution 1−G (z) = (1z )k with shape parameter k
and minimum productivity level equal to one.
The main focus of the paper is the short-run and, as such, cross-country reallo-
cation of firms is not allowed. 48 This implies that the number of potentially active
firms in the economy, M , is fixed and there is no free entry condition. Firms only
choose whether to produce or not in each period based on the profitability for the
corresponding period.
Firms can sell their varieties in both the domestic and the export market. Markets
are segmented and selling abroad requires incurring a per-unit trade cost τ > 1.
While domestic demand for variety z, qHt (z), is given by equation (1.4), the foreign
demand for a domestic variety z, q∗Ft (z), is given by:
q∗Ft (z) = A−Bp∗Ft (z) , (1.7)
where A and B are exogenous given a small-open economy setting. In the spirit
of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), Appendix 1.11.3 shows that this small
open economy is a special case of the two economy framework where the share of
potentially active firms in Home, n = MM+M∗ approaches zero.
49
46The same is true for the foreign economy: there is a continuum of measure M∗ potentially
active foreign firms.
47To rationalize this functional form, suppose there is a second factor of production, land, which
is inelastically supplied by households and the production function is Cobb-Douglas in land and
labor. If the rental price of land is assumed to be constant, the unit production cost is given by
Ct =
(
Wt
σ
)σ ( κ
1−σ
)1−σ
.
48Note that this is only true for the baseline set-up. In one of the extensions, I allow for firm
entry and exit and study long-run implications instead.
49In the limit z∗F is unaffected by changes in Home, the term A includes the price index, the
number of consumed varieties and the marginal utility of wealth in Foreign while the term B is
proportional to the marginal utility of wealth in Foreign.
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Optimality conditions The profit maximization problem delivers the following
set of first-order conditions:
qHt (z) = max
{
λt
γ
[
pHt (z)−
W σt
z
]
, 0
}
,
qFt (z) = max
{
λt
γ
[
pFt −
τt (W
∗
t )
σ
z
]
, 0
}
,
q∗Ft (z) = max
{
B
[
p∗Ft (z)−
τW σt
tz
]
, 0
}
,
where the expressions for domestically-consumed domestically-produced, henceforth
domestic goods, qHt (z), and exported goods, q∗Ft (z), are given by the optimization
of domestic firms while the expression for imported goods, qFt (z), results from the
optimization of foreign firms. Note that the corresponding prices are also derived
from the above expressions.
The labor demand for a domestic firm with productivity level z is given by:
Lt(z) =
σ
W 1−σt
qt(z)
z
, (1.8)
where qt(z) will be either qHt (z) or q∗Ft (z) depending on whether the labor input
hired will be used to serve the domestic or the export market.
1.5.3 Aggregation and market clearing
I aggregate firm-level variables and impose market clearing conditions as the building
blocks to define the competitive equilibrium.
Productivity thresholds Given that firm-level productivity follows a Pareto dis-
tribution, the aggregate productivity level for a given market is summarized by a
productivity threshold.50 This is simply the productivity level of the marginal firm
that is indifferent between producing or not for a specific market.
On the supply side, the zero profit condition holds for the marginal firm: it
optimally sets its price equal to its marginal cost. On the demand side, the linearity of
consumer’s demand gives rise to the existence of a choke price. This is the maximum
price that can be charged for a given variety at which demand is driven down to zero.
By combining these two conditions, the equilibrium thresholds can be expressed as:
zHt =
γ + ηNt
αγ 1λt + ηPt
W σt , (1.9)
zFt =
γ + ηNt
αγ 1λt + ηPt
τt(W
∗
t )
σ , (1.10)
z∗Ft =
B
A
τW σt
t
, (1.11)
50See Section 1.6 for the formal proof.
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where zHt is the productivity threshold for domestic firms serving the domestic mar-
ket, zFt is the importer threshold and z∗Ft is the exporter threshold. Given the small
open economy set-up, the productivity threshold for foreign firms serving the foreign
market, z∗Ht is exogenously determined and it is irrelevant for the analysis.
Number of firms The number of active firms in the domestic market, Nt is the
sum of domestic firms that serve the domestic market, NHt , plus the number of
foreign importers, NFt . Given the number of existing firms in both markets, M and
M∗, and the Pareto distribution assumption, the number of active firms is given by:
Nt = M
(
1
zHt
)k
+M∗
(
1
zFt
)k
, (1.12)
where
(
1
zH
)k is the probability that an incumbent has a productivity level above the
cutoff and, thus, generates positive profits. Note that because each firm specializes
in a particular variety, Nt is also the number of differentiated varieties available for
consumption in the small open economy.
Price level The aggregate price level is given by the sum of prices of all goods
consumed domestically, that is, prices of domestically produced goods consumed
domestically and import prices:
Pt = N
H
t
ˆ
zHt
pHt (z)
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz +NFt
ˆ
zFt
pFt (z)
g(z)
1−G(zFt )
dz .
Combined with the optimal price expressions that result from the firm’s maxi-
mization problem and the number of active firms in equilibrium, given by equation
(1.12), the above expression is considerably simplified to read:
Pt =
2k + 1
2k + 2
W σt Nt
zHt
. (1.13)
The aggregate price level is determined by the number of firms and the average
effective marginal cost. The former follows by definition, the latter from the individ-
ual firm’s optimization problem. Firms charge higher prices whenever their cost of
production increase. This is the case when the wage level is high but also when the
individual productivity level is low. As the average productivity level in the economy
depends positively on the domestic threshold, the aggregate price level decreases in
zHt .
Wage level I introduce nominal rigidities in the form of sticky information, as in
Mankiw and Reis (2002), in the wage setting process. The representative household
updates its information set for each labor type it supplies with a probability µ. The
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aggregate wage is then given by:
logWt = µ
∞∑
s=0
(1− µ)sEt−s
{
logW it
}
= log
θ
θ − 1 − µ
∞∑
s=0
(1− µ)sEt−s {log λt} .
(1.14)
A labor type that last updated its information set s periods ago chooses its wage
today to be equal to its s-periods-ago expectation of today’s flexible wage. Thus,
the aggregate wage is a weighted average of the current and all past expectations of
today’s desired wage. Expectations farther in the past are given less weight because
the share of labor types that are stuck with old information decays over time.
Labor market clearing To ensure that the labor market clears in equilibrium,
aggregate labor demand must equal aggregate labor supply. To aggregate domestic
individual labor demand given by equation (1.8), I sum across all active domestic
firms using the Pareto distribution assumption. Labor market clearing then boils
down to:
Lt =
k
(k + 1)(k + 2)
σ
W 1−2σt
M
[
λt
γ
(
zHt
)−(k+2)
+B
τ2
t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)]
. (1.15)
The balance of payments condition Combining some of the equilibrium con-
ditions above, together with the domestic firms’ aggregate profit equation and the
consumer’s budget constraint gives the aggregate resource constraint of the economy,
which, in an open-economy setting, is simply the balance of payments condition. In
other words, it states that the current account must be equal to the capital account
in equilibrium:
EXt − IMt = t (Bt −RtBt−1) , (1.16)
where EMt and IMt, the total export and import revenues in domestic currency
terms, are given by:
IMt =
ˆ NFt
pFt (ω) q
F
t (ω) dω =
1
k + 2
M∗
λt
γ
(τt (W
∗
t )
σ)2
2
(
zFt
)−(k+2)
, (1.17)
EXt = t
ˆ N∗Ft
p∗Ft (ω) q
∗F
t (ω) dω =
1
k + 2
M
B
2
(τW σt )
2
t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)
. (1.18)
1.5.4 Exchange rate policy
To pin down the nominal variables of the model, I need to determine exchange rate
policy. Suppose the central bank implements monetary policy by setting the nom-
inal exchange rate. I consider two exchange rate regimes characterized by different
targeting rules. First, consider a currency union. This is equivalent to assuming that
the central bank can perfectly commit to a currency peg in which t = 1 at every
period t.
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Second, assume a policy of strict zero wage inflation targeting. This rule sim-
ply offsets all the distortions originating from nominal rigidities in the economy by
implementing the flexible wage equilibrium, which is given by equation (1.6). Any
movements in the real exchange rate will translate one-to-one into movements in
the nominal exchange rate. This is the equivalent to a floating arrangement in this
framework.51
1.5.5 Equilibrium
I am now ready to define a rational expectations equilibrium as a set of stochastic pro-
cesses {zHt , zFt , z∗Ft , IMt, EXt, Lt, Nt, Bt, Rt, Pt, λt,Wt}∞t=0 satisfying equations (1.3),
(1.5), and (1.9)-(1.18) given the exogenous process {ξt}∞t=0 and the central bank’s
policy {t}∞t=0. The foreign wage, W ∗t , is normalized to one.
Appendix 1.11.3 discusses the existence and uniqueness of the non-stochastic
steady state.
1.6 Sudden stops and productivity
Before proceeding to the full characterization of the model’s solution, it is useful to
build some intuition on the potential impact of a sudden stop on productivity. A
sudden stop episode forces a real exchange rate depreciation in the domestic econ-
omy. This implies a nominal exchange rate depreciation, an internal devaluation or a
combination of both depending on the exchange rate policy in place. To ease under-
standing, I redefine a sudden stop directly as either an exogenous fall in wages, if in
the currency union regime, or as an exogenous increase in the nominal exchange rate,
if in the floating arrangement. In other words, I disregard the balance of payment
condition, given by equation (1.16), for this section and study a version of the model
with a partial equilibrium flavour.
1.6.1 Aggregate productivity
The variable of interest is domestic aggregate productivity, which is given by:
ZHt = N
H
t
ˆ ∞
zHt
Ω(z) z
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz ,
51The exchange rate policy defined here can be easily generalized by assuming a rule such that:
(Πwt )
φW (t)
1−φW = 1 , (1.19)
where Πwt = WtWt−1 is wage inflation and 0 ≤ φw ≤ 1 is the weight that the monetary authority
puts on wage stabilization. A currency union and a strict wage inflation target are the two extreme
versions of this rule, with φw set equal to zero and one respectively.
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where Ω(z) is the weight used in the aggregation. It must satisfy:
NHt
ˆ ∞
zHt
Ω(z)
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz = 1 .
Aggregate productivity is normally computed as: (i) the unweighted average,
Ω(z) = 1
NHt
; (ii) the output-weighted average, Ω(z) = q(z)
QHt
; or (iii) the revenue-
weighted average, Ω(z) = r(z)
RHt
. 52 The following Lemma establishes that zHt is the
key statistic for measuring aggregate productivity independent of the weights used
in the aggregation.
Lemma 1. Domestic aggregate productivity, ZHt , is an increasing function of the
domestic productivity threshold, zHt .
Proof. See Appendix 1.11.4
In other words, changes in productivity in this model are governed by firms’
entry and exit dynamics. This is in contrast to alternatives in the literature that
either model productivity as an exogenous shock to the economy, allow for variable
capacity utilization or consider R&D decisions.
Note further that, given Lemma 1, the terms (domestic) aggregate productivity
and (domestic) productivity threshold, zHt , are used interchangeably for the rest of
this section.
1.6.2 Pro-competitive, cost and demand channels
The productivity threshold is determined by the number of firms in the market, the
cost of production and the level of consumer demand; all three are potentially subject
to change during a sudden stop episode. Let Xˆt define the log deviation of Xt and
X¯ be its value at steady state.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium:
zˆHt =
1
2k + 2
η
αγ
N¯λ¯W¯ σ
z¯H
Nˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pro-competitive
+ σWˆt︸︷︷︸
Cost
+ λˆt︸︷︷︸
Demand
.
52QHt is total domestic output given by:
QHt = N
H
t
ˆ ∞
zHt
q(z)
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz ,
and RHt is total domestic revenue given by:
RHt = N
H
t
ˆ ∞
zHt
r(z)
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz .
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Proof. See Appendix 1.11.4
The intuition follows next. In the first place, a larger number of active firms in
the market, Nˆt > 0, implies greater competition. Given the preferences considered,
enhanced competition lowers individual firm demand. This forces less productive
firms out of the market as profit margins are reduced at every level of productivity.
This pro-competitive effect was first introduced by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) that
only considers competition in the goods market.
Second, a higher aggregate wage, Wˆt > 0, lowers the firm’s profit margin by
increasing the costs to all firms. Again, a higher productivity level is then required
to remain profitable and select into production, therefore, aggregate productivity
increases. This is what I denote the cost effect, which is the underlying mechanism
in the canonical Melitz (2003) model that focuses on competition in the labor market.
Finally, higher aggregate demand from consumers, λˆt < 0, raises individual firm
demand at all productivity levels and loosens the minimum productivity requirement.
Less productive firms have a higher chance of entering or surviving in the market.
This final channel, a novelty of this model, is referred to as the demand effect.53.
1.6.3 Sudden stops and productivity
The following proposition considers the effect of a sudden stop, defined as explained
above, on productivity under the two alternative exchange rate regimes.
Proposition 2. Given a sudden stop,
1. In a floating arrangement, only the pro-competitive channel operates and pro-
ductivity falls:
Nˆt < 0, Wˆt = 0 and λˆt = 0 so that zˆHt < 0 .
2. In a currency union, all three channel operate and the change in productivity
is ambiguous:
Nˆt < 0, Wˆt < 0 and λˆt > 0 so that zˆHt ≷ 0 .
Proof. See Appendix 1.11.4
First, suppose that the nominal exchange rate depreciates one-to-one with the
real exchange rate, i.e. t increases. Under this assumption, the cost and the demand
effect are muted as the wage level remains unchanged. There is a fall, however, in the
53There is an implicit demand effect in the baseline Melitz (2003) model too. However, the
assumption of fixed production costs introduces an additional fixed cost channel (on top of the
variable cost channel here considered) that exactly offsets the demand effect.
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active number of firms in the domestic economy as the number of importers declines
with the loss of competitiveness of foreign firms. There is an unambiguous fall in
productivity as a result of this negative pro-competitive effect.
Suppose instead that the aggregate wage adjusts completely: Wt falls while the
nominal exchange rate remains unchanged. Under this alternative scenario, the
negative pro-competitive effect prevails as there is still a decline in importing firms.
The change in wages, in addition, leads to a negative cost effect, production of goods
is cheaper, and a negative demand effect, households consume less.54 In other words,
all three channels are operating.
1.6.4 Increasing TFP in a currency union
The change in productivity after a sudden stop is ambiguous in the currency union
and depends on parameter values. It is possible, nonetheless, to show under which
parameterization, the demand effect dominates and productivity increases.
Corollary 1. Following a sudden stop in a currency union, a sufficient condition
for zˆHt > 0 is that 1 > µσ(1 + k).
Proof. See Appendix 1.11.4
There are three key parameters for this condition to hold: the share of labor
income, σ, the degree of wage rigidities, µ, and the shape parameter of the produc-
tivity distribution, k. The share of labor income governs the mapping between the
wage level and the unit production cost. As σ increases, labor represents a greater
share of the optimal input bundle and falling wages cheapen production costs by
more. This reinforces the cost effect of a sudden stop. In the Melitz (2003) model,
the cost channel is at its strongest featuring a linear production function which is
linear in labor, σ = 1.
The degree of wage rigidities determines the size of the demand effect. A sud-
den stop here is simply an improvement in the domestic economy’s competitiveness
through an exogenous decline in the wage level. As the level of wage stickiness
increases and fewer labor-types are allowed to adjust, the decline in labor-specific
wages, W it , that is required to achieve the desired overall wage adjustment is larger.
This leads to a larger decrease in today’s consumer wealth and, thus, a stronger
demand effect of a sudden stop.
The shape parameter measures the concentration of firms at the lower end of the
productivity distribution. This represents the inverse of the dispersion in firm-level
productivity. As firms only differ in their productivity levels, if k increases, they
become more homogeneous. This strengthens the pro-competitive channel by tight-
ening the link between the number of firms and the degree of market power among
54Recall that a negative demand effect is represented by a positive change in λˆt.
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domestic competitors. The less unique a firm is, the more increased competition will
lower its individual demand.
Two questions remain unanswered. First, is the above requirement satisfied un-
der reasonable parameterization? Second, do these results hold in the fully fledged
model? In what follows I discuss how to calibrate and solve for the general equilib-
rium version of the model.
1.7 Taking the model to the data
As the model cannot be solved analytically, I next explore its properties by gen-
erating impulse response functions, focusing exclusively on a risk premium shock
and studying the role of specific parameters in shaping the TFP result.However, to
take the model to the data, I first need to redefine one assumption and calibrate
parameters using Spanish data.
1.7.1 Number of existing firms
The baseline model described in Section 1.5 is augmented to better suit the analysis
that follows. In particular, the number of existing firms is allowed to vary. While
this modification improves the predictive performance of the model in general equi-
librium, it does not change the main conclusions derived in the previous sections as
shown in full detail in Appendix 1.11.5.
The pool of potentially active firms, M , which is assumed to be constant in the
benchmark case, now responds to a sudden stop to circumvent the production boom
that the model would otherwise generate.55 This feature of the baseline model is
common to many other papers in the sudden stop literature. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009)
show that standard models that abstract from financial frictions are unable to repro-
duce observed decreases in output. The literature has considered featuring imported
intermediate goods, labor frictions, variable capacity utilization, Greenwood et al.
(1988) preferences, and exogenous TFP declines. Given the new extensive margin
introduced in the model, I instead assume a law of motion for the number of existing
firms such that in log deviation terms:
Mˆt = −ρˆt − (1− ρ)Wˆt .
The interpretation is the following: additional labor, domestic or foreign, is required
to set up a new firm and, thus, the pool of potentially active firms depends negatively
on the cost of labor input, either the domestic wage, t, or the foreign wage in do-
mestic currency units, t. The parameter ρ measures the degree of complementarity
between domestic and foreign labor in setting up new firms.
55Note this is true independently of the exchange rate policy that is implemented.
44
This assumption captures, in essence, some of the implications of the long-run
version of the baseline model. Further details of the full extension together with
results are available in Section 1.8.3. In short, the long-run version features a fixed
input requirement in the form of capital for the production of any differentiated
variety. Capital is produced under perfect competition and accumulated through
an investment decision. This follows closely Ottaviano (2012) in putting Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) in a DSGE framework. The only difference is that the fixed input
requirement is assumed to be a combination of domestic and foreign capital and,
therefore, the number of potentially active firms depends on the price of both types
of capital i.e. domestic wages and the exchange rate. The law of motion above builds
on this relationship, however, it does not take into account the dynamic optimization
problem that the long-run version entails.
1.7.2 Calibration
Table 1.3 provides a summary of the parameters of the model, their baseline values
and the source or the empirical target. The first set of parameters are standard
and, thus, values are set in line with the literature and, when possible, consistent
with Spanish statistics taking the 2002-2008 period as a reference. The time period
of the model is a quarter. Accordingly, the discount factor β is chosen to be 0.99.
The output elasticity parameter σ is set to 0.64, roughly the average labor share and
within the range that is common in the literature. For the elasticity of substitution for
labor types and the index of wage rigidities, values are taken from Galí and Monacelli
(2016) which are based on empirical studies on European countries conducted by the
OECD. In terms of trade costs, τ is equal to 1.3 following Melitz and Ghironi (2005)
and many others. The steady state level of debt, B¯, is assumed to be zero, such that
trade is balanced in steady state. Regarding the preference parameters, α, γ and η,
I borrow the values used in Ottaviano (2012), all equal to 10.
The ESEE firm-level data presented in Section 2 is then used to estimate the
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, following the approach proposed by
Del Gatto et al. (2006). Given the observed cumulative distribution, G(z), I run the
following regression for every year and industry:
ln (1−G (z)) = β0 + β1ln (z) + η
where, assuming a Pareto distribution, the slope coefficient, β1 provides a consistent
estimator for k. For the 2002-2008 period, k is estimated to be, on average, equal
to 1.9, close to Del Gatto et al. (2006)’s result of 2 for a combination of European
countries in the year 2000. In addition, the regression R2, which is equal to 0.7,
confirms that the Pareto distribution is a reasonable assumption in this setting.
The above estimation provides an additional coefficient, β0, that maps one-to-one
to the realized distribution’s cutoff, z¯H . I use the corresponding 2002-2008 average as
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Table 1.3: Calibration
Parameter Value Calibration target/source
β Discount factor 0.99 Annual real return on bonds is 4%
µ Index of wage rigidity 0.2 Gali and Monacelli (2016)
θ Elasticity of substitution (labor) 4.3 Gali and Monacelli (2016)
τ Iceberg trade cost 1.3 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
γ Preference parameter 10 Ottaviano (2012)
α Preference parameter 10 Ottaviano (2012)
η Preference parameter 10 Ottaviano (2012)
B¯ Steady state level of debt 0 Steady state trade balance
σ Labor share 0.64 National Accounts Spain
n Relative size of SOE 0.12 Business Demographic Statistics
k Shape productivity parameter 1.9 Estimated from ESEE data
A Foreign demand parameter 0.01 Domestic productivity cutoff (1.55 )
B Foreign demand parameter 0.33 Share of exporting firms (63.6%)
M¯ Number of total firms 173 Active domestic firms (75.86)
φ Risk premium parameter 3.2 Output volatility (3%)
a first moment target in two different ways. On the one hand, I combine it with the
2002-2008 average number of firms in the ESEE sample to back up the value of M¯
given that the number of potentially active firms is unobservable. The corresponding
expression is given by M¯ =
(
z¯H
)k
N¯H .
On the other hand, I use z¯H to determine the value of the foreign demand param-
eters, A and B. To do so I proceed in three steps. First, I set the relative size of the
domestic economy, n, to match the 12% share of all Euroarea manufacturing firms
that Spanish firms represent according to Eurostat’s Business Demography Statis-
tics. Next, I take the average 2002-08 propensity to export as an additional first
moment target which combined with z¯H pins down z¯∗F as N¯
∗F
N¯H
=
(
z¯H
z¯∗F
)k
. Third,
I back up the wage level that is consistent with the estimated cutoff using a com-
bination of equilibrium conditions (1.9), (1.10), (1.13) and (1.12) in steady state.
Parameter values for A and B then follow naturally using equation (1.11) and the
trade balance condition.
The risk premium parameter, φ, is a theoretical shortcut to ensure stationarity
in small open economy frameworks. In the current setting, it measures the severity
of the current account reversal given a one standard deviation shock. Thus, I choose
its value such that the second theoretical moment of output during a sudden stop
exactly matches its empirical counterpart, 3% for the 2009-2013 period. Finally,
as there is no obvious candidate value for the degree of complementarity between
foreign and domestic labor in setting up new firms, I consider an intermediate case,
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ρ = 0.5.
1.7.3 Impulse Responses Functions
Figure 1.6 summarizes the model response of key macroeconomic variables to a sud-
den stop. All variables, but the current account, are expressed in log deviations from
steady state. The current account is expressed in levels as trade balance is assumed
to hold before the realization of the shock.
Figure 1.6: Macroeconomic effects of a sudden stop
Notes. These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation
shock to the country-specific risk premium. All variables but the current account are expressed
in log deviations from steady state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is
expressed in levels.
As expected, a sudden stop is characterized by a depreciation of the real exchange
rate and a current account surplus. The model is able to predict a slight delay in
the adjustment within a currency union. This is entirely driven by nominal rigidities
as the model disregards additional policy instruments available within a currency
union, such as public capital inflows, that might directly cushion the adjustment in
the data.
The path of TFP diverges across regimes. On the one hand, under the baseline
calibration, the negative effect of a lower aggregate demand offsets the positive effect
of lower production costs and fewer competing firms on the domestic productivity
cutoff and, thus, TFP improves in the currency union. On the other hand, produc-
tivity falls unambiguously in the floating regime. I study the sensitivity of these
results to alternative parameter values in the following section.
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GDP and consumption are both measured in units of foreign currency to ease
comparison with Figures 1.1 and 1.2. The model correctly predicts a fall in both
variables and under both regimes. Moreover, for a similar GDP decline, the fall
in consumption is larger in the currency union, consistent with the aggregate data.
The response of employment does not fully match the data: while the event study in
Section 1.3 suggests employment in a floating arrangement is unchanged or slightly
decreasing, the model predicts a minor increase. On the other hand, there is a clear
decline in employment within a currency union both in the model and in the data.
Impulse response functions for all other endogenous variables can be found in
Figure 1.10. The current account surplus is explained by a simultaneous increase in
export and decline in imports. In the currency union, there is an immediate decline
in the price index while wages fall in a staggered fashion. In the floating regime, the
exchange rate depreciates on impact with wages and prices remaining unchanged. In
both regimes, the number of firms and, thus, the number of varieties falls with the
shock.
1.7.4 Sensitivity of the TFP fact
The analytical results of Section 1.6 point to three structural parameters as the main
determinants of the overall response of TFP: the degree of wage rigidities, ω, the share
of labor income, σ, and the shape parameter of the productivity distribution, k. I
next embed the analysis within the general equilibrium framework.
The upper left graph of Figure 1.7 plots the immediate impact of TFP, in log de-
viations from steady state, for both the currency union and the floating arrangement
regimes for 0.1 ≤ ω ≤ 0.9. By definition, under the floating arrangement wages are
stabilized completely and, thus, there is no effect of wage frictions whatsoever. For
the currency union, nevertheless, higher wage flexibility (higher ω) leads to a smaller
increase in TFP.56
The upper right graph of Figure 1.7 decomposes the effect of a sudden stop on
TFP into the demand, pro-competitive and cost effects for the currency union as
defined in Proposition 1.57 As wages become more flexible, the unit production cost
falls by more. The opposite is true for the demand effect: when more labor types are
allowed to adjust their wages, the labor-specific wage declines by less and, thus, the
required increase in marginal utility of wealth is smaller i.e. the positive contribution
of negative demand shrinks. The magnitude of the pro-competitive effect also varies
with the degree of wage flexibility. The intuition relies on second round effects: as
wages fall by more and the increase in productivity cutoff is smaller, the reduction
in the number of competitor declines and the pro-competitive effect weakens.
56While Figure 1.7 depicts the immediate effect of a sudden stop shock on TFP, conclusions
remain true if the cumulative effect on TFP is considered. Results available upon request.
57Note that for the floating arrangement it is still the case that only the pro-competitive channel
operates.
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Panels (b) and (c) perform the same exercise for 0.1 ≤ σ ≤ 0.9 and 1.5 ≤ k ≤ 2.5
correspondingly. On the one hand, as the share of labor falls, the drop in wages that is
required to regain international competitiveness increases substantially in a currency
union. The greater the fall in wages, the stronger the demand effect and the larger the
improvement in TFP. Once again, there is little change in the floating arrangement
as the adjustment of the exchange rate is not affected by the production structure
of the economy. On the other hand, the shape parameter measures the relative
number of low-productivity firms; as it increases, there is a higher concentration of
firms in the lower end of the productivity scale. According to the results depicted
in Figure 1.7, the behavior of TFP is robust, even in quantitative terms, to different
parameterizations of k. Although the size of pro-competitive effect increases with k,
as anticipated in Section 1.6, in general equilibrium there is an offsetting increase in
the demand effect.
1.8 Extensions
This section briefly introduces a number of extensions to the baseline framework and
discusses how the previous results are affected.
1.8.1 A model with capital
The analysis has so far abstracted from the role of capital. This is due to two
reasons: first, there is already a number of papers (Reis (2013), García-Santana et al.
(2016) and Gopinath et al. (2017)) which have extensively studied the role of physical
capital in the context of capital flows. Instead, this paper aims at incorporating an
alternative yet complementary explanation to the discussion. Second, the firm-level
evidence presented in Section 1.4 is supportive of theories that focus on the composite
variable input, and not only on capital. Nonetheless, this extension incorporates
explicitly pre-installed physical capital as a second factor of production.
The setting is standard: the production function is Cobb-Douglas in labor, Lt,
and pre-installed capital, Kt−1. Capital goods are owned by the representative con-
sumer and rented to firms in exchange of a rental rate κt. The stock of capital
accumulates driven by the investment decision by the representative consumer and
the rate at which it depreciates, δ. Appendix 1.11.6 formalizes this extension and
provides details on the resulting equilibrium conditions.
Figure 1.11 plots the impulse responses of GDP, consumption, employment, pro-
ductivity, the current account and the real exchange rate index to a sudden stop shock
as defined above. The differences in TFP response across regimes is still noticeable.
However, the dynamics depicted do not match those in Figure 1.6 completely. For
example, in a currency union the reversal of the current account only holds on im-
pact, net exports fall shortly after and stabilize at a negative level. The rest of
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Figure 1.7: The TFP fact - robustness to alternative calibrations
(a) The role of wage rigidities
(b) The role of the labor share
(c) The role of the shape parameter
Notes: This figure documents the sensitivity of the TFP fact to different model parameterizations.
Panel (a) focuses on different degrees of wage rigidities - higher ω implies lower rigidities. Panel
(b) allows for plausible calibrations of the labor share - higher σ implies a larger labor share. Panel
(c) explores alternative values of the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution - higher k implies
lower dispersion of productivity draws. The first column plots the immediate response of TFP to
a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium in log deviations terms. The
second column breaks down the immediate response of TFP into the demand, the pro-competitive
and the cost channels as defined by Proposition 1.50
macroeconomic variables behave as predicted. In a floating regime, the reversal lasts
slightly longer and as long as the current account is positive, the qualitative results
of Figure 1.6 hold. For completeness, Figure 1.12 plots the impulse response of the
three new variables: investment, price of capital and the unit cost of production.
1.8.2 Extensive versus intensive margin
To account for the decline in firm-level TFP growth observed during the two Spanish
sudden stops reported in Section 1.4, I augment the baseline model by assuming that
firms’ effectiveness in transforming inputs into output depends on (i) an aggregate
time-varying component, Zt; and (ii) a constant firm-specific component, z. The
former is represented as an AR(1) process in logs and the latter is drawn from a
Pareto distribution as in the baseline setting.
A sudden stop is redefined as a positive realization of the country-specific risk
premium, ξt, with a simultaneous negative shock to the aggregate component of
firm productivity, Zt. Details of the formalization of this extension are relegated to
Appendix 1.11.6. The predicted response of macroeconomic variables is unchanged,
at least qualitatively, as depicted by Figure 1.13.
The main difference involves the variable of interest: aggregate domestic produc-
tivity. While in the baseline set-up it was sufficient to measure the effect of a sudden
stop on the domestic productivity threshold as summarized by Lemma 1; under the
new framework, the common component, Zt, also affects aggregate TFP directly.
Figure 1.14 decomposes the effect of a sudden stop on aggregate productivity into
the contribution of the productivity threshold (the extensive margin) and that of the
common shock (the intensive margin). The right panel fully matches the 2009-13
sudden stop as summarized by Table 1.1. Firm-level TFP is declining over time,
however, the exit of unproductive firms completely counteracts the negative effect
and productivity increases overall. The left panel is only partly in line with the
1992-93 episode. While Table 1.1 shows a decline in firm-level TFP, the observed
contribution of the extensive margin is negligible instead of negative as predicted by
the model.
1.8.3 Long-run analysis
This extension studies a long-run version of the baseline model that fully endogenizes
the number of existing firms,Mt, in line with Ottaviano (2012). The previous frame-
work is augmented by (i) allowing for investment in capital shares; (ii) introducing
a new sector that produces capital; and (iii) imposing a fixed input requirement in
terms of capital in the production of differentiated varieties.
In particular, the representative consumer is allowed to buy shares, xt, of the
economy’s capital stock, Kt, at price Vt. While capital is assumed to fully depreciate
after one period; the investment entitles the representative consumer to a fraction of
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next period’s aggregate firm profit. The consumer budget constraint is correspond-
ingly adjusted to read:
ˆ Nt
pt (ω) qt (ω) dω + tBt + xtVtKt =
ˆ 1
0
W itL
i
t di+ xt−1Πt + tRt−1Bt−1 .
Capital is supplied under perfect competition by a second sector in the economy.
A new unit of capital is produced by combining domestic and foreign units of labor
using a Cobb-Douglas production technology: Kt =
(
lk,Ht
)ρ (
lk,Ft
)1−ρ
. 58 Given
the fixed capital requirement, the production of capital determines how many firms
will be able to enter the market, Mt = KtfE . There is a one-period-time-to-build-lag
such that firms that enter at time t, will only be able to produce, provided that they
satisfy the corresponding productivity threshold condition, in period t+ 1.
Appendix 1.11.6 describes in greater detail the full equilibrium of this version of
the model. It is relevant, however, to highlight one key new optimality condition
that emerges from this set-up:
Mt =
(
ρ
Wt
)ρ(1− ρ
t
)1−ρ
βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Πt+1
]
. (1.20)
Intuitively, a lower price of capital encourages investment and increases the num-
ber of existing firms. As capital is produced under perfect competition, price is equal
to marginal cost and, thus, a function of the price of both types of labor. The price
of foreign labor is equal to the foreign wage, which is normalized to one, in domestic
currency units i.e. the nominal exchange rate. This relationship is captured in re-
duced form by the law of motion proposed in Section 1.7. In addition, the number
of existing firms is also dependent on the discounted expected profits, as profits rep-
resent the return on capital investment. This inter-temporal dimension is missing in
the previous analysis, however, solving for this long-run version of the model shows
that the main conclusions derived above hold.
Figure 1.15 plots the impulse responses of the same variables as the original
Figure 1.6, following a sudden stop. The predictions are qualitatively unchanged.
The shape of responses is slightly changed because of the delay in adjustment caused
by the new timing assumption. The only remarkable difference refers to the relative
ordering of GDP and the real exchange rate: in this version, GDP falls by more in the
floating arrangement while the real depreciation is less pronounced in the currency
union. The opposite is true in the baseline results.
58I deviated from Ottaviano (2012) in two ways. First, I introduce foreign labor in the production
of capital to ensure a direct role for the nominal exchange rate in firm entry. Second, I consider that
while capital fully depreciates, all new units of capital are available for production the following
period. The timing is slightly adjusted: investment takes places, next period firms are set-up and
capital depreciates.
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1.9 Welfare
Once that the model has proved to correctly capture the macroeconomic dynamics
that follow a sudden stop episode under the two alternative policy regimes in Section
1.7, it can then be used to conduct normative analysis.
1.9.1 Output loss
I evaluate the performance of exchange rate regimes by comparing the cumulative
real output loss resulting from a sudden stop. The reason is two-fold: first, pref-
erences in the model are non-standard, rendering utility-based measures of welfare
controversial. Second, output can be easily measured in the empirical data and it is
explicitly targeted by policymakers all around the world.
In greater detail, I compute the discounted sum of percentage deviations of real-
ized output from its steady state level following a one standard deviation shock to
the country-specific risk premium:
output loss =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Yt − Y¯
Y¯
)
,
Figure 1.8 plots the ratio of the cumulative output loss of a sudden stop under a
currency union to that under a floating arrangement for different degrees of nominal
rigidities, with 1 − ω = 0 representing a world of perfectly flexible wages. If the
ratio is above one, the floating arrangement generates a lower output loss than the
currency union and viceversa. Results of the model are summarized by the blue
solid line. As can be seen, the desirability of the floating arrangement is increasing
in wage stickiness. However, for a wide range of nominal rigidity levels, a currency
union performs better in output loss terms.
The second result might feel counter-intuitive since I have argued that in the
currency union productivity increases through a welfare-diminishing mechanism: a
fall in domestic demand. It is key, however, to understand that a fall in wages and
a rise in nominal exchange rates have opposing effects on the number of existing
firms, Mt. While the former increases Mt by cheapening domestic labor, the latter
decreases Mt by making foreign labor more expensive. In a currency union, the
increase in Mt can partly cushion the fall in the number of active domestic firms,
Ndt =
Mt
(zHt )
k , resulting from the increased productivity requirement. If this effect
is big enough, the cumulative loss of output is actually smaller than in a floating
arrangement as the negative impact of the sudden stop on Ndt is reduced.
To give a sense of how far the calibrated economy is from the indifference point,
where the ratio is exactly one, the shaded area in Figure 1.8 displays the range of
values of wage stickiness that have been used by the literature. While the baseline
calibration of ω is purposely conservative, 1−ω = 0.8, micro-evidence from the ECB
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Wage Dynamic Networks has found that the quarterly frequency of unconditional
wage adjustments ranges between 20% and 35% i.e. 1−ω ∈ (0.65, 0.8). 59 According
to this, which policy regime generates lower output losses after a sudden stop remains
an unsettled question.
The Friedman view How do these findings compare to the inherited wisdom on
the fixed versus floating debate? The standard case for flexible exchange rates, as
first proposed by Friedman (1953), can be summarized in two claims. First, in a
world of perfectly flexible wages, a nominal depreciation and an internal devaluation
would lead to the same economic outlook. Second, it is the pervasiveness of nominal
rigidities, however, that justifies the desirability of floating: when prices do not
adjust, quantities do, thus, the lack of wage adjustment in fixed exchange rate regimes
leads to suboptimal unemployment and output loss.
To capture the predictions of this traditional view, I modify the baseline model
in two ways: shutting down entry and exit firm dynamics and imposing linear pro-
duction in labor. The former requires featuring a fixed number of homogeneous firms
in terms of productivity.60 The latter consists of setting the labor share, σ, equal to
one. The resulting output loss ratio is depicted by the red dashed line in Figure 1.8,
an upward-sloping convex curve that starts at exactly the indifference point. Consis-
tent with the two claims above, a floating arrangement always performs better; with
the exception of a perfectly flexible wage world, in which the floating arrangement
is equivalent to a currency union.
In short, the normative implications of the model match the second claim of the
standard argument but disagree regarding the first: it is still the case that increases
in wage stickiness are relatively more harmful within currency unions; but accounting
for firm dynamics, makes a currency union more desirable if wages are sufficiently
flexible.
1.9.2 Other welfare-relevant measures
Findings are robust to considering an alternative performance measure: consumption
loss. Figure 1.16 plots the ratio of the cumulative consumption loss of a sudden stop
under a currency union v.s. a floating arrangement for different degrees of nominal
rigidities. The cumulative consumption loss is computed as explained above. The
shape of the two curves remains unchanged: both are increasing and convex with the
plot representing the Friedman view starting at exactly one. The main difference,
however, lies on the relative steepness. Wage rigidities are increasingly more harmful
in terms of consumption relative to output losses for the Friedman view while the
59See Druant et al. (2009) and Le Bihan et al. (2012).
60A more detailed description of this version of the model together with the corresponding equi-
librium conditions can be found in Appendix 1.11.6.
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Figure 1.8: Currency union versus floating arrangement
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the output loss under a currency union to the output loss under
a floating arrangement following a sudden stop. The output loss is calculated as the discounted sum
of output log deviations after a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk premium.
The blue solid line refers to the baseline model. The red dashed line refers to a version of the model
with no firm dynamics (firms are homogeneous and the number of firms is constant) and linear
production in labor (σ = 1). The shaded area shows the range of plausible values for the wage
rigidity parameter as discussed by the literature.
opposite is true for the baseline model. In addition, the indifference point in Figure
1.16 takes place at a higher level of wage stickiness.
Finally, for completeness, I also compute a utility-based measure of welfare as it
is standard in the literature. As there is no closed-form representation of the welfare
function, I evaluate welfare losses numerically. In particular, I compute the fraction
of labor, λL, that equates the conditional expectation of future utility along the
equilibrium as of time zero to its value in the non-stochastic steady state.61,. The
interpretation is the following: the welfare loss associated to a sudden stop under
a given exchange rate regime is the extra amount of labor that the consumer is
willing to supply (amount of leisure given up) in steady state to remain indifferent
between a world with and without a sudden stop episode. λL is implicitly given by
the expression:
61As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I consider the conditional rather than the unconditional
expectation because different policy regimes tend to have different stochastic steady states. Note
that although this strategy computes the constrained policy rule associated with a particular initial
state of the economy, this is precisely the state that is of interest for my analysis: the non-stochastic
steady state.
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E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU (qrt (ω) , L
r
tz)
]
= U (q (ω) , (1 + λL)L) , (1.21)
where qrt (ω) and Lrt represent the optimal consumption and labor supply paths
associated to a particular exchange rate policy r and the right-hand side term mea-
sures utility at the non-stochastic steady state. The left-hand side of equation (1.21)
is approximated to second-order.
Figure 1.17 shows the corresponding welfare loss ratio, which follows closely the
pattern depicted by Figure 1.16. This should not be surprising provided that con-
sumption enters the utility function and, thus, determines the welfare measure di-
rectly.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper revisits a classical question in International Macroeconomics: how does
exchange rate policy affect macroeconomic performance after a shock? While the
literature has commonly praised the advantages of exchange rate flexibility, it has
often overlooked the response of productivity. I study the question anew in the
context of a sudden stop, emphasizing the divergence in TFP patterns that emerges
across exchange rate regimes in the aggregate data and relating them to observed
differences in firm dynamics at the micro-level.
The empirical analysis of the paper delivers two main findings. First, TFP sys-
tematically collapses under a flexible exchange rate arrangement while it improves,
albeit moderately, within a currency union. Second, the difference in productivity
growth is largely explained by the reallocation of resources from unproductive exiting
firms to productive survivors. While this cleansing effect is quantitatively noticeable
after an internal devaluation, it is absent during a nominal depreciation in the cases
considered here.
I develop a model that is able to rationalize these empirical facts by endogeniz-
ing productivity and incorporating demand effects. The model features three key
elements: firm selection, variable markups and elastic labor supply in a small open
economy DSGE setting. When jointly combined, productivity is determined by the
number of firms (pro-competitive mechanism), the marginal utility of wealth (de-
mand mechanism) and the unit cost of production (cost mechanism). The effect
of a sudden stop on productivity works through the combination of each of these
channels and depends directly on the degree of currency appreciation vis-à-vis wage
devaluation.
Simulations of the model show how accounting for firm dynamics changes the
relative macroeconomic performance of exchange rate regimes after a shock. While
increased wage flexibility is still desirable within a currency union, greater firm het-
erogeneity and lower labor income shares also contribute towards smaller output
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losses after a sudden stop. Importantly, regimes perform differently, even in the
extreme case of perfect flexibility.
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1.11 Appendices
1.11.1 Aggregate data appendix
Identifying sudden stops: algorithm
The following algorithm combines elements of Calvo et al. (2004) and Cavallo and
Frankel (2008).
• Use IMF Balance of Payment annual data for all available countries in the
period 1990-2015.
• Drop (i) small countries - in terms of population (below 1 million inhabitants)
and in terms of wealth (below 1 billion USD); (ii) countries with incomplete
time series.
• Compute year-to-year changes in the financial account.
• Compute rolling averages and standard deviations of the change in the financial
account with a window length equal to ten years. Check that at least 60% of
the observations in the window are available, otherwise set to missing.
• Identify reversal episodes as subsequent country-year observations that show
reductions in the financial surplus half a standard deviation above the mean
change as calculated in the previous step. Classify the first and last country-
year observation as the start and end of each episode.
• Filter to keep reversal episodes that contain at least one country-year obser-
vation with a reduction in the financial surplus one standard deviation above
the mean change.
• Filter again to keep reversal episodes that are accompanied by a fall in GDP
per capita during the same year or the year that follows immediately after.
• Filter again to keep reversal episodes that are accompanied by a fall in the cur-
rent account deficit during the same year or the year that follows immediately
after. Surviving episodes are classified as sudden stops.
Note that two further refinements are made. First, one year episodes starting in 2009
are dropped from the final sample as they simply capture the global trade collapse
that followed the burst of the 2008 financial crisis instead of a country-specific reversal
of capital flows. Second, I collapse adjacent sudden stops into the same episode if
the gap among the end of the former and the start of the latter is only one year.
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1.11.2 Firm-level data appendix
Production function estimation
This appendix reviews the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction to the proxy approach
to production function estimation. I augment it to account for attrition as first
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).
Consider the standard model,
yit = α+ β
k
s kit + β
l
slit + ωit + it , (1.22)
where yit is value added, kit is capital and lit is labor input. ωit is unobserved
firm-level TFP and modelled as a Markov chain, ωit = g (ωit−1) + ξt.
Under the assumptions:
1. There exists an observable input or choice variable mit = ft(kit, lit, ωit) such
that ft is strictly monotonic in ωit.
2. ωit is the only econometric unobservable in the mapping above.
The production function, equation (1.22), can be rewritten as:
yit = α+ β
k
s kit + β
l
slit + f
−1
t (kit, lit,mit) + it ,
where all regressors are now observable.
First stage As opposed to the standard proxy approach (Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)), allowing for labor dynamics with functional depen-
dence prevents me from identifying the labor coefficient, βl, in the first stage. Instead,
in the first stage I am only able to remove the shock it from the dependent variable
yit by treating f−1t non-parametrically and recover Φˆit from:
yit = Φit(kit, lit,mit) + it .
Second stage A firm will continue to operate provided its productivity level ex-
ceeds the lower bound: χit = 1 if ωit ≥ ωit, where χi is a survival indicator variable.
I estimate the survival probability, Pˆit, by fitting a probit model on capital, labor
and the proxy variable:
Pit ≡ Pr{χt = 1 |ωit, It−1} = ht(kit−1, lit−1,mit−1) ,
where It−1 is the information set at time t− 1.
Third stage Given guesses for βk and βl, it is possible to obtain the residuals
ωˆit = Φˆit − βkkit − βllit ,
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and, exploiting the Markov chain assumption on ωit, obtain the corresponding resid-
ual ξˆit by simply regressing ωˆit on ωˆit−1 and Pˆit. βk and βl are estimated using the
following GMM criterion function:
1
N
1
T
∑
i
∑
t
(
ξˆitkit
ξˆitlit−1
)
= 0 .
Allocative efficiency
This appendix summarizes the Hsieh and Klenow (2017) argument that resource
misallocation can hinder aggregate productivity.
As explained in the main text, consider a framework with a final good featuring
a CES production function in differentiated intermediates goods that are imperfectly
substitutable. Intermediate good producers have standard Cobb-Douglas production
technologies, with capital share α, and are subject to firm-specific exogenous wedges
that distort (i) output, τyit, and (ii) capital relative to labor, τ
k
it. The individual
intermediate good producer optimization problem delivers the following first-order
conditions with respect to labor, lit, and capital, kit:
MRPLit =
(
1− α
µ
)(
PitYit
Lit
)
=
(
1
1− τyit
)
Wt , (1.23)
MRPKit =
(
α
µ
)(
PitYit
Kit
)
=
(
1 + τkit
1− τyit
)
Rt , (1.24)
where PitYit is firm nominal value added, Wt is the cost of labor, Rt is the cost
of capital and µ is the constant markup of price over marginal cost.
Define physical and revenue productivities at the firm-level as
TFPQit ≡ Ait = Yit
KαitL
1−α
it
, (1.25)
and
TFPRit ≡ PitAit = PitYit
KαitL
1−α
it
. (1.26)
By substituting equations (1.23) and (1.24) into equation (1.26),
TFPRit = µ
(
MRPKit
α
)α(MRPLit
1− α
)1−α
= µ
(
Rt
α
)α( Wt
1− α
)1−α (1 + τki )α
1− τyi
,
it follows that optimal allocation of labor and capital ensures that firms with higher
TFPQ expand production such that they charge lower prices than more unproduc-
tive firms and TFPR is equalized across plants. In other words, dispersion in TFPR
is solely driven by the presence of firm-specific distortions in this model. Such dis-
tortions can lower aggregate TFP by the following expression:
60
TFPt =
[∑
i=1
(
Ait
TFPRt
TFPRit
)σ−1] 11−σ
,
where TFPRt is the revenue weighted average TFPR.
1.11.3 Model appendix
A model of two large countries: the limit case
This appendix shows that the assumptions required to treat Home as a small open
economy can be derived from the steady state version of a model with two countries
which are symmetric in everything except size i.e. Home is assumed to be small
relative to Foreign. In particular, if the two countries are endowed with n and n− 1
shares of the world’s total number of potentially active firms, M¯ ,
M = nM¯, M∗ = (1− n)M¯, n ∈ [0, 1],
then the limit case to be considered is one in which n→ 0. The productivity cutoffs
of this model would be given by the steady state versions of equations (1.9) and
(1.10) together with:
z∗F =
γ + ηN
αγ
λ + ηP
τ(W ∗)σ , (1.27)
z∗H =
γ + ηN∗
αγ
λ∗ + ηP
∗ (W
∗)σ , (1.28)
The number of active firms in Home and Foreign is given by equation (1.12) and
N∗ = (1− n)M¯∗(z∗H)−k + nM¯(zF )−k , (1.29)
while the aggregate price level is summarized by equation (1.13) and
P ∗ =
2k + 1
2k + 2
(W ∗)σN∗
z∗H
. (1.30)
Finally, the balance of payments condition in a zero trade balance steady state can
be rewritten as
n
1− n =
λ
λ∗
(
W ∗
W
)2σ
3
(
z∗F
zF
)(k+2)
, (1.31)
To summarize, for a given n, the equilibrium in the model with two countries can
be described by Equations (1.9), (1.10), (1.12), (1.13), (1.27)-(1.66) with nine un-
known variables {zH , zF , z∗H , z∗H , N,N∗, P, P ∗,W}, taking foreign labor input as
the numeraire (W ∗ = 1).
This system, however, can be further collapsed into three equations in three
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unknowns, namely, zH , z∗H and W :
αγ
1− θ
θ
zHW = W σ
[
γ +
η
2k + 2
(
1
zH
)k
M¯
(
n+ (1− n)
(
W σ
τ
)k)]
, (1.32)
αγ
1− θ
θ
z∗H =
[
γ +
η
2k + 2
(
1
z∗H
)k
M¯
(
(1− n) + n
( 
τW σ
)k)]
, (1.33)
n
1− n =
W 2σ(k+1)−1
2k+1
(
z∗H
zH
)(k+2)
. (1.34)
As n→ 0, Equation (1.38) simplifies to
αγ
1− θ
θ
z∗H =
[
γ +
η
2k + 2
(
1
z∗H
)k
M¯
]
,
which solves for z∗H as a function only of parameters. I have, thus, proved the first
assumption: the foreign domestic productivity cutoff is not affected by changes at
Home for n small enough.
Note that due to the Pareto distribution assumption, z∗H , cannot fall below
one, the minimum value for productivity. Therefore, I need distinguish between two
different cases. Suppose
αγ
1− θ
θ
< γ +
η
2k + 2
M¯ , (1.35)
then the solution to the above equation is larger than one. Once, I have solved for
z∗H , the foreign demand for the domestic variety is given by
q∗F (z) =
1
γ + ηN∗
(
α+
η
γ
θ
1− θP
∗
)
− θ
1− θ
1
γ
p∗F (z) , (1.36)
where N∗ = M¯
(
z∗H
)−k and P ∗ is a function of z∗H as given by Equation (1.30),
and, thus, constant.
Suppose, instead, the opposite is true, and the inequality given by Equation
(1.35) does not hold. In such a case, z∗H remains at one so that all foreign firms
produce, N∗ = M¯ . This also means, that the choke price for Foreign is not binding62
and a new equation for the aggregate price level in Foreign is required. In particular,
the new price level is given by
P ∗ =
(
2
M¯
− η
γ + ηN∗
)−1 [ αγ 1−θθ
γ + ηN∗
+
1
b
k
k + 1
]
.
The rest of the argument follows: foreign demand for the domestic variety is given
by Equation (1.36) which implies that A and B in Equation (1.7) are constants as
62The maximum price faced by foreign consumers is actually lower than the choke price they
would be willing to pay.
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none of the foreign variables i.e. z∗H , N∗ and P ∗, are affected by changes in Home.
Equilibrium summary
Endogenous variables: zHt , zFt , z∗Ft , Lt, Nt, Bt, Rt, Pt, λt, Wt, t
Equilibrium conditions:
zHt =
γ + ηNt
αγ
λt
+ ηPt
W σt , (1.37)
zFt =
γ + ηNt
αγ
λt
+ ηPt
τt(W
∗
t )
σ , (1.38)
zF∗t =
B
A
τW σt
t
, (1.39)
Nt = M(z
H
t )
−k +M∗(zFt )
−k , (1.40)
Pt =
2k + 1
2k + 2
W σt Nt
zHt
, (1.41)
Lt =
k
(k + 1)(k + 2)
σW 2σ−1t M
(
λt
γ
(
zHt
)−(k+2)
+
Bτ2
t
(
zF∗t
)−(k+2))
, (1.42)
1 = βRtEt
(
t+1
t
λt+1
λt
)
, (1.43)
Rt = R
∗
t + φ
(
eB¯−Bt − 1
)
+
(
eξt−1 − 1
)
, (1.44)
MB
(τW σt )
2
t
(
zF∗t
)−(k+2)−M∗λt (τt(W ∗t )σ)2
γ
(
zFt
)−(k+2)
= 2(k+2)t(Bt−Rt−1Bt−1) ,
(1.45)
Wt =
∞∏
s=0
(
θ
θ − 1Et−s
(
1
λt
))µ(1−µ)s
, (1.46)
monetary policy rule . (1.47)
Existence and uniqueness of steady state
This appendix solves for the steady state of the model and shows that it is unique
provided B¯ = 0. To ease notation, I drop all time subscripts. The steady state
is summarized by one equation in one unknown, which can be solved numerically
provided parameter values.
Start by rewriting the wage equation in steady state as
λ =
θ
θ − 1
1
W
. (1.48)
Combine (1.37) and (1.41) to get
zHαγ = W σλ
(
γ +
η
2k + 2
N
)
. (1.49)
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Rewrite zF as a function of zH , given equations (1.37) and (1.38),
zH =
τ
W σ
zH , (1.50)
and plug into equation (1.40)
N =
(
1
zH
)k(
M +M∗
(
W σ
τ
)k)
.
which can now be combined with equation (1.48) and (1.49) such that
zHαγ =
θ
θ − 1
1
W 1−σ
(
γ +
η
2k + 2
(
1
zH
)k(
M +M∗
(
W σ
τ
)k))
. (1.51)
Next, note that in steady state the interest rate is given by R = 1β and bond
holdings are B = B¯ (see equations (1.43) and (1.44) respectively). Imposing this on
the balance of payment condition, (1.45), together with equations (1.39), (1.48) and
(1.50), delivers
M
Ak+2
Bk+1
k+1
(τW σ)k
−M∗ θ
θ − 1
W σ(k+2)−1
γ
(
zH
)−(k+2)
(τ)k
= −2 (k + 2) (1− β)
β
B¯ . (1.52)
Equation (1.52) can be rewritten in terms of zH and then plugged into equation
(1.51). This would deliver a system of one equation in one unknown: if the economy
is embedded in a currency union, the exchange rate is equal to one and the unknown
isW . If the economy has a floating arrangement, the wage level is equal to the target
and the unknown is . In any case, there exists a steady state equilibrium.
Impose that trade balance holds in equilibrium (B¯ = 0). Equation (1.52) is
simplified to
1
zH
=
[
γ
θ − 1
θ
M
M∗
Ak+2
Bk+1
k+2
W 2σ(k+1)−1
] 1
k+2
,
and can now substitute for zH in equation (1.51) as follows
αγ
θ − 1
θ
=
[
γ
θ − 1
θ
M
M∗
Ak+2
Bk+1
k+2
W 2σ(k+1)−1
] 1
k+2
[
γ +
η
2k + 2
[
γ
θ − 1
θ
M
M∗
Ak+2
Bk+1
k+2
W 2σ(k+1)−1
] k
k+2
(
M +M∗
(
wσ
τ
)k)]
.
The left hand side is a positive constant. The right hand side is:
1. A monotonically decreasing function in W with positive limit of zero and a
negative limit of +∞ in the currency union regime.
2. A monotonically increasing function in  with positive limit of +∞ and a
negative limit of zero in the currency union regime.
Thus, in both cases, there exists a unique solution.
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1.11.4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Unweighted average productivity is given by
z˜Ht =
ˆ ∞
zHt
z
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz =
k
k − 1z
H
t .
Average productivity weighted by output is given by
zˆHt =
ˆ ∞
zHt
z
q(z)
q(z˜Ht )
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz .
Noting that q(z)
q(z˜Ht )
=
z−zHt
z˜Ht −zHt
z˜t
z , the above expression simplifies to zˆ
H
t = z˜
H
t .
Average productivity weighted by revenue is given by
z¯Ht =
ˆ ∞
zHt
z
r(z)
r(z˜Ht )
g(z)
1−G(zHt )
dz .
Noting that r(z)
r(z˜Ht )
=
z2−(zHt )2
(z˜Ht )
2−(zHt )2
(z˜t)2
z2
, the above expression simplifies to z¯Ht =
2k3
(2k−1)(k2−1)z
H
t .
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By combining equations (1.9) and (1.13), the domestic productivity threshold
can be rewritten as
zHt =
λtW
σ
t
αγ
[
γ +
η
2k + 1
Nt
]
. (1.53)
To derive the expression in Proposition 1 log-linearize equation (1.53) around its
steady state.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. To see this formally, combine equations (1.9), (1.10), and (1.12) to rewrite
the equilibrium number of active firms in the domestic market as
Nt =
(
1
zHt
)k [
M +M∗
(
W σt
τ (W ∗t )
σ t
)k]
,
and combine with the expression for zHt above, equation (1.53), to get
zHt −
η
2k + 2
λtW
σ
t
αγ
(
1
zHt
)k [
M +M∗
(
W σt
τ (W ∗t )
σ t
)k]
=
λtW
σ
t
α
, (1.54)
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from here it is straightforward to see that there is a negative relationship between
zHt and t i.e. the left-hand side of equation (1.54) is increasing in both zHt and t.
It then follows that ζzHt ,t =
∂zHt
∂t
t
zHt
< 0.
The relationship between zHt and Wt is less obvious. The right-hand side of
equation (1.54) is decreasing in wages as λtW σt ∝ 1
W
1
µ−σ
t
by Lemma 2. The left-hand
side, however, depends on parameter values and, thus, ζzHt ,Wt =
∂zHt
∂Wt
Wt
zHt
≷ 0.
Lemma 2. There is a negative relationship between the marginal utility of income
and the wage level.
Proof. In steady state, wages are equalized across labor types and equation (1.14)
can be rewritten as
λt =
1− θ
θ
1
Wt
.
During the dynamics, the negative relationship still holds as
λt ∝ 1− θ
θ
1
W
1
µ
t
.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Suppose µσ < 11+k , then the left-hand side of equation (1.54) is increasing
in wages. Thus, there is an unambiguous negative relationship between zHt and Wt
that ensures ζzHt ,Wt =
∂zHt
∂Wt
Wt
zHt
< 0.
1.11.5 Auxiliary assumption
This appendix discusses how the auxiliary assumption introduced in Section 1.7.1,
the law of motion for existing firms, changes results derived in Section 1.6.
The law of motion can be written in levels as
Mt =
M¯
ρt
(
Wt
W¯
)1−ρ . (1.55)
The definition of aggregate productivity and the equilibrium condition for the
domestic productivity threshold remain unchanged. Therefore, Lemma 1 and Propo-
sition 1 still hold.
The proof of Proposition 2 needs to be adjusted slightly to read:
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Proof. To see this formally, combine equations (1.9), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.55) to
rewrite the equilibrium number of active firms in the domestic market as
Nt =
(
1
zHt
)k M¯
ρt
(
Wt
W¯
)1−ρ
[
1 +
1− n
n
(
W σt
τ (W ∗t )
σ t
)k]
,
and combine with the expression for zHt above, equation (1.53), to get
zHt −
η
2k + 2
λtW
σ
t
αγ
(
1
zHt
)k M¯
ρt
(
Wt
W¯
)1−ρ
[
1 +
1− n
n
(
W σt
τ (W ∗t )
σ t
)k]
=
λtW
σ
t
α
,
(1.56)
from here it is straightforward to see that there is a negative relationship between
zHt and t i.e. the left-hand side of equation (1.54) is increasing in both zHt and t.
It then follows that ζzHt ,t =
∂zHt
∂t
t
zHt
< 0.
The relationship between zHt and Wt is less obvious. The right-hand side of
equation (1.54) is decreasing in wages as λtW σt ∝ 1
W
1
µ−σ
t
by Lemma 2. The left-hand
side, however, depends on parameter value and, thus, ζzHt ,Wt =
∂zHt
∂Wt
Wt
zHt
≷ 0.
Given the modified proof of Proposition 2, the corresponding Corollary should
now read
Corollary 2. Following a sudden stop in a currency union, a sufficient condition
for zˆHt > 0 is that 1 + µ (1− ρ) > µσ(1 + k).
Proof. Suppose (1 + k)µσ < µ(1 − ρ), then the left-hand side of equation (1.56) is
increasing in wages. Thus, there is an unambiguous negative relationship between
zHt and Wt that ensures ζzHt ,Wt =
∂zHt
∂Wt
Wt
zHt
< 0.
However, as µ > 0 and 1 − ρ > 0, it is the case that the sufficient condition in
Corollary 1 is more restrictive than that in Corollary 2 i.e. 1 + µ (1 − ρ) > 1 >
µσ(1 + k).
1.11.6 Extensions to the model
A model with capital
This appendix describes a version of the baseline model that features pre-installed
capital as the second input in the production of differentiated varieties. In particular,
the unit cost of production is now given by
ct =
(
Wt
σ
)σ ( κt
1− κ
)1−σ
, (1.57)
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where κt is the rental price of capital.
The evolution of the capital stock, Kt, is determined by investment by the repre-
sentative consumer and depreciation. The budget constraint is accordingly modified
to read:
ˆ Nt
pt (ω) qt (ω) dω+tBt+VtKt =
ˆ 1
0
W itL
i
t di+Πt+tRt−1Bt−1+Vt(1−δ)Kt−1+κtKt−1 ,
where Vt is the price of capital and δ is the depreciation rate.
There is an additional equilibrium condition governing the optimal capital choice:
Vt = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
((1− δ)Vt+1 + κt+1)
]
, (1.58)
and a transversality condition that ensures the absence of bubbles in equilibrium:
lim
T→∞
βTEtλt+TKt+T = 0 . (1.59)
In addition, capital market clearing ensures that capital supplied by the repre-
sentative household is equated to the aggregate demand by firms:
Kt−1 =
Mt
(k + 1)(k + 2)
(1− σ)c2t
κt
[
λt
γ
(zHt )
−(k+2) +
Bτ2
t
(z∗Ft )
−(k+2)
]
. (1.60)
The rational expectations equilibrium of this extension is the set of stochas-
tic processes {zHt , zFt , z∗Ft , IMt, EXt, Lt, Nt, Bt, Rt, Pt, λt,Wt, κt, ct, Vt,Mt,Kt−1}∞t=0
satisfying equations (1.3), (1.5), (1.12), (1.14), (1.57)-(1.60) and
zHt
ct
(
αγ
λt
+ ηPt
)
= γ + ηNt ,
zFt
τtc∗t
(
αγ
λt
+ ηPt
)
= γ + ηNt ,
z∗Ft =
B
A
τct
t
,
Mt =
1
ρt c
1−ρ
t
,
Pt =
2k + 1
2k + 2
ctNt
zHt
,
Lt =
Mt
(k + 1)(k + 2)
σc2t
Wt
[
λt
γ
(zHt )
−(k+2) +
Bτ2
t
(z∗Ft )
−(k+2)
]
,
EXt − IMt = t(Bt −Rt−1Bt−1) + Vt(Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1) ,
IMt =
1
k + 2
M∗t
λt
γ
(τtc
∗
t )
2
2
(
zFt
)−(k+2)
,
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EXt =
1
k + 2
Mt
B
2
(τct)
2
t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)
,
given the exogenous process {ξt}∞t=0 and the central bank’s policy {t}∞t=0. The
foreign unit production cost, c∗t , is normalized to one.
This extension of the model is parametrized following the same principles as the
baseline frame-work. This implies setting, A = 1.123, B = 0.540 and φ = 0.012;
all other values are unchanged. In addition, the depreciation rate, δ, is set to 2.5%
following Melitz and Ghironi (2005) among many others.
Extensive versus intensive margin
This appendix describes a version of the baseline model that accounts for common
shocks to firm-level productivity. Suppose the efficiency of a firm in transforming
the input bundle into output is described by the composite Ztz, where Zt is a new
time-varying common component and z is the firm-specific productivity level drawn
from a Pareto distribution as described in Section 1.5.
The definition of the rational expectations equilibrium has to be adjusted slightly.
In particular, equilibrium conditions (1.9), (1.11), (1.13), (1.15) and (1.18) are sub-
stituted by:
zHt =
γ + ηNt
αγ
λt
+ ηPt
W σt
Zt
,
z∗Ft =
B
A
τW σt
tZt
,
Pt =
2k + 1
k + 1
W σt
Zt
Nt
zHt
,
Lt =
σk
(k + 1)(k + 2)
M
Wt
(
Wt
Zt
)2 [λt
γ
(
zHt
)−(k+2)
+B
τ2
t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)]
,
EXt =
1
k + 2
M
B
2
(τW σt )
2
Z2t t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)
.
and Zt is assumed to be an exogenous AR(1) process with auto-correlation coef-
ficient equal to 0.99.
In addition, aggregate productivity will now be determined by both the produc-
tivity cutoff and the shock to the common component. In particular, unweighted
and average productivity weighted by output are both given by: kk−1Ztz
H
t . Average
productivity weighted by revenue is given by: 2k
3
(2k−1)(k2−1)Ztz
H
t .
Long-run analysis
This appendix describes a long-run version of the baseline model where the number
of existing firms, Mt, is endogenous. The set-up follows Ottaviano (2012) in putting
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in a DSGE framework. The key innovation is the intro-
duction of capital which is supplied by a second sector, accumulated by consumers
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and required for the set-up of firms producing the differentiated varieties. In what
follows, I highlight how these assumptions and new implications fit into the set-up
presented in Section 1.5.
The representative household As explained in the main text, the representative
consumer is allowed to buy shares, xt, of the economy’s capital stock, Kt, at price, Vt.
While capital is assumed to fully depreciate after one period; the investment entitles
the representative consumer to a fraction of next period’s aggregate firm profit. The
consumer budget constraint is correspondingly adjusted to read:
ˆ Nt
pt (ω) qt (ω) dω + tBt + xtVtKt =
ˆ 1
0
W itL
i
t di+ xt−1Πt + tRt−1Bt−1 .
Regarding the household’s optimization problem, there is an additional optimal-
ity condition describing the purchase of capital shares. In particular:
1 = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Πt+1
VtKt
]
.
Capital investment is encouraged when the price of capital is low or when ex-
pected future returns are high. Given risk aversion, returns are adjusted by the
stochastic discount factor: returns are more desirable whenever the marginal utility
of income is higher.
Production of capital Capital is produced under perfect competition using a
Cobb-Douglas technology that combines units of domestic labor, lk,Ht and foreign
labor, lk,Ft : Kt =
(
lk,Ht
)ρ (
lk,Ft
)1−ρ
.
Producers of capital choose labor inputs such that costs are minimized. For this
analysis, only the demand for domestic labor is relevant,
lk,Ht =
(
ρ
1− ρ
t
Wt
)1−ρ
Kt. (1.61)
Production of differentiated varieties I assume that fE units of capital are
required for a firm to produce a differentiated variety. The timing is such that the
fixed entry cost is due one period before the firm is able to start production. This
implies that the realization of the firm’s productivity draw is still unknown. The
resulting free-entry condition pins down the number of firms that will be potentially
active in period t+ 1, denoted by Mt:
Mt =
Kt
fE
. (1.62)
Aggregation and market clearing The number of active firms in the domestic
market, Nt, has to be modified to account for the new timing assumption. In par-
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ticular, the number of firms at time t will depend on the number of firms that paid
the fixed capital requirement in period t− 1 such that:
Nt = Mt−1
(
1
zHt
)k
+M∗
(
1
zFt
)k
. (1.63)
Aggregate labor demand is augmented to include the domestic labor input used
in the production of capital as given by equation (1.61), such that the labor market
clearing condition now reads:
Lt =
k
(k + 1)(k + 2)
σ
W 1−2σt
Mt−1
[
λt
γ
(
zHt
)−(k+2)
+B
τ2
t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)]
+
(
ρ
1− ρ
t
Wt
)1−ρ
fEMt ,
(1.64)
where the free market condition, equation (1.62), is used to substitute for capital.
Given the capital investment decision, aggregate profit is now a variable of inter-
est. It is computed by summing profits of domestic and export sales. More precisely,
Πt =
k
2(k + 1)(k + 2)
W 2σt Mt−1
[
λt
γ
(
zHt
)−(k+2)
+B
τ2
t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)]
. (1.65)
A new market clearing condition for capital ensures that demand by consumers
is equated to supply by producers. Given the perfect competition assumption, this
simply implies that the price of capital is equal to its marginal cost. Formally,
Vt =
(
Wt
ρ
)ρ(tW ∗t
1− ρ
)1−ρ
.
As the consumer’s budget constraint has been modified, the resulting balance of
payment condition is:
EXt − IMt = t (Bt −RtBt−1) +
(
Wt
ρ
)ρ(tW ∗t
1− ρ
)1−ρ
(1− ρ)feMt , (1.66)
where EMt and IMt, the total export and import revenues in domestic currency
terms, are given by:
EXt =
1
k + 2
Mt−1
B
2
(τW σt )
2
t
(
z∗Ft
)−(k+2)
, (1.67)
and equation (1.17) respectively. Note that the above balance of payment condi-
tion is derived by imposing that, in equilibrium, capital shares add up to one.
Solving the model The rational expectations equilibrium of this extension is the
set of stochastic processes {zHt , zFt , z∗Ft , IMt, EXt, Lt, Nt, Bt, Rt, Pt, λt,Wt,Mt−1,Πt}∞t=0
satisfying equations (1.3), (1.5), (1.9)-(1.11), (1.13), (1.14), (1.17), (1.20), (1.63)-
(1.67) given the exogenous process {ξt}∞t=0 and the central bank’s policy {t}∞t=0.
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The foreign wage, W ∗t , is normalized to one.
This extension of the model is parametrized following the same principles as
the baseline framework. The additional parameter fE is calibrated such that the
economy starts at the same steady state as the baseline.
The Friedman view
This appendix describes a version of the baseline model with no firm dynamics. Sup-
pose there is a fixed number of firms, all of which feature the same productivity level.
While the solutions to the household’s and the (representative) firm’s optimization
problems are unchanged, the choke price is no longer a relevant variable, provided
that there is positive production in all markets. In other words, the equilibrium
cannot be written in terms of productivity thresholds.
Instead, the rational expectations equilibrium is now defined as the set of stochas-
tic processes
{
qHt , q
F
t , q
∗F
t , p
F
t , p
∗F
t , Lt, Bt, Rt, λt, Wt, t
}∞
t=0
satisfying (1.3), (1.5),
(1.14),
qHt =
1
2γ + η(NHt +N
F
t )
(
α− λtW
σ
t
Zt
)
,
qFt =
1
2γ + η(NHt +N
F
t )
(
α− λtτt
Zt
)
,
q∗Ft =
1
2
(
A−BτW
σ
t
tZt
)
,
Lt =
σ
W 1−σt
NHt
Zt
(
qHt + τq
∗F
t
)
,
pFt =
1
2γ + η(NHt +N
F
t )
(
αγ
λt
− (γ + η(NHt +NFt )) τtZt
)
,
p∗Ft =
1
2B
(
A+B
τW σt
tZt
)
,
tN
H
t p
∗F
t q
∗F
t −NFt pFt qFt = t (Bt −Rt−1Bt−1) ,
given the exogenous processes
{
Zt, N
H
t , N
F
t , ξt
}∞
t=0
and the central bank’s policy
{t}∞t=0.
I need to re-calibrate some of the parameters before solving this version of the
model. I set Zt = 1, NHt = nM¯ and NFt = (1 − n)M¯ at all times where n and M¯
are calibrated as in the baseline model. The debt elasticity of interest rate, φ = 2.1,
is set again to match output volatility.
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Figure 1.9: Effect of a sudden stop in the distribution of TFP
(a) 1992-93 episode
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Notes: This graph plots kernel density estimates for firm-level log (TFP) before and after a sudden
stop. Panel (a) refers to the 1992-93 episode, while Panel (b) focuses on the 2009-13 episode. The
corresponding base and end years are 1991 and 1993 for the first episode; 2009 and 2013 for the
second episode.
Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
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Figure 1.10: Impulse response functions
Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of all endogenous variables to a one standard deviation shock
to the country-specific risk premium. All variables but bonds, Bt, are expressed in log deviations
from steady state. The holding of bonds, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed in levels.
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Figure 1.11: A model with capital - Macroeconomic effects of a sudden stop
Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation
positive shock to the country-specific risk premium in a version of the model featuring pre-installed
physical capital as described in Appendix 1.11.6. All variables but the current account are expressed
in log deviations from steady state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is
expressed in levels.
Figure 1.12: A model with capital - other variables
Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of investment, the unit cost of production and the rental rate of
capital to a one standard deviation positive shock to the country-specific risk premium in a version
of the model featuring pre-installed physical capital as described in Appendix 1.11.6. All variables
are expressed in log deviations from steady state.
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Figure 1.13: Extensive versus intensive margin - Macroeconomic effects of a sudden
stop
Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation
positive shock to the country-specific risk premium and a one standard deviation negative shock to
the aggregate component of firm TFP. All variables but the current account are expressed in log
deviations from steady state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed
in levels.
Figure 1.14: Extensive versus intensive margin - TFP decomposition
Notes: These figures decompose the overall response of TFP to a sudden stop as described above
into the change in the aggregate component of firm-level productivity (the intensive margin) and
the change in the productivity threshold (extensive margin). All variables are expressed in log
deviations from steady state.
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Figure 1.15: Long-run analysis - Macroeconomic effects of a sudden stop
Notes: These figures plot the IRFs of key macroeconomic variables to a one standard deviation
positive shock to the country-specific risk premium in the long run version of the model as described
in Appendix 1.11.6. All variables but the current account are expressed in log deviations from steady
state. The current account, assumed to be zero in steady state, is expressed in levels.
Figure 1.16: Currency union versus floating arrangement - consumption Loss
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the consumption loss under a currency union to the consumption
loss under a floating arrangement following a sudden stop. The consumption loss is calculated as the
discounted sum of consumption log deviations after a one standard deviation shock to the country-
specific risk premium. The blue solid line refers to the baseline model. The red dashed line refers
to a version of the model with no firm dynamics (firms are homogeneous and the number of firms
is constant) and linear production in labor (σ = 1). The shaded area shows the range of plausible
values for the wage rigidity parameter as discussed by the literature.
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Figure 1.17: Currency union versus floating arrangement - welfare Loss
Notes: This figure plots the ratio of the welfare loss under a currency union to the welfare loss under
a floating arrangement following a sudden stop. The welfare loss is calculated as the share of steady
state employment that makes the representative consumer indifferent between the steady state and
the dynamic equilibrium path after a one standard deviation shock to the country-specific risk
premium. The blue solid line refers to the baseline model. The red dashed line refers to a version
of the model with no firm dynamics (firms are homogeneous and the number of firms is constant)
and linear production in labor (σ = 1). The shaded area shows the range of plausible values for the
wage rigidity parameter as discussed by the literature.
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Table 1.4: List of sudden stops
country start year end year exchange rate country start year end year exchange rate
Albania 1991 1992 4 Macedonia FYR 2009 2010 2
Argentina 1995 1995 2 Malaysia 1998 1998 4
Argentina 1999 2002 4 Mali 1991 1991 1
Argentina 2014 2014 3 Mexico 1995 1995 4
Belarus 2014 2015 3 Moldova 1998 2003 3
Brazil 2015 2015 4 Moldova 2012 2013 3
Bulgaria 1991 1991 4 Morocco 1996 1996 3
Bulgaria 2009 2010 2 New Zealand 2004 2010 4
Chile 1999 1999 3 Nicaragua 1991 1991 2
Chile 2009 2010 4 Oman 1999 2000 2
Colombia 1998 1999 3 Oman 2010 2010 2
Croatia 1997 2002 2 Philippines 1998 1998 4
Croatia 2009 2010 2 Poland 1990 1990 4
Cyprus 2011 2011 1 Portugal 2001 2003 1
Czech Rep. 1997 2002 3 Portugal 2009 2013 1
Czech Rep. 2008 2008 3 Romania 1999 1999 4
Czech Rep. 2011 2013 3 Russia 1998 2002 3
Ecuador 1999 2000 0 Rwanda 1994 1994 4
Estonia 1996 2001 2 Saudi Arabia 1992 1992 2
Estonia 2008 2009 2 Saudi Arabia 1999 2000 2
Ethiopia 1991 1991 3 Senegal 1994 1994 1
Ethiopia 2003 2003 3 Sierra Leone 1996 1996 4
Finland 1991 1993 3 Slovak Republic 1997 2002 3
Finland 2013 2013 1 South Africa 2008 2008 4
France 1991 1993 2 Spain 1993 1993 3
Gabon 1999 1999 1 Spain 2009 2013 1
Greece 1993 1993 2 Sri Lanka 2001 2001 3
Greece 2009 2013 1 Sudan 2010 2010 3
Haiti 2003 2003 4 Sweden 1991 1991 3
Haiti 2009 2010 3 Thailand 1997 1998 4
Indonesia 1998 1998 4 Turkey 1994 1994 4
Iran 1992 1995 4 Turkey 2001 2001 4
Ireland 2009 2014 1 Ukraine 1998 2003 2
Israel 2001 2001 3 Ukraine 2014 2015 4
Italy 1993 1994 3 United Kingdom 1990 1991 3
Italy 2011 2014 1 United States 2007 2007 4
Kenya 1991 1992 4 Uruguay 2001 2001 3
Korea 1997 1998 4 Venezuela 1994 1994 4
Latvia 2008 2009 3 Venezuela 1999 2000 3
Lithuania 1997 2002 2 Yemen Rep. of 2009 2014 3
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Table 1.5: Moments of the distribution
1992-93 episode 2009-13 episode
pre-sudden stop sudden stop pre-sudden stop sudden stop
mean 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.12
mode 0.29 0.17 0.14 0.16
sd 0.58 0.62 0.69 0.62
skewness -0.40 -1.24 -2.37 -0.89
kurtosis 7.04 10.42 27.92 7.13
min -3.73 -5.28 -9.07 -3.68
max 2.58 2.40 2.49 2.49
Notes: This table summarizes moments of the distribution of firm-level log (TFP) before and after
a sudden stop. The first two columns refer to the 1992-93 episode, while the last two focus on the
2009-13 episode. The corresponding base and end years are 1991 and 1993 for the first episode;
2009 and 2013 for the second episode.
Source: ESEE data and own calculations.
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Chapter 2
How Do Central Banks Control
Inflation? A Guide for the
Perplexed
2.1 Introduction
How do central banks keep inflation on target? How do we prevent hyperinflations
setting in, with all their tragic consequences for human welfare? And, if we fear that
the economy is stuck in secular stagnation, in a liquidity trap, or in a fiscal crisis,
is the central bank powerless to prevent exploding deflation or inflation? These are
crucial questions that a student fresh off a macroeconomics class should be able to
answer using the current state of knowledge. Yet, our experience over the years is
that students are flummoxed by these issues. Undergraduates mostly retain that
central banks print money and money means more inflation. They are then thor-
oughly confused when they realize that most central banks barely mention money
in their speeches, that they do not actually choose how much money to print, and
that the monetary base has increased many-fold with no appreciable inflation in the
last decade. Graduate students learn about the setting of interest rates and about
inflation-output trade-offs mapped out by the Phillips curve, and perhaps even about
the welfare costs of inflation and positive interest rates. But as soon as you ask them
to reconcile the Fisher principle—higher interest rates are associated with higher
inflation one to one—the Taylor rule—increasing interest rates more than one-to-one
in response to inflation keeps inflation constant—and the empirical evidence—raising
interest rates lowers inflation—you are likely to get an incoherent answer. And, if
you ask what role does fiscal policy play in all this, almost surely expect a blank
stare.
The reason for this state of affairs is that there are few, if any, accessible entry
points to this literature. Reading the journal articles, a student gets consumed by
debates about the role of transversality conditions, the monetarist or fiscal theories
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of the price level, or the microfoundations of money, and finds it difficult to see that
there is actually a well established theory of how the prive level is pinned down. The
goal of this article is to provide a pedagogical survey of the literature on price-level
determination. The approach that we will take is to highlight the common features
of different view points by using a single neoclassical general-equilibrium model of
the economy, noting that different theories simply focus on different equations and
markets within the same model. We will focus on the central bank as the agency
with a mandate to deliver a value for the price level, but without neglecting the
interaction with the fiscal authorities.
This is not an article about the optimal way to conduct monetary policy or about
how to trade off variability in inflation or real activity. It is a survey of the process of
monetary policy, that is the way in which given a target for inflation, the central bank
goes about delivering. Letting P ∗t denote this target for the price level, the question
is how to choose central bank actions to deliver an actual price level Pt as close as
possible to the target. To make the question stark, we take this target as given.
While it is exogenous to the model in this paper, the target may well be stochastic,
have a unit root, or depend on other variables, as in the dominant interpretations.
Whether by setting some policy tool, the central bank can ensure that in equilibrium
there is a single Pt that is as close as possible to P ∗t , involves two questions. The
first is a determinacy question, on whether a process can uniquely deliver a price
level using its tools. The second is an effectiveness question, on whether that process
leads to a lower deviation between the actual and the target price level.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the canonical dynamic
model to show that classical analysis of supply and demand does not pin down the
price level. It introduces a basic description of what is a central bank and its actions,
which will be expanded as the paper moves along.
Sections 2.3-2.6 discuss four classes of processes to control the price level. Each
of them focuses on a different equilibrium condition in a particular market, and a
different policy tool of the menu available to the central bank. While they may
appear distinct, we show that they all refer to the same model, but refer to different
strategies by the central bank.
The first of these, in section 2.3 focuses on financial markets, the arbitrage con-
ditions that describe equilibrium in them, and consequently on the central bank’s
setting of the interest on the deposits that banks hold at the central bank. The
second approach in section 2.4 looks at equilibrium in the market for currency, and
the policy tool is the monopoly power of the central bank to print money. Section
2.5 describes a third approach, where the need for fiscal resources by the government
plays central role, and the policy tool is the size of the balance sheet of the central
bank. Next comes section 2.6 where the key market is that for different goods, so
the equilibrium condition is the law of one price, and the central bank policy tool is
the definition of the unit of account. Finally, section 2.7 considers a fifth approach
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that allows for the study of nominal rigidities.
Section 2.8 provides some tentative conclusions. Future revisions of this draft
will include also a hybrid processes for inflation control, and a empirical discussion
of the effectiveness of each approach based on the size of the control errors they give
rise to.
2.2 Inflation in equilibrium
At the core of most dynamic macroeconomic models is an Euler equation of the form:
Et [Mt+1(1 +Rt)] = 1. (2.1)
The operator Et(.) captures the private-sector expectations of the future as of date
t. These need not be rational; we only assume that they are a valid expectations
operator and satisfy the law of iterated expectations. Rt is the promised return at
date t on a real investment that pays off at date t + 1, while Mt+1 is a stochastic
discount factor.
The economic intuition behind this equation is thatMt+1 reveals how many goods
next period the private agents would require in exchange for one unit of goods today.
In other words,Mt+1 is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today
and tomorrow. Since 1+Rt is the opportunity cost of consuming one more unit today
in terms of consumption foregone tomorrow, then the equation above is the usual
optimality condition that agents must be indifferent between consuming or saving
one more unit.
An alternative, but equivalent, investment intuition is that for there to not be
arbitrage profits, it must be that the risk and time adjusted net return on any
investment is zero. The stochastic discount-factor gives the adjustment factor for
time and risk. If investors are risk neutral then Mt+1 would be equal to a constant
β that captures solely impatience, and the equation states that the real return is
approximately equal to the rate of time preference − ln(β).
A strong assumption for all of this paper is the following: Mt+1 is exogenous.
This assumption is commonly known as the classical dichotomy. It states that no
matter what the price level happens to be, real tradeoffs are unchanged. This allows
the paper to focus on determining the price level.
An equilibrium in this economy is then a solution for {Rt, Pt}∞t=0 such that given
an exogenous {Mt+1}∞t=0, equation (2.1) holds.
2.2.1 General equilibrium micro-foundations
To see the central role of the Euler equation, consider a simple exchange economy
economy populated by many private agents that have the same time-separable pref-
erences over a single consumption good E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tU(Ct) and that can trade bonds
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Kt with each other subject to a budget constraint: PtCt+PtKt+1 ≤ PtYt+PtKt(1+
Rt−1). There is no capital or any storage technology and the bonds are in zero net
supply, so market clearing imposes that consumption is equal to aggregate output
Ct = Yt. Aggregate output is a random endowment that just falls from the sky. Op-
timal behavior in this economy is then entirely described by equation (2.1) where the
stochastic discount factor is equal to: Mt+1 = βU ′(Yt+1)/U ′(Yt), which is exogenous.
2.2.2 Price level (in)determinacy
In equilibrium, the real interest rate is given by:
Rt = Et [Mt+1]−1 − 1, (2.2)
at all dates. But nothing pins down the price level. Any sequence {Pt}∞t=0 is consis-
tent with the Euler equation holding and the economy being in equilibrium.
More formally, let st be the state of the world at date t ≥ 1, and let st =
(P0, s1, ..., st) be the history of states until date t. Define then inflation as Π(st) ≡
Pt/Pt−1, the increase in the price level. A nominal equilibrium is then an initial
value P0 and a function Π(st) for all dates t ≥ 1.
The level of inflation is unique or determinate in equilibrium if:
1. There is a unique scalar P0 in equilibrium.
2. If Π′(st) and Π′′(st) both satisfy equilibrium conditions, then Π′(st) = Π′′(st).
The first condition requires that even if the entire future of inflation is pinned
down from today onward, still one must know what today’s price level is. What
ultimately matters is what is a dollar’s worth in real goods at any given date. Without
pinning down the initial value of the dollar, then for a given inflation path, the actual
price level Pt could be any number.
The second condition states that, while if states of the world are different, the
inflation may be different, for a given state of the world, inflation must be unique.
If, in spite of all fundamental features of the world being the same, inflation can be
different, then the central bank has failed to pin down inflation.
The result that in equilibrium, without a central bank, then inflation is indeter-
minate holds in any classical model. The reason dates back to Hume (1752): dollars
are just a unit of account with which the prices of goods are determined. If people
started denominating prices in cents instead of dollars nothing would change. There
is no demand or supply that pins down that 100 cents equals one dollar. Nothing
in classical economics pins down the price level or inflation, in the same way that
nothing in it determines whether measurements should be in inches or centimeters.
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2.2.3 Nominal bonds do not solve indeterminacy
In the simple model, neither consumption nor savings are denominated in dollars.
Perhaps this is what leads the value of the dollar to be indeterminate. To see if it
is so, introduce nominal bonds. If these bonds exist, then there is a no-arbitrage
relation between real and nominal bonds:
Et
[
Mt+1
(
1 +Rt − 1 + It
Πt+1
)]
= 0, (2.3)
This states that, once adjusted by the stochastic discount factor, saving in real or
nominal bonds must yield the same expected return. It is often called the Fisher
equation. It can easily be micro-founded by letting the representative agent choose
whether to save in nominal or real bonds, in which case this is the indifference
condition between the two that holds at the optimum.
Introducing nominal bonds does not solve price level indeterminacy. While this
gives an additional equilibrium condition, there is also an additional endogenous
variable, It, that must be pinned down. Using the Fisher equation to pin down what
It will be, given Πt, one is still left with no equations to pin down neither the initial
price level nor inflation thereafter.
2.2.4 Introducing a central bank
Modern central banks perform many roles. We start by describing a crucial yet
minimal such role and throughout the paper build it up with more of the features
observed in the world.
In modern digital economies, people use electronic means of payment like debit
or credit cards to settle their transactions. Because for any given transaction the
seller may have an account in bank A, and the buyer an account with bank B, there
must be a settlement whereby bank A collects payment for bank B. The central bank
is the clearing house where the payments between banks take place. These payments
are made using another digital mean of payment, often named reserves, which are
nothing but liabilities of the central bank towards banks.1 Because reserves are the
ultimate form of payment, they are the unit of account. That is, because reserves
are denominated in dollars, and people choose to denominate their prices in dollars
as well. The price of a good is simply how many units of reserves must be given to
obtain that good.
The current stock of reserves is just a list of entries in a spreadsheet at the
central bank, one for each bank. Because the central bank has sole control over
the spreadsheet, it can freely choose how to remunerate these reserves, that is at
what rate does it increase the number in each entry in the spreadsheet. In this way,
1For people that prefer to settle some transactions without using a bank (a minority today) the
central bank also issues banknotes, a particular durable good, and commits to exchange them for
reserves one-to-one at all times. We will discuss currency in section 2.4.
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reserves are just like a nominal bond, but one for which It is chosen by the central
bank. Because of its role as the controller of the spreadsheet for the unit of account,
the central bank has one tool that it can use for policy: the interest rate at which it
remunerates the reserves {Ivt }∞t=0.
To understand the power of doing so, just note that now the Fisher equation
provides an equation to solve for inflation given that now Rt,Mt, as well as Ivt are
exogenous. This equation is:
Et
(
Mt+1
Πt+1
)
=
1
1 + Ivt
. (2.4)
Expected (SDF-adjusted) inflation is now determined.
However, actual inflation is not pinned down. The mean of the random variable
Π(st+1) may be pinned down, but its distribution is not. There is an infinite number
of possible inflations at different sets of the world that satisfy this equation, violating
the second requirement for determinacy of the price level. As thoroughly discussed
by Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005), the actual price level may turn out to be
arbitrarily far from this expectation, as long as people’s future expectations are
sufficiently uncertain.
Moreover, the first requirement for uniqueness of inflation is also not satisfied. If
there is no uncertainty in the economy, the expectations operator disappears from
the equation above, and indeed there is a single Πt+1 at each date. However, there is
no other condition for pin down P0. If people expect higher prices in the future, the
price level will simply jump up today, keeping inflation form date 1 onward the same,
but the real value of money indeterminate. This indeterminacy was made famous by
Sargent and Wallace (1975).
The next four sections show that the central bank can go further though and
indeed fully pin down inflation. Each of them is a different (mutually exclusive)
policy option by the central bank. Namely, the central bank can choose to control:
the remuneration it offers on its reserves, the quantity of reserves it issues, the
quantity of banknotes it issues promising to exchange them for reserves, and what
to buy with these reserves. This gives rise to the four different approaches that we
discuss from now onward.
2.2.5 Fiscal policy
Before doing so though, one must complete the description of the model. No model of
economic policy is complete without specifying how the central bank interacts with
the fiscal authority. As part of their actions, central banks may earn income and
rebate dividends to the fiscal authorities. For now, we assume that the fiscal authority
issues no bonds and has some exogenous spending programs, so it endogenously picks
taxes in order to pay for its spending minus the dividends it receives from the central
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bank. This is sometimes called a Ricardian policy, and it implies that the treasury
fiscally backs the central back, accepting whatever dividends it receives even if they
are negative.
2.3 No arbitrage approach: remunerating reserves
Banks can choose to hold reserves or real investments. Imagine that the expected
price level tomorrow is higher. Then, the return on reserves would be smaller than
that on real investments. The dollars that the central bank pays to the holders of
the reserves can afford fewer goods than the ones that holding real investment today
would give access to. Banks would want to hold zero reserves and invest all of their
resources in real terms if this persisted, which would not be an equilibrium given
the positive supply of reserves. Rather, as they demand fewer reserves, their value
must rise. Because the real value of the reserves is 1/Pt since, after all, they are
the unit of account, this means the price level must rise. A higher price level means
that the real return on reserves is now higher, rising until the point where people are
indifferent again.
The forces of no-arbitrage applied to central bank reserves therefore move the
equilibrium price level today. The equation capturing these forces is the Fisher
equation.2 The policy tool at the disposal of the central bank is its ability to choose
how to remunerate these reserves. The process for monetary policy in this case
consists of specifying how to remunerate reserves appropriately in order to pin down
inflation on target. We start with this policy strategy because it is the one followed
by most central banks today.
2.3.1 A simple but unused strategy: real payments on reserves
To begin though, we start with a policy process that no central bank that we know
of uses, but which makes the forces of arbitrage very transparent at pinning down
inflation. Imagine the central bank promises to remunerate reserve holders with a
payment in real goods of Xt, as suggested by Hall and Reis (2017). Governments
have issued indexed bonds for a long time across the world, and so could (and maybe
should) central banks, which is what promising a real payment amounts to. The
nominal return on reserves in dollars would then be Ivt,t+1 = (1 +Xt)Pt+1.
Rearranging equation (2.4) and using the result in equation (2.2) then delivers:
Et
[
Mt+1
(
1 +Rt − (1 +Xt)Pt+1Pt
Pt+1
)]
= 0 ⇔ Pt = 1 +Rt
1 +Xt
. (2.5)
2This equation assumes that reserves are a pure financial asset that provides no payment or
liquidity services, so they are valued purely for their returns. Reis (2016) estimates that the market
for reserves has been saturated in the United States since approximately 2011, once reserves started
exceeding $1 trillion.
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Since Xt is exogenously chosen by policy, and Rt is exogenously pinned down by real
forces, then the above equation delivers a determinate price level.
The central bank can then follow a process for this payment: 1+Xt = (1+Rˆt)/P ∗t ,
given its current estimate of the current real interest rate Rˆt, and the target for the
price level. To clarify the notation used, Et(Pt+j) is the public’s expectation at t of
what the price level will be at date t+ j, while Pˆt+j is the central bank’s expectation
at t. We do not assume rational expectations, so these may not be the same. Also,
we use small letters to denote log-linear deviations from a constant steady state, so
rt = ln((1 +Rt)β).
Give this process, the actual price level is:
pt = p
∗
t + εt with εt = rt − rˆt . (2.6)
Insofar as the central bank makes mistakes assessing the state of the economy, in
the form of the current real interest rate, the actual price level will deviate from its
target.
The intuition for how the price level is pinned down is the following. The real
return on any investment is pinned down exogenously by the stochastic discount
factor. If the central bank promises a real payment on reserves, then arbitrage pins
down how many goods reserves are worth today. This is the economic force behind
the Fisher equation: since real bonds and reserves both deliver the same payment
tomorrow, they must be worth the same today. But, since reserves are denominated
in dollars, not goods, then this pins down the price level today.
2.3.2 A Wicksellian rule
Most central banks instead announce a nominal interest rate on their reserves. Now
reserves and bonds are equivalent assets: each is denominated in dollars and promises
a risk-free payment in dollars.3 Therefore, by no arbitrage it must be that Ivt = It.
It is convenient in this section to work with a log-linearized version of the Fisher
equation around a steady-state point where inflation is constant Pt+1/Pt = Π. The
Fisher equation then becomes:
it − Et(∆pt+1) = rt. (2.7)
We already saw that simply setting ivt , and thus it as it wishes, does not pin down
inflation. However, imagine the central bank sets the interest rate according to a
feedback rule. In particular, consider a Wicksellian interest-rate process as described
3Again this assumes that the market for reserves is saturated. Otherwise, the interest on reserves
would only put a floor on short-term interest rates, since lending to the central bank carries the
least default risk in the economy and the maximum liquidity. The short-term interest rate can still
be set by the central bank but now only by both setting the interest on reserves and controlling the
amount of reserves through constant open-market operations.
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in Woodford (2011a):
it = rˆt + pˆ
∗
t+1 − p∗t + φ(pt − p∗t ), (2.8)
where φ > 0.
Combining the process with the Fisher equation (2.7) gives a difference equation
for the price level:
(1 + φ)pt − p∗t = (rt − rˆt) + Et(p∗t+1 − pˆ∗t+1). (2.9)
Iterating forward and imposing the terminal condition:
lim
T→∞
(1 + φ)−T Et
(
pt+T − p∗t+T
)
= 0 , (2.10)
then pins down the price level at the target pt = p∗t + εt, where the error is given by:
εt =
∞∑
s=0
(1 + φ)−s−1 Et
[
rt+s − rˆt+s + p∗t+1+s − pˆ∗t+1+s
]
. (2.11)
Inflation is now determinate. For a realization of shocks, there is a single inflation
rate, and the initial price level is pinned down as well. If εt = 0, then this feedback
process is observationally equivalent to a peg. Yet, the mere presence of φ > 0 solves
the two degrees of indeterminacy discussed in the previous section.
Under this process for monetary policy, expectations about future policy are as
important as current policy. With the payment on reserves rule, only the current
promised payment next period pinned down prices, with this feedback rule, it is the
iteration of interest rates until the infinite future that determines the price level.
Announced forward guidance by the central bank about changes in the target for
prices in the future p∗t+1+s or in the expected state of the economy in the future rˆt+s
both affect prices right away today.4
2.3.3 A Taylor rule
The more common feedback rule, which many central banks admit to follow is that
proposed by Taylor (1993):
it = rˆt + pˆ
∗
t+1 − p∗t + φ(∆pt −∆p∗t ) . (2.12)
Interest rates set by the central bank now respond to deviations of inflation from
target, as opposed to the price level. The condition on the strength of that response
is now φ > 1, the so-called Taylor principle whereby the central bank raises nominal
4These two types of announcements have been called Odysseian and Delphic, respectively, and
have been quantitatively criticized because they can have large effects right now even when the
future is distant.
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interest rates more than one-to-one if inflation deviates from target.
Similar steps of algebra now lead to:
∆pt = ∆p
∗
t +
∞∑
s=0
φ−s−1 Et
[
rt+s − rˆt+s + p∗t+1+s − pˆ∗t+1+s
]
. (2.13)
Since this holds for all t ≥ 0, it also pins down p0 for any given p−1, which is given
by history. Thus both degrees of determinacy are satisfied.
An enormous literature has used this rule as the process for monetary policy
following Taylor (1993)’s demonstration that it seemingly fits the U.S. experience
well.
The intuition for why the Taylor rule works goes as follows. Imagine that inflation
is higher than target at date t by one log unit. Then, the central bank will raise the
nominal interest rate by φ leading to an increases in expected inflation between t
and t+1 of φ. But this in turn leads the central bank to raise it+1 by φ2 which raises
expected inflation between t + 1 and t + 2 by that amount. The process continues
so inflation keeps on rising exponentially and the feedback rule delivers inflation in
T periods to be larger by φT .
If this is possible, inflation is not pinned down. Subject to this path for future
prices, the current price level can be one unit, or any other arbitrary amount higher
or lower; p0 is still indeterminate. Future stochastic inflation is determinate, as the
equations for εt show, since there is unique map from the exogenous shocks to the en-
dogenous realizations of inflation. The degree of indeterminacy is therefore solely on
the initial price level. Feedback rules by themselves did not solve the indeterminacy
of the initial price level. What did it was instead the terminal condition.
2.3.4 The elusive terminal condition
For the Taylor rule, the terminal condition was:
lim
T→+∞
φ−T Et
(
∆pt+T −∆p∗t+T
)
= 0. (2.14)
It was this condition that ruled out any price level that differs from the target by
anything but the errors in ε. A single path for the price level satisfies this condition,
so determinacy is achieved.
The Taylor principle that φ > 1 is important because it imposes that the random
variable defined by Et
(
∆pt+T −∆p∗t+T
)
belongs to O(φ). That is, if expected infla-
tion deviates from target, those deviations cannot grow faster than at the rate φ. If,
for instance, such deviations are bounded, which is coherent with the approximation
error in the log-linearization being small, then this condition will hold.
Feedback rules associate any indeterminacy of the initial price level to explosive
paths for inflation from then onwards. One can argue that such explosions are
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implausible and that people would never believe them. In the literature, equilibria
in which explosive beliefs are ruled out are called locally bounded equilibria. If one
thinks that these are the only plausible equilibria, then this gives rise to the terminal
condition above. Among the set of bounded equilibria, inflation will be uniquely
pinned down.
Yet, where does this equilibrium restriction or terminal condition come from? It
is not a transversality condition. Those apply to the real value of savings, whereas
the condition needed here is on a purely nominal variable, the price level. In the
same way that optimal behavior imposed no money illusion in the Euler equation, it
also imposes no money illusion in transversality conditions. Also, there is no sense
in which the economy blows up if this condition does not hold. The unit of account
may be exploding, but agents with no money illusion do not care for this at all. All
real outcomes and variables continue to be finite.
Cochrane (2011) provides a scathing critique of the use of this bounded assump-
tions. A large literature has debated alternative assumptions that mostly fit into
three lines of argument.
Escape clauses
The idea of an escape clause originates with Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983). The central
bank could commit to a feedback process only while inflation does not go on an un-
bounded explosive path. Otherwise, if inflation exceeds a pre-announced threshold,
the central bank would switch to another policy process (a money rule as in Taylor
(1996) and Christiano and Rostagno (2001)). These other rules would then be able
to pin down the price level at the date of that switch at a finite level.
More formally, the policy strategy is now to follow the feedback interest rate rule
while inflation is within some interval
[
piL, piH
]
, but if at some date T , inflation piT
falls outside this interval, then choose another policy process that at date T pins
down inflation, and so determines uniquely pT at the desired target p∗T perhaps with
an error. For instance, this might be the payment on reserves rule that we discussed
already.
In this case, iterating on the difference equation for the price level in equation
(2.9), in the case of the Wicksellian rule, now delivers:
pt = p
∗
t+
T−1∑
s=0
(1+φ)−s−1 Et
[
rt+s − rˆt+s + p∗t+1+s − pˆ∗t+1+s
]
+(1+φ)−T Et
(
pt+T − p∗t+T
)
(2.15)
Because the last term on the right-hand side is now uniquely pinned down by the
regime switch, then the price level of the left-hand side is uniquely pinned down as
well.
This approach to pinning down the price level is valid and perhaps even realistic.
If inflation was rising without bound, no central bank would stick to blindly following
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a feedback rule that tells it to raise interest rate more and more, even as it sees
inflation rising faster and faster. Switching to one of the other policy strategies
described in this paper, might well be what would happen, and even if the error
in that was very large, as long as it delivers uniqueness, the feedback rule would
uniquely pin down the price level in all other periods.
Theoretically though, in the sense of answering: “how does the central bank
control inflation?" this is not entirely satisfactory, as it relies on the other policy
processes to do it. At the extreme, if either the width of the interval
[
piL, piH
]
goes
to zero, or the errors εt are large enough, the economy would spend essentially no
time with the feedback rule after t = 1.
Equilibrium refinements
An alternative approach also relies on regime switches but these are now not provid-
ing a terminal price level, but rather making an off-equilibrium threat that ensures
the regime switch never happens. Much of this work builds on Bassetto (2005), and
includes Atkeson et al. (2010)’s sophisticated and Christiano and Takahashi (2018)’s
strategy equilibria.
The policy process is committed to a Taylor rule while inflation stays in a bounded
interval
[
piL, piH
]
. But if piT falls outside this interval, there is switch in process in
the next period at T + 1. This new process is able to uniquely pin down inflation
piT+1, but differently from before, this now happens to some level well inside the
interval, and in particular to a level such that piT+1 < piH − rt.
Therefore, from the Fisher equation (2.7) the regime switch pins down iT =
piT+1 + rt < pi
H . Yet, at T , the Taylor rule implies that since piT was larger than
piH , and the Taylor rule coefficient is larger than one, then iT > piH . This is a
contradiction. The only way to avoid it is for inflation to never leave the bounded
interval. If the width of the interval is large enough such that the size of the exogenous
shocks would never send the economy there, then what is ruled out are the explosions
that led to indeterminacy with a Taylor rule. Because the feedback rule implies that
inflation explodes at rate φ−1, then one of the bounds will be reached for sure in
finite time for any inflation level but for the one that satisfies the elusive terminal
condition that we used before.
Christiano and Takahashi (2018) emphasize that the process to which policy
switches must credibly deliver indeed a low inflation from then onwards. This may
require for instance that rt is endogenous to make sure that the key inequality piT+1+
rt < pi
H is reached.
Non-rational expectations
A third argument to justify a terminal condition in equation (2.14) focuses on the
expectations operator. What the central bank needs in order to pin down inflation
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is for people not to start expecting that inflation in an arbitrary far away future is
growing (or falling) at an explosive rate. Therefore, assumptions on how expectations
of these far away events are formed can deliver determinacy. Woodford (2013) reviews
macroeconomic models with non-rational expectations. They involve two related
concepts.
First is the concept of a temporary equilibrium, defined as a competitive equi-
librium at each date in time that depends on an exogenous set of subjective expec-
tations. One can write the temporary equilibrium as a map Γ(· ) from the sum of
the subjective expectations of future endogenous variables, et, to actual outcomes:
pit = Γ(et). For our simple model, combine a generalized version of the Fisher equa-
tion (2.7) that reads:
∞∑
s=0
βsrt+s︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡rrt
= it +
∞∑
s=0
βsE∗t (βit+s+1 − pit+s+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡et
, (2.16)
with the Taylor rule as given by equation (2.12). Γ(· ) is a linear operator such that:
pit =
1
φ
(rrt − ı¯t)− et
φ
, (2.17)
where ı¯t ≡ rˆt + pˆ∗t+1 − p∗t − φpi∗t is a set of exogenous variables that do not depend
on expectations.5
Second is the revision process by which expectations are updated. This often
requires specifying first a map Ψ (· ) from the conjectured set of expectations, et, to
expectations that would be correct if people acted under the conjectured expecta-
tions: e∗t = Ψ(et); as in the “calculation equilibrium” of Evans and Ramey (1992,
1995, 1998) This is simply derived by plugging the temporary equilibrium relation
into the definition of subjective expectations,
e∗t =
∞∑
s=0
βsE∗t
{(
β − 1
φ
)
rrt+s+1 +
1
φ
ı¯t+s+1 −
(
β − 1
φ
)
et+s+1
}
. (2.18)
Note that the non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium is defined as the fixed
point of this problem.
Let k be the stage in the revision process so that e(k) are the expectations
at this stage. Different expectations models will involve different law of motions.
For example, reflective expectations, introduced by García-Schmidt and Woodford
5The standard first-order difference equation in inflation that results from combining the baseline
Fisher equation and the Taylor rule:
pit =
1
φ
(rt − ı¯t) + 1
φ
E∗t pit+1 ,
is an alternative representation of this temporary equilibrium.
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(2019), feature a continuous specification:
∂et(k)
∂k
= e∗t (k)− et(k) = Ψ (et(k))− et(k) , (2.19)
while the k-level thinking literature, as in Farhi and Werning (2018), delivers the
discrete counterpart:
et(k) = Ψ
k (et(0)) . (2.20)
Both models are closely related and are examples of eduction. Moreover, if the
levels of thinking are assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, both models are
observationally equivalent.6 The main difference, however, lies in the interpretation.
Reflection is concerned with average beliefs allowing individuals to form expectations
individually, whereas in level-k thinking, all agents are assumed to be at the same
stage of the iteration process.
A third class of expectations models that fit into a similar setup are models
of least squares learning like McCallum (2009) and Evans and McGough (2018),
which are instead based on experience. These models assume that agents behave as
statisticians when forecasting the future value of variables and adjust expectations
as new data becomes available:
et = χ (pit−1, pit−2, . . . ) , (2.21)
where inflation dynamics are described by pit = Γ (χ (pit−1, pit−2, . . . )). Agents are
assumed to estimate the parameters of a system which simultaneously depends on
those estimates. The forecasting rule χ(· ) follows from the standard least squares
formula.
Next, we show a simple example in which the previously described models of
expectations converge to the non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium in the
limit.
Proposition 3. Consider a stationary environment, in which rt = 0 for all t, and
the monetary policy rule intercept is fixed such that ı¯t = ı¯ for all t. Moreover,
expectations of future endogenous variables are constant at all horizons and given by
(pie, ie).
(i) Reflective expectations converge to bounded rational expectations asymptoti-
cally.
(ii) Level-k thinking converges to bounded rational expectations asymptotically.
(iii) Least-squares learning converges to the bounded rational expectations asymp-
totically.
6See García-Schmidt and Woodford (2015) for the formal argument.
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Proof. The non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium is given by piRE = − 1φ−1 ı¯
and the corresponding belief sequence:
eRE =
1
1− β [βi
e − pie] = 1
1− β [β ı¯ + (βφpi − 1)pi] =
1
φpi − 1 ı¯ .
To prove part (i), we show that belief revision dynamics represented by (2.19)
converges as k grows boundlessly to the belief sequence associated with the non-
explosive rational expectations equilibrium. Given the above assumptions equation
(2.19) reads:
e˙ =
1
1− β
[
1
φpi
ı¯−
(
1− 1
φpi
)
e
]
, (2.22)
which has a stable solution at e¯ = eRE provided that φ > 1 i.e. the Taylor principle
holds.7
To prove part (ii), we show that belief revision dynamics represented by (2.20)
converges as k grows boundlessly to the belief sequence associated with the non-
explosive rational expectations equilibrium. For a finite k, equation (2.20) can be
rewritten as:
e(k) =
1
1− β
1
φ
ı¯
k−1∑
s=0
(
1− βφ
φ
1
1− β
)
+
(
1− βφ
φ
1
1− β
)k
e(0) . (2.23)
Thus, as k →∞, it follows that e(k)→ 1φpi−1 ı¯ as long as φ > 1 and e(0) is finite.
To prove part (iii), we make use of the e-stability principle that states that the the
mapping from the agent’s perceived law of motion (PLM), based on the econometric
specification, to the actual law of motion (ALM), which results from the temporary
equilibrium, governs the stability of equilibria under learning. The corresponding
mapping here is:
θ˙ =
1
φ
(θ − ı¯)− θ , (2.24)
which solves as θ¯ = − 1φ−1 ı¯, implying pit = piRE given the least-squares learning
specification.8 E-stability is guaranteed given φ > 1.
7Recall the stability theorem: let dx
dy
= f(x) be an autonomous differential equation and suppose
x(t) = x∗ is an equilibrium. Then, if f ′(x∗) < 0, x∗ is stable.
8To obtain the mapping above, note that the PLM is given by:
pit = θ , (2.25)
and plugging this into the temporary equilibrium in its first-order difference equation version delivers
the ALM:
pit =
1
φ
(θ − ı¯) . (2.26)
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2.3.5 Long-term interest rates and forward guidance
Central banks sometimes issue bonds, together with their traditional reserves. Whereas
the latter are central bank liabilities that are used as the unit of account and to set-
tle digital transactions that involve banks, the former are standard bonds of a fixed
maturity that are then paid off with reserves. In the same way that the central bank
chooses the way in which it remunerates reserves, it can potentially choose how to
remunerate these bonds. In doing so, the central bank is choosing not just a short-
term nominal interest rate, but also longer-term ones. This provides an alternative
way to try to control inflation (Adão et al., 2014; Magill and Quinzii, 2014).
If the central bank issues a j period bond and pays Ijt interest rate on it, then
the Euler equation that applies to this new form of investment is:
Et
[
Mt+1Mt+2...Mt+j(1 + I
j
t )
Πt+1Πt+2...Πt+j
]
= 1. (2.27)
Since the central bank chooses Ijt and theMt+j are exogenous, then this provides one
more set of equations, one for each date t, with which to try to determine the sequence
of inflation rates over time. Increasing the number of equations without increasing
the number of unknowns gives hope that perhaps inflation is now determinate. If
the central bank issues many such bonds of different maturities, then it creates more
equilibrium conditions with which perhaps it can control inflation.
To see this at play, consider the simple case in which there is only uncertainty
about Mt+1 and that this follows a two-state stationary Markov chain with values
MH and ML and transition matrix with probabilities that are non-negative and
satisfy BHH + BHL = 1 and BLH + BLL = 1. Controlling inflation is determining
the two values of inflation ΠH and ΠL uniquely for each of the two states. The Euler
equations with respect to the one period reserves and the two period bonds can be
written at state s as:
(1 + I1s )
(
BsH
MH
ΠH
+BsL
ML
ΠL
)
= 1, (2.28)
(1 + I2s )
(
BsH
MH
ΠH(1 + I1H)
+BsL
ML
ΠL(1 + I1L)
)
= 1. (2.29)
These are two equations in two unknowns. Standard linear algebra shoes that as
long as I1H 6= I1L, then there is a unique solution for inflation. The key condition for
determinacy is now that the central bank does not set the interest on reserves to be
the same across states of the world.
Note that this approach does not pin down P0. Only the stochastic degree of
indeterminacy disappears. Intuitively, not just the mean of inflation but also how
it covaries with the stochastic discount factor across two successive periods are now
pinned down by arbitrage. Thus, the indeterminacy of inflation across states of the
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world can be solved as long as the nominal interest rate varies with those states
of the world. However, while these interest rates are varying over states, over time
they are still pegged in the sense of section 2.2. Thus, the problem of controlling P0
remains.
No central bank that we are aware of has ever used this monetary policy process.
At the same time, central banks since 2010 have “gone long" by using unconventional
monetary policies, like quantitative easing, to exert control over long-term interest
rates, approximating the behavior just described. The major advanced-economy
central banks did not issue bonds, but they bought and sold government bonds
in order to exert some control over their interest rate through quantitative easing
policies.
Another way to achieve the same goal is to have forward guidance, whereby the
central bank uses speeches and announcements to control not just the current interest
on reserves, but also what people expect it to be. In fact, similar steps to before,
show that if the central bank announces both its current interest rates on reserves,
as well as its expected value for tomorrow, this again provides two equation with
which to solve for inflation across states.
2.3.6 Global analysis, banknotes, and the zero lower bound
A distinctive feature of the previous section is that it did not log-linearize the equi-
librium conditions. The previous log-linearizations in the study of feedback rules
were not crucial to the conclusions. To simplify the problem, eliminate uncertainty
on the real interest rate so the stochastic discount factor is now constant at β, and
there is only possibly indeterminacy with respect to the initial price level.
The Taylor monetary policy process then implies that:
Pt+1
Ptβ
=
P ∗t+1
P ∗t β
(
PtP
∗
t−1
Pt−1P ∗t
)φ
. (2.30)
The left hand side is the nominal interest rate given by the Fisher equation, and
the right-hand side is the non-linear Taylor rule with φ > 1. Letting Π˜t+1 =
(Pt+1/Pt)/(P
∗
t+1/P
∗
t ) be the deviations of gross inflation from target, this simpli-
fies to just Π˜t+1 = Π˜
φ
t , a nonlinear difference equation. Taking logs though, one
gets precisely the same dynamics as in the log-linearized case. If inflation starts on
target, when Π˜ = 1 it stays there forever. If it deviates upwards or downwards, then
this leads log inflation to explode to plus or minus infinity. Again a limit condition
that rules out these explosions will pin down inflation.9
This global analysis shows that with negative deviations of inflation from target,
at some point inflation will be so negative that the nominal interest rate must be
9It is easy to show that the same with the Wicksellian case: Pt+1/P ∗t+1 = (Pt/P ∗t )1+φ which
as an identical representation to Figure 2.1, but with deviations of the price level from target as
opposed to inflation.
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negative as well. Yet, central banks together with digital reserves also typically issue
physical banknotes. Since both are supposed to serve as the unit of account, they
exchange one-to-one. Banknotes though come with the property that they pay no
interest. This puts a constraint on the interest on reserves, namely that banks would
want to substitute all of their reserves for banknotes if interest rates were to become
negative. Banknotes therefore imply a zero lower bound on what the payment of
interest on reserves can be.10
The ZLB poses a constraint on the process for monetary policy, since from the
Fisher equation, non-negative nominal interest rates require that Pt+1/Pt ≥ β. With
the payment on reserves rule, or the Wicksellian rule, this lower bound makes no
difference to the determination of inflation.11 With a Taylor feedback rule though,
the ZLB becomes a serious issue. The Taylor monetary policy process then implies
that:
1 =
β
Πt+1
max
{
Π∗
β
(
Πt
Π∗
)φ
, 1
}
(2.31)
This difference equation for inflation is represented in Figure 2.1. As soon as
inflation is equal to β, it stays there forever. This is a global steady state equilibrium
of the system: a deflation trap. Moreover, note that if P0 is below target, the system
will converge in a finite number of periods to the deflation trap. Since any such
deviation leads to this same outcome, consistent with the equilibrium conditions,
then the price level is again indeterminate: any initial inflation between P ∗t+1/P ∗t
and β is consistent with an equilibrium, and is not ruled out by excluding explosive
solutions.
This problem arose in the first place because of the presence of banknotes. The
next section focuses on banknotes directly as process to control inflation.
2.4 The monetarist approach to inflation control
Banknotes, or currency, are distinct from reserves in four ways. First, they can be
freely held by anyone in the economy, not just banks. Second, they are physical but
still cost close to zero to be produced by the central bank, who is the monopoly
producer of them and their services. Third, they are anonymous as people do not
have to declare to government bodies how much currency they have and who they
10In reality, the lower bound is below zero because banknotes are physical while reserves are elec-
tronic, so holding the former comes with inconvenience and storage costs. Eliminating banknotes,
charging a tax on them, or defaulting on the commitment to exchange them one-to-one for reserves
are the three ways to eliminate the zero lower bound.
11To see this with the payment on reserves process, note that the modified process now is:
1 + xt = max
{
1+Rˆt
P∗t
, 1
Pt+1
}
. Once the zero lower bound does not bind, then this process pins
down the price level on target. When the zero lower bound binds at date t, then Pt+1 = Pt. As
long as the zero lower bound does not bind forever, then the price level is determinate, but the
central bank is incapable of achieving the desired target as inflation is equal to the negative of the
real interest rate during the ZLB episodes.
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Figure 2.1: Inflation dynamics at the ZLB
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transfer it to. Fourth, they pay no interest.
All combined, these properties lead to there being some demand for money which
declines with the nominal interest rate in the economy. They can be held by people
with tastes for privacy, or who do not want to use a bank as an intermediary to
make their payments, so they may provide some services in facilitating transactions.
Because the alternative to banknotes are reserves, the higher is the interest rate
they pay, the higher the opportunity cost of holding currency and thus the lower the
demand for it.
A particular form of this demand function is:
Ht
CtPt
= eut
(
It
1 + It
)−η˜
, (2.32)
where Ht/Pt ≥ 0 are real money balances, and ut represents a money demand shock.
The income elasticity of the demand for currency is set to one to be consistent with
the (rough) balanced growth fact that the left hand-side of this equation (sometimes
called the inverse of velocity) does not have a strong trend over decades in the
data. The interest-rate elasticity is measure by η˜, which we take to be constant,
even though attempts to estimate it often find it is not, and is close to zero. More
generally, attempts to estimate this equation have been fraught with difficulties since
both the measurement of Ht is hard, and all estimates find very poor fits or that the
variance of ut is very large.
The central bank controls the supply of banknotes HSt . However, because of the
existence of close substitutes to currency produced by the private market, financial
innovation implies that the market clearing condition is
Ht = e
vtHSt , (2.33)
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where vt is very volatile due to shocks to payments systems and financial innovation.
Moreover, because central banks stand ready to exchange reserves for banknotes
one-to-one at all times, even controlling the exact supply of banknotes is hard.
Combining these two equations, for currency supply and demand, together with
the Fisher equation and using the log-linearized version such that ht = log(HSt /H¯)
and η = η˜/I, we get the key equation of the monetarist approach:
ht − pt = ct − η(rt + Et ∆pt+1) + ut − vt. (2.34)
2.4.1 Microfoundations and the terminal condition
Relative to the microfoundations in section 2.2, private agents can now transfer funds
across time at zero interest rate by holding currency, and their preferences are
u(Ct, Ht/Pt) =
[
C
1−1/η˜
t + e
ut/η˜(Ht/Pt)
1−1/η˜
]η˜/(η˜−1)
. (2.35)
The first order condition gives rise immediately to the demand function stated before.
Another optimality condition from this optimization problem is the transversality
condition:
lim
T→∞
βT
(
∂U(CT , HT )
∂CT
)(
HT
PT
)
= 0. (2.36)
This states that the agents do not want to hold positive stocks of currency until
infinity because they could instead convert them into consumption and raise utility.
2.4.2 Money growth processes
The central bank could choose to exogenously set money supply ht as it wished. This
is a different approach to the one in the previous section. For a given ht that controls
inflation, there will follow an endogenous it that clears the market for currency. The
interest paid on reserves now becomes a secondary tool, adjusting endogenously to
support the exogenous choice of currency supply.
An effective rule for this supply is
ht = p
∗
t + cˆt − η(rˆt + pˆ∗t+1 − p∗t ) + uˆt − vˆt, (2.37)
which focuses on the central bank’s estimates of the shocks to supply and demand for
means of payment, together with the real interest rate and the level of consumption
as before.
Combining equations (2.34) and (2.37), iterating forward and imposing the transver-
sality condition, (2.36), yields pt = p∗t + t uniquely. The central bank is able to
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control inflation and the associated error is:
t =
1
η
∞∑
s=0
(
η
1− η
)s
Et[cˆt+s − ct+s − η(rˆt+s − rt+s) + (2.38)
(uˆt+s − ut+s)− (vˆt+s − vt+s) + η(p∗t+1+s − pˆ∗t+s+1)]. (2.39)
Monetarism controls inflation. At the same time, the control error is very large,
especially when compared to the one with interest-rate rules. The shocks to currency
demand and currency supply, ut and vt, are very large.
2.4.3 Seignorage processes
When the central bank prints more currency, it buys goods with it and these give
rise to a resource flow called seignorage. Since it costs close to nothing to produce
currency and there is a downward-sloping demand for it, currency is not a liability
of the central bank, but rather a durable good that it produces and sells for its value
1/Pt. Seignorage is then equal to:
St =
HSt −HSt−1
Pt
= Ct
[
eut−vt
(
It
1 + It
)−η˜
− eut−1−vt−1
(
It−1
1 + It−1
)−η˜ Pt−1Ct−1
PtCt
]
.
(2.40)
The second equality used the expression for currency demand. This expression
makes clear that seignorage and inflation are tightly linked. Higher expected inflation
comes with higher nominal interest rates, which lowers the demand for currency and
lowers seignorage. At the same time, a higher unexpected inflation implies that more
goods can be bought with the newly printed banknotes, which raises seignorage.
Consider then a policymaker which follows a policy process for seignorage. It
is committed to generating some revenue, like a government fiscal agency providing
some public service and which is given a target for sales. It will then print more or
fewer banknotes as needed to reach this target. We can log-linearize the expression
above to end up with a second-order difference equation for inflation, which once
combined with the transversality condition provides a unique solution for inflation.
A central bank that behaves strictly like a fiscal agent is able to control inflation as
explained by Sargent and Wallace (1975).
There are a few unsatisfying features of this process for inflation control. First,
since S in steady state is bounded above by Ceu−v, there is a limit that likely moves
over time to how much one can use this approach. If the central bank aims to
raise too much revenue, above this limit, this will not pin down inflation. Second,
seignorage is usually quite small, and shocks to demand and supply of currency make
its link to inflation very volatile. Therefore, calibrating it for use is prone to large
control errors. Third, seignorage is very easy to raise in the short run. This makes it
a tempting source of revenue for desperate policymakers needing to fill a fiscal hole,
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even if the end result is high inflation. In fact, historically, many hyperinflations were
preceded by large fiscal crises, and ended with fiscal reforms (Sargent and Wallace,
1975).
2.5 The budget approach
So far, we have described a central bank that issues reserves, prints currency, and
may even also borrow through long-term bonds. With these funds, central banks
buy assets and pay for expenses as well as rebate dividends to the fiscal authorities.
Letting Vt denote the value of reserves chosen at t − 1, At the real value of assets
chosen at t− 1, Et be real expenses and Dt be real dividends, then the flow budget
constraint of the central bank is:
Vt+1 + (1 +Rt−1)PtAt = (1 + It−1)Vt + PtAt+1 + Pt(Et +Dt − St). (2.41)
Because private agents must voluntarily decide to hold reserves, they will have
a transversality condition that imposes a no Ponzi scheme condition on the central
bank. This takes the form:
lim
T→∞
βT
(
∂U(CT , HT )
∂CT
)(
VT+1
PT
−AT+1
)
= 0. (2.42)
It states that the liabilities of the central bank must at infinity be covered by its
assets so the holders of the reserves always get paid.
Another important condition is the solvency constraint for the central bank.
Central banks are part of the government, but they are independent, and this inde-
pendence reflects itself as a constraint on the flow of dividends between the central
bank and the government. If there was no independence, then the central bank’s bal-
ance sheet could just be consolidated with that of the government, as unrestricted Dt
would connect the two. An independent central bank that was fully fiscally backed
would have its dividends always match precisely its net income, whether this is pos-
itive or negative, so its net worth would always be zero and its budget constraint
would again never bind. Instead central banks are often independent and not fully
backed, which can be expressed as a constraint on the stream of dividends they must
deliver.
We assume a simple case of such a solvency constraint, whereby the present value
of dividends from the central bank must be zero, so the central bank is intertempo-
rally solvent. The intertemporal budget constraint of the central bank then is:
(1 + It−1)
Vt
Pt
= (1 +Rt−1)At + Et
∞∑
j=0
Mt+1+j (St+j − Et+j) . (2.43)
Intuitively, this states that the real liabilities of the central bank equal its real as-
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sets plus the present value of revenues minus expenses. Substantively, the economics
behind it is the solvency condition for the central bank. Operationally, it points to
a new tool that the central bank can use to control inflation: the size of the balance
sheet, or the amount of outstanding reserves.
2.5.1 The budget process
Assume for simplicity that Et−St is exogenous i.i.d. mean zero εt. Rearranging the
budget constraint of the central bank then gives:
Pt =
(1 + It−1)Vt
(1 +Rt−1)At − εt . (2.44)
Since Vt and At were chosen at t− 1, they are exogenous at period t. Therefore, this
gives a single equation with a single unknown and uniquely pins down Pt.
If the central bank chooses the size and composition of its balance sheet with a
target inflation in mind, then this process will deliver inflation on target. All else
equal, the larger is Vt the larger will the price level be. The intuition is simply that
if the central bank has a larger debt, then this debt must be worth less, and the
inverse of the price level is the real value of the debt. Controls errors will be related
to surprises to revenues and expenses as captured by εt. If the central bank has
further control over its net expenses though, it can at least in principle minimize
these errors.
2.5.2 Relation to the FTPL
In this framework, there is no fiscal policy. Nevertheless, the above argument can
be easily framed in terms of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Simply assume
away central bank independence, so that the budget of the central bank and the
government are integrated. Their total nominal liabilities are now the sum of central
bank reserves and the market value for the government’s multitude of public bonds,
netting out the government bonds held by the central bank. In turn, net revenues
now include not just the central bank’s, but much larger and more relevant, the
primary surplus of the government.
The economic logic of price level determinacy is the same, and that is that the
larger is the total government debt, then the larger the price level will be in order
to bring the real value of that debt in line with the real surpluses. Trickier in this
perspective is the coordination between authorities. Now, control errors will arise
also from the side of the government and its fiscal surplus. Moreover, attempts by
the central bank to expand its balance sheet can be offset by decreases in borrowing
from the government. Finally, changes in the maturity of the outstanding public
debt affect the variability of inflation, but the central bank does not control the
Treasury’s choices of how much debt of each maturity to issue.
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2.6 Gold standard approach: choosing pegs
So far, we have considered only one good in the economy, and focused on financial
choices, the choice of currency, and the choice to hold government liabilities. Now,
we focus instead on consumption choices to describe one of the most classic forms of
inflation control: pegging the exchange rate of your unit of account to an external
good or currency.
With many non-durable goods available for consumption, the optimality condi-
tion of the household is that the log of the marginal rate of substitution between any
two goods, say good j and good 0 must equal the log of their relative prices:
ρt(i) = pt(i)− pt(0). (2.45)
The marginal rate of substitution is determined by the amounts of each good con-
sumed and produced which, just like the stochastic discount factor earlier, are ex-
ogenous from the endowments.
In turn, the price level is an index over the price of all goods, which we take as
being a simple geometric average:
pt =
I∑
i=0
ωi pt(i) = pt(0) +
I∑
i=1
ωiρt(i). (2.46)
The weights ωi are non-negative and sum to one, and should be independent of the
overall price level since agents do not suffer from money illusion.
This is the new key equation. It is capturing demand for goods given changes in
their relative prices. Because that choice is static, no terminal conditions are needed
or show up. The policy tool is that the central bank can choose to elect one (or
several goods) to peg its unit of account to.
2.6.1 A commodity peg
The tool of the central bank is to decide which one good is to become the anchor for
the unit of account. Reserves, or even currency, can now be denominated in terms
of units of that good. Taking that good as a gram of gold, say, then the central
bank can say that such a gram is worth 100 dollars say. Because the central bank
decides the unit of account for its reserves it can simply do this by decree. It just
has to announce that from now onwards 100 dollars of reserves will be able to buy
one gram of gold. The central bank will issue reserves, and if asked will exchange
these for currency, in unlimited amounts to keep the price of one gram equal to 100
dollars.
This clearly uniquely determines the price level. The question is rather how
effective this approach is. Consider a policy process then that decides that the
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arbitrary good 0 will be the commodity to which the price level is pegged to. The
central bank would like to adjust this peg in case of relative-price movements, but
only has an estimate of them. Its policy process is:
pt(0) = p
∗
t −
I∑
i=1
ωiρˆt(i), (2.47)
where ρˆt(i) is the estimate of the corresponding relative prices. The result is that
the price level is on target with control errors given by
εt =
I∑
i=1
ωi(ρˆt(i)− ρt(i)), (2.48)
The main problem with this approach is that these errors can be large. Changes
in the supply of the key good 0 or in the public’s tastes for it become sources of
deviations of inflation from target. Moreover, insofar as the good is complementary
with other, then changes in their supply will spill over to relative prices again leading
to control errors. The ideal good has a stable supply and is not complementary or
substitutable with that many other goods. Gold or other precious metals meet these
two criteria explaining why they have been used through history.
2.6.2 A peg to a basket
Instead of picking a good, the central bank could choose a wide consumption basket,
but having to come up with estimates of what their consumption basket weights will
be in any given period ωˆi. In this case, the policy process now is:
I∑
i=0
ωˆipt(i) = p
∗
t , (2.49)
and the control error is: εt =
∑I
i=0(ωˆi − ωi)pt(i). While this is more demanding of
the central bank and harder to implement, it may lead to smaller errors.
2.6.3 An exchange rate peg
Even more common than pegging to gold, is to peg to a foreign currency like the
dollar or the euro. A small open economy, which imports goods from other countries
denominated in this dominant foreign currency, will often accumulate large amounts
of this currency and stand ready to buy or sell them against its domestic reserves to
keep to this peg.
Letting j be a good denominated in this foreign currency, the first-order condition
in logs from the consumer is:
ρt(i, j) ≡ pt(i)− pt(j)− et, (2.50)
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where et is the log nominal exchange rate. Letting α denote the measure of home
bias and pFt be the foreign price index, which are both exogenous to the domestic
economy, the domestic price level is defined as:
pt = α
I∑
i=0
ωipt(i) + (1− α)
J∑
j=0
ωj [pt(j) + et] = α
I∑
i=0
ωipt(i) + (1− α)
[
pFt + et
]
.
(2.51)
Since the relative prices can be combined to read
∑J
j=0 ωj ρt(i, j) = pt(i)− pFt − et,
it follows that the price index becomes:
pt = α
I∑
i=0
J∑
j=0
ωiωjρt(i, j) + et + p
F
t . (2.52)
Pegging the exchange rate is choosing an et. This pins down the right-hand side
of this equation, and therefore the price level in the domestic economy.
2.7 The Phillips curve approach to inflation control
Central bankers often discuss the process of controlling inflation as a result of their
ability to affect real activity. The argument goes as follows: central bank policy has
an effect on the level of slack in the economy, meaning the amount of resources in left
unused. When firms use labor and capital more intensively (less slack), production
costs tend to rise and firms want to raise their relative prices accordingly. As they
all do so, the absolute price level rises.
So far, we have used (and maybe abused) the classical dichotomy to separate the
control of inflation from the effects of monetary policy on the real economy. In this
section, we let go of the assumption that output is exogenous. We replace it with the
standard assumption in the new Keynesian literature that monopolistic firms choose
the price of the good they produce to increase proportionally with marginal costs
and a markup. The price set is subject to nominal rigidities, and the firms stand
ready to produce whatever is demanded at that price.
The effect of introducing nominal rigidities and demand-determined output is to
deliver an expectations-augmented Phillips curve (in log-linearized variables):
pit = pi
e
t + κmct + ut (2.53)
The first term on the right-hand side piet is a measure of expected inflation by the
firms who set prices. Different models of nominal rigidities lead to different specifica-
tions of this term, and we will discuss a few alternatives in section 2.7.2. The second
term is a measure of aggregate real marginal costs mct, which is associated with
slack in product and labor markets. Several central bank tools can affect slack and
the costs faced by firms. Section 2.7.1 discusses credit while section 2.7.3 considers
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other alternatives. The third and final term ut is a stationary mean-zero markup
shock, capturing changes in the market power of firms.
2.7.1 The New Keynesian Phillips curve and credit tools
The most popular model of nominal rigidities is the sticky price model of Calvo
(1983). It assumes that firms set their price every period according to a Poisson
arrival, and otherwise have to keep their price unchanged from last period. Being
forward looking, when firms choose their price they take into account the probability
they will not be able to change it again into the infinite future. Expected future
inflation becomes an aggregate sufficient statistic for how expectations of future
changes in the price level, marginal costs, and markups will evolve. The result is
that pie = β Et(pit+1) where β < 1 is the steady-state discount factor.
Among the many tools used by central banks that we have discussed so far, the
missing candidate is credit policies. Central banks can have a direct effect on the
amount and price of private credit to firms. They do so directly by setting the
requirements for minimum reserves that banks must hold at the central bank as a
fraction of their deposits (or loans) and by imposing a variety of macroprudential
tools, including requirements that credit is bound to be a multiple of net worth, or
that a fraction of assets must be held in liquid marketable assets instead of loans.
In the recent decade, both the Bank of England and the European Central Bank
lent funds to banks at favorable rates under the condition that these funds were lent
to firms.12 We capture this myriad of policies by assuming that the central bank
targets the equilibrium real lending rate faced by firms rLt .
One component of firms’ marginal costs is the cost of having to raise funds ex-
ternally through loans to pay for investment and working capital. The opportunity
cost of doing so is the external finance premium rLt − rt, the difference between rais-
ing funds externally from banks or internally where the opportunity cost is the real
interest rate. Marginal costs can then be written as: mct = ψ(rLt − rt) + ct where ct
includes all the other stochastic determinants of marginal costs that we take to be
independent of inflation and ψ is the external finance premium elasticity of marginal
costs.
Combining these ingredients gives, as in previous sections, a pair of equations
capturing the economic mechanism and the policy tool rule:
pit = β Et(pit+1) + κψ(rLt − rt) + κct + ut (2.54)
rLt = rˆt + (κψ)
−1 [(1 + β)p∗t − pt−1 − βpˆ∗t+1 − κcˆt − uˆt]− pt−1 + elt . (2.55)
In the policy tool, a new source of error emerges, elt. This is the error that arises
from the lending rate not being directly set by the central bank, but only targeted
12These policies were called the Funding to Lending scheme, and the Targeted Long-term Repur-
chase Operation, respectively.
112
through different policies.
Imposing that limT→∞ βt Et(...) = 0 is uncontroversial since this is a combination
of forecasting errors that even minimally-rational agents should not expect to explode
over time, and real marginal costs which involve real resources and so are subject
to the consumer’s transversality condition. Therefore, iterating forward, inflation is
determinate and under control subject to errors given by:
εt =
1
1 + β
∞∑
s=0
(
1
1 + β
)s
Et
[
β(p∗t+1+s − pˆ∗t+1+s) + κ(ct+s − cˆt+s)
+ κψ(rˆt+s − rt+s) + (ut+s − uˆt+s) + κψelt+s
]
. (2.56)
A central bank that relies on the Phillips curve to control inflation is subject
to three new sources of errors, beyond uncertainty about real interest rates and
miscommunication about the target and the policy tool as in our previous analyses.
First are errors on markup shocks, which policymakers often refer to as “cost-push"
shocks, and were notably used to explain the failure to control U.S. inflation in the
1970s. Separating changes in markups from movements in marginal costs is itself
difficult in real time, and often takes economists years or decades to agree on.
Second, are errors on what current and future marginal costs are. Productivity
is notably volatile and hard to predict, as is the the marginal cost of hiring an
additional worker when there are different firms and households. As a result, central
banks end up employing significant resources to measure growth potential, output
gaps, natural rates, and other concepts that go into ct. In addition, the slope of the
Phillips curve, both in the sense of the structural parameter κ, and in the sense of
the reduced-form correlation between inflation and measures of slack, seems to shift
often enough that the policy rule is hard to implement without considerable errors.
Aside from these sources of errors arising from the Phillips curve, there is a third
source arising from the credit channel of monetary policy. Because rLt is not a direct
policy tool, but rather an intermediate target that a myriad of tools try to target,
there will be errors elt. The source of the error is similar to the supply and demand
shocks for currency in section 2.4: financial innovation in credit markets or any shock
to the banking sector will spill over to the level of inflation if the central bank uses
this policy tool.
2.7.2 Alternative models of the Phillips curve and expected infla-
tion
The literature has produced different models of nominal rigidities beyond sticky
prices.13 A large class of them focuses on imperfect information as the reason why
13And even within sticky price models, the Calvo model above is just the more popular, with sev-
eral alternatives including adjustment-cost models, fixed-cost state-dependent adjustment models,
partial indexation models, and others.
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firms do not perfectly adjust their prices to shocks. A simple canonical model in this
class has piet = Et−1(pit), which results from some firms receiving information with
a one-period delay, and so choosing their price based on their old information.14 A
third class of models assumes instead that agents are backward-looking and imitate
econometricians in using past time-series realizations data to make forecasts about
the future. The simplest classic model is the adaptive expectations assumption that
piet = pit−1.15
Starting with the imperfect-information case, the policy rule that controls infla-
tion is now:
rLt = rˆt + (κψ)
−1
(
pi∗t − βEˆt−1(pit)− κcˆt − uˆt
)
+ elt , (2.57)
The novelty is that the central bank must now respond to deviations of past inflation
expectations from the target. The central bank in this setting monitors surveys of
expectations, market prices of assets that provide hedges against inflation, or any
other piece of information that summarizes what people expected inflation to be. If
these measures differ persistently from target, the central bank responds aggressively
via its policy tool to affect slack and through it actual inflation.
By doing so, the central bank can control inflation so that pt = p∗t + εt and the
error now is:
εt = β
(
Et−1(pit)− Eˆt−1(pit)
)
+ κ(ct − cˆt) + κψ(rˆt − rt) + (ut − uˆt) + κψelt . (2.58)
There are two differences relative to the sticky price case. First, insofar as the
central bank can measure and respond to past expectations of present inflation, then
inflation is no longer affected by forecast errors about future conditions. Second, and
the other side of the coin, errors in measuring these expectations are now the main
source of control errors.
Turning to the backward-looking Phillips curve, naturally, the policy rule that
controls inflation now involves responding to past realizations of inflation:
rLt = rˆt + (κψ)
−1 (pi∗t − βpˆit−1 − κcˆt − uˆt) + elt , (2.59)
where we allow for the fact that due to measurement lags, past inflation is typically
not known precisely and must be estimated by the central bank. This naturally leads
to the control errors:
εt = β (pit−1 − pˆit−1) + κ(ct − cˆt) + κψ(rˆt − rt) + (ut − uˆt) + κψelt . (2.60)
14Within imperfect information models, there are dynamic sticky information models, rational
inattention models, models where agents receive imperfect signals on the state of the world, imper-
fect information arising due to higher-order uncertainty, and many combinations of these.
15Alternatives here include models with least-squares learning, imperfect knowledge, extrapolate
expectations, diagnostic expectations, and others.
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From this view on policy, a major investment by the central bank should go into
real-time measurement of inflation, complementing the measurement of real interest
rates, marginal costs, and markups.
2.7.3 Alternative central-bank approaches to affect inflation via
slack
Likely, lending rates are a small component of marginal costs. That is, ct is probably
very large. Therefore, using lending policies as the main monetary tool in conjunction
with the Phillips curve, may not be particularly efficient at controlling inflation.
Among the macroeconomic variables that affect marginal costs, the level of output
stands out as the main driver as it through its effect on the relative scarcity of
credit, the price of intermediate inputs or the level of wages. Therefore, considering
mct = αyt+ct instead may well minimize the variance of the determinants of marginal
costs that are orthogonal to output ct
Once the classical dichotomy does not hold, any of the previously discussed policy
tools at the disposal of the central bank can potentially affect real activity and so
marginal costs. The setting of interest rates, potentially combined with forward-
guidance and going long policies, that were discussed in section 2.3, the printing of
banknotes discussed in section 2.4, the quantitative and qualitative easing that vary
the size and composition of the central bank balance sheet in section 2.5, and the
foreign exchange rate interventions discussed in section 2.6, all have effects on real
activity. Through the Phillips curve, they will affect inflation as well, and so could
be used to control it.
At a general level, the Phillips curve captures a breakdown of the classical di-
chotomy in the sense that all shocks now have an effect on both real outcomes and on
inflation. That is, focusing on nominal income, nt = pt+yt in logs, the Phillips curve
captures the menu of possible combinations of pt and yt that may result. This makes
nominal income a natural intermediate target for monetary policy in a Phillips-curve
approach to controlling inflation. Through its multiple tools, the central bank can
steer nominal GDP. The Phillips curve then solves for how efficiently these control
inflation.
Taking the view that policy is now choosing nt, inflation solves:
pit = β Et(pit+1) + κnt − κpt + ut. (2.61)
This gives a stochastic second-order difference equation for pt:
β Et (pt+1)− (1 + β + κ)pt + pt−1 = −κnt − ut. (2.62)
The quadratic equation x2−(1+β+κ)x+β = (1−x/θ)(1−θx) has two positive
roots: θ and βθ where we choose θ to be the smallest among the two. Therefore, the
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difference equation has the solution:
pt = θpt−1 + βθ
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et (nt+k + ut+k) . (2.63)
From this it follows that choosing the policy target for nominal income to follow the
process:
nt =
1− βθ
βθ
[
p∗t − θpt−1 − βθ
∞∑
k=1
(βθ)k (nˆt+k + uˆt+k)
]
− uˆt + ent , (2.64)
will control inflation around the target with control errors:
εt = ut − uˆt + βθ
∞∑
k=1
(βθ)k [Et(nt+k)− nˆt+k + Et(ut+k)− uˆt+k] + 1− βθ
βθ
ent . (2.65)
Arguably, the errors in controlling inflation are smaller with this broad nominal
income targeting than with the narrow setting of credit policies. the trade-off is likely
between the ct being smaller but the ent being larger. This captures a more general
lesson in inflation control. Moving from direct instruments that the policymaker
controls to intermediate targets on endogenous variables on the one hand reduces
the errors arising from the relation between policy tool and economic variable while
on the other hand increases the errors in keeping the intermediate target on target.
2.7.4 The three-equation model
We now turn to the classic three-equation New Keynesian model that incorporates
the notion of output gap as a measure of the level of slack in the economy. The
output gap, yˆt, is the difference between actual output and its estimated potential,
understood as the output level that would arise in the absence of nominal rigidities.
To characterize the corresponding New Keynesian Phillips curve, we impose a linear
mapping from real marginal costs to output gap: mˆct = γyˆt, and sticky prices à la
Calvo (1983):
pit = β Et(pit+1) + κγyˆt + ut . (2.66)
So far we have assumed there is some component of the real marginal cost that
is exogenously determined. By fully dropping the classical dichotomy, a two-way
relationship between inflation and the real economy emerges. To see this assume log
utility and combine the Euler equation (2.1), the definition of the stochastic discount
factor and the Fisher equation (2.4):
1
Yt
= βEt
[
1
Yt+1
1 + It
Πt+1
]
. (2.67)
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Then, log-linearizing and rewriting in terms of the output gap delivers:
yˆt = Et(yˆt+1)− (it − Et(pit+1)− rnt ) , (2.68)
where rnt is the natural rate of interest. This equation is called the IS curve. Higher
expected inflation increases current output through an increase in consumption as
the incentive to save (the real interest rate) is reduced, other things equal.
The main implication of this new two-way relationship is that indeterminacy
now has real effects.16 Absent appropriate monetary policy, different combinations
of inflation rates and output allocations may well satisfy equations (2.66) and (2.68),
resulting in multiple equilibria. To prevent this, the three-equation New Keynesian
models features a Taylor-type rule that responds to both inflation and the output
gap:
it = r
n
t + φpipit + φyyˆt + vt , (2.69)
where vt is a monetary policy shock while φpi and φy are inflation and output Taylor
coefficients respectively.
Picking the Taylor coefficients to ensure determinacy in this setting involves
slightly more algebra. First, rewrite equations (2.66), (2.68) and (2.69) in matrix
notation: [
yˆt
pit
]
= A
[
Et {yˆt}
Et {pit+1}
]
+ Ωvt , (2.70)
where A ≡ Ω
[
1 1− βφpi
κγ κγ + β(1 + φy)
]
and Ω ≡ 1
1 + φy + κγφpi
.
Next, evaluate the stability of a system of linear difference equations using the
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions. These state that a unique non-explosive
solution will exist whenever the number of eigenvalues of A outside the unit circle is
equal to the number of non-predetermined variables. For the above, both eigenvalues
of A lie within the unit circle provided: φy(1 − β) + κγ(φpi − 1) > 0.17 This is an
16See Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002) and Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005) for further discussion
on sticky prices and real indeterminacy.
17The characteristic polynomial of A is given by:
det
∣∣∣∣∣
1
1+φy+κγφpi
− λ 1−βφpi
1+φy+κγφpi
κγ
1+φy+κγφpi
κγ+β(1φy)
1+φy+κγφpi
− λ
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 ,
which can be rewritten as:
[1− λ(1 + φy + κγφpi)] [κγ + β(1 + φy)− λ(1 + φy + κγφpi)]− κγ(1− βφpi) = 0 ,
and simplifies to: λ2 + a1λ + a0 = 0, where a1 = − 1+κγ+β(1+φy)1+φy+κγφpi and a0 =
β
1+φy+κγφpi
. Both
eigenvalues of A lie within the unit circle if and only if both of the following conditions hold:
(i) |a0| < 1
(ii) |a1| < 1 + a0
Condition (i) is trivially satisfied as 0 < β < 1. For condition (ii) to be satisfied: φy(1 − β) +
κγ(φpi − 1) > 0.
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generalized version of the Taylor principle.
The New Keynesian model as presented here is subject to the same caveats high-
lighted in sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.6: determinacy relies on a terminal condition and
policy specifications disregard the zero lower bound constraint on the Taylor rule.
The recent monetary experience has made the latter particularly relevant and a num-
ber of papers have studied the model’s behavior in a liquidity trap. Cochrane (2016)
argues that central banks can increase inflation at the zero lower bound by increasing
their interest rate targets. Eggertsson (2010) and Eggertsson et al. (2014) emphasize
that positive supply shocks, such as increased labor supply or structural reforms, can
be contractionary.18 Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011), Woodford (2011b)
and Carlstrom et al. (2014) find fiscal multipliers to be larger than normal times and
increasing in the duration of the fiscal stimulus. Del Negro et al. (2012) document
that the model overestimates the macroeconomic effects of central bank announce-
ments about future interest rates.19 Cochrane (2017) stresses policy predictions are
strengthened as price stickiness is reduced despite effects vanishing at the friction-less
limit.
In these papers, policy is often characterized as an exogenous path for the nominal
interest rate {i∗t }∞t=0. To overcome the indeterminacy that results from an interest
rate peg, Werning (2012) shows that featuring a Taylor rule of the type: it = i∗t +
φ(pit − pi∗t ), where pi∗t is the equilibrium inflation rate, is observationally equivalent.
However, there are many inflation rates that are consistent with i∗t in equilibrium and,
thus, it is the central banker’s choice which one she picks to implement. Cochrane
(2017) shows that this equilibrium selection process is key in understanding the
puzzling predictions of the New Keynesian model at the zero lower bound. Different
pi∗t deliver different policy prescriptions.
2.8 Conclusion
In his presidential lecture to the American Economic Association, Christopher A.
Sims (2013) concluded:
The kinds of models that have been the staple of undergraduate macroe-
conomics teaching, with price level determined by balance between “money
supply” and “money demand”, and money supply described using the
“money multiplier”, are obsolete and provide little insight into the policy
issues facing fiscal and monetary authorities in the last few years. There
are relatively simple models available, though, that could be taught in
18Wieland (2019) provides empirical support to this claim.
19Many papers have since then attempted progress on addressing the so-called forward guid-
ance puzzle. McKay et al. (2016) focus on incomplete markets while Angeletos and Lian (2018)
and Gabaix (2018) abstract from rational expectations and propose a framework with imperfect
information and behavioral myopia respectively.
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undergraduate and graduate courses and that would allow discussion of
current policy issues using clearer analytic foundations.
This article tried to present these simple models, emphasizing their common
features, and presenting their differences in terms of different policy choices rather
than as opposing schools of thought. In future work we hope to evaluate each of
processes empirically by estimating their hypothetical effectiveness.
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Chapter 3
Dual Mandates and Excessive
Hawkishness: a Principal-Agent
Approach
3.1 Introduction
The aftermath of the recent financial crisis brought under discussion the benefits
and reservations of the adoption of a dual mandate by central banks throughout the
world. While the initial response of monetary authorities to the credit freeze and the
incipient downturn was akin across developed economies, marked disparities in policy
design during the late recession and, especially, during the recovery have questioned
the suitability of inflation targeting as the unique objective of central banks.
In the first phase of the crisis, 2007-2009, the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) responded aggressively to the
bursting of the US housing bubble by cutting interest rates to effectively zero and
implementing an array of unconventional monetary policy measures in an attempt
to ease liquidity and fix disrupted financial markets.
During the second stage of the crisis, 2010-2013, the Fed, on the one hand, contin-
ued to pursue intense monetary stimulus, conducting large open market operations,
in order to propel robust economic growth as well as to enhance the recovery of the
labor market. Its European counterpart, on the other hand, remained much more
cautious: purchases made by the ECB appear limited in comparison to the large
packages of quantitative easing implemented by the US and interest rates were even
pushed up twice in 2011, despite the impending sovereign debt crisis in the Euro
area.
According to some economists, the difference in mandates is accountable for the
divergence in the strategies followed by policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Since 1977, the US Federal Reserve Act states that decision making in monetary
policy should be guided by the objectives of maximum employment, stable prices
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and moderate long-term interest rates. Meanwhile, unlike the Fed, the ECB (and,
similarly, the BoE) is mandated to deliver price stability, defined as keeping headline
inflation around 2 percent in the medium run.
Undoubtedly the performance of the US economy has, by far, exceeded that of
the Euro zone during the aftermath of the crisis: the recession was technically over
as early as June 2009 and ever since GDP has been growing gradually but steadily
with its rate reaching 2.4% in the fourth quarter of 2013. The Euro zone fell into a
second and longer recession in the third quarter of 2011, which exited much later;
GDP grew 0,3% in the last quarter of 2013 and the unemployment rate is at almost
record levels of 12.1%.
While the suitability of a dual mandate is still uncertain, the recent experience has
revived the debate. Should strict inflation targeting be complemented by economic
growth objectives in any form, for example, targeting output gap or unemployment
stabilization?
The ongoing discussion, however, has overlooked an outstanding revelation: it is
precisely this 2010-2013 episode the unique example of clear dissension among mon-
etary authorities from the main western economies. Despite long-established differ-
ences in objectives, central banks have responded to shocks using similar strategies.
Strict inflation targeting has been the predominant approach to monetary policy
implementation even in countries with an explicit dual mandate.
The historic trend is actually more surprising than by its recent reversal. As high-
lighted by The Economist in late 2012, it is common knowledge that policymakers
at the US Federal Reserve have always felt more comfortable with the low inflation
statutory goal than with full employment and it has not been until the recent crisis
that the Fed has publicly emphasized that unemployment and inflation both carry
weight in its decisions by setting a threshold for each objective.
Current differences in policy-making are perfectly in line with predictions made
by economic theory, while former homogenized behavior is hardly rationalized using
existing models. In fact, little or no attention has been devoted to studying the causes
behind central banks’ marked hawkishness. This paper examines the incentives that
shape central bank’s decision making in order to address the following question: why
do central banks with a dual mandate prioritize inflation stabilization?
I build a model of monetary policy design based on a principal-agent problem
framework, where society (or Congress) is forced to delegate the implementation of
optimal policy to two independent agents. The monetary authority is entrusted with
two tasks, inflation stabilization and economic growth, while the fiscal authority is
only responsible for the latter. The agent evaluates the benefits of exerting effort
in each of the tasks and the personal costs associated. The key elements are the
compensation scheme and the coordination of strategies between the two agents.
These can lead to excessive hawkishness by central banks with a dual mandate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes prevailing
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monetary macroeconomic models, outlines related micro-foundations and reviews
existing literature. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework, solving for the
optimization problems and introducing main results. Section 3.4 discusses potential
extensions and main caveats and, finally, Section 3.5 brings this paper to an end by
adding some concluding remarks.
3.2 Literature Review
This section reviews, on the one hand, prevalent macroeconomics models of monetary
policy design, and, on the other hand, the microeconomic literature on contract
theory and moral hazard that will serve as a building block for my model.
Models of optimal monetary policy Optimal monetary policy has always been
a recurrent topic of interest in Macroeconomics, especially after the hyperinflation
episodes that followed World War I. However, the most fruitful period of research
started in the mid 70s, and took off during the 80s and 90s (see also Taylor and
Williams (2010) for a detailed review).
Economists address the question of how monetary policy should be conducted
using either a historical or a model-based approach. The former, which focuses on
the empirical analysis of a particular event or case study to provide intuition of
what works in practice, has been loosing ground to the latter as sophisticated DSGE
models with rational expectations and nominal rigidities have been developed.
Barro and Gordon (1983a) present the first positive theory of monetary and
inflation policy in a purely discretionary environment that is relevant for this analysis.
Building on the verbal and graphical model of Kydland and Prescott (1977), they
align the monetary authority’s objective with the preferences of a representative
private agent. In other words, the extent of monetary response to a shock is governed,
mostly, by society’s relative dislike for inflation and unemployment. This theoretical
framework lies within the main contributions of the paper and has been used by
a large number of succeeding papers in the monetary literature, including the first
section of the model I present below.
In addition, the main finding of the paper is that rational expectations lead to an
inflation bias: the central bank will keep unemployment rate below its natural level,
raising wages, which, ultimately lead to a higher inflation rate. This is explained
by the inability of the central bank to commit to a zero inflation rate, the efficient
monetary policy, i.e. the inconsistency of optimal plans.
The literature provides different solutions to the inconsistency problem in mone-
tary policy: rules, reputation and delegation. In the first case, the policymaker can
credibly commit in advance to a rule that is responsive to changes in observable vari-
ables, generally, changes in inflation and the output gap. McCallum (1986), Taylor
(1986), Svensson (2001), and many others, discuss the design of these policy rules
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and estimate their performance relative to discretionary policies. However, as argued
by Taylor (2011), despite the popularity of rule-based monetary policy during the
80s and the 90s, in the last decade, there has been a dramatic shift back toward
discretionary policies.
A second alternative proposed by Barro and Gordon (1983b) and Backus et al.
(1985) involves repeated interaction between the central bank and the private agents.
In such a game, they argue, reputational considerations discourage the monetary au-
thorities from pursuing surprise inflation (deviating from optimality) and, therefore,
contracting constraints are not required.
Finally, the delegation solution assumes that the government delegates the mone-
tary policy task to the central bank. In these models, the design of institutions plays
an important role, given that it might lead to differences in the loss function adopted
by the central banker and that desired by the government (or society). Some papers
that support this approach include Rogoff (1985), Svensson (1997), and Chortareas
and Miller (2003). Among this, Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995) in-
troduce an explicit principal-agent approach, in which a penalization rate is imposed
whenever the central bank deviates from the stipulated inflation target.
The main innovation of this set of papers, which I follow throughout the model,
is the idea that it is not central banks but policymakers that set interest rates and
are, therefore, subject to behavioral motives.1 Following this notion, my model in-
corporates a moral hazard rationale to the monetary policy decision-making process.
However, it addresses a completely different phenomenon: excessive hawkishness in
central banks with dual mandates.
Moral hazard Given the above, the model is closely influenced by the mechanism
design literature, more precisely, it formalizes an economic relation between soci-
ety and the central banker that easily fits into the general principal-agent problem
framework. As it is commonly known, the agency problem arises when the principal
needs to delegate on a different party, the agent, the fulfillment of a given task. If the
agent’s actions are unobservable, there is an incentive for the agent to prioritize her
own interest over the objective of the principal. In these circumstances, the principal
seeks to design a compensation scheme that mitigates the effect of the informational
asymmetries and indirectly incentivizes the agent choosing the correct action. Hart
and Holmstrom (1987) provide a good introduction to the methodology of moral
hazard.
The literature has developed a large number of extensions to this basic analysis.
For example, Bernheim andWhinston (1986) consider a model with several principals
but a single agent. Another interesting and popular extension by Fudenberg et al.
1What is sometimes known as the who and the how of monetary policy has drawn attention from
researchers recently. Reis (2013) offers an important selection of topics in central bank design with
a special mention to the strictness of the central bank’s mandate.
126
(1990) and Allen (1985) among others, investigates the dynamics of the incentive
mechanism. They investigate how efficient long-term contracts are relative to short-
term ones, in a context in which the agency problem repeats over many periods. Dye
(1986) allows for the observability of the agent’s effort but after paying a monitoring
cost.
The most relevant extension for this paper is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
They explore the more realistic case of multidimensional effort and develop a model
in which the principal’s utility depends on multiple tasks the agent engages in. In
this setting, the problem cannot be simplified to a trade-off between risk sharing
and incentive design. The principal must now take into account how the incentive
provided for one action might affect the incentive to undertake a different task. In
fact, the incentive contract varies with the shape of the cost function (degree of
substitutability of efforts) and the degree of observability of tasks. The examples
considered by the original paper include the remuneration of CEOs, salespeople job
description or the debate on incentive pay for teachers, but can easily be extended
to any other context.
3.3 Model
This section develops a model of monetary policy design which is two-fold and based
on a multitask principal-agent setting. I first focus on the principal optimization
problem in which society (or the general public) minimizes deviations in output and
inflation from a given target subject to the constraints faced by the policymaker, in
order to determine the optimal level of both monetary and fiscal policy.
I then assume that the principal cannot implement policy on its own, which would
correspond to the first best in this context, but is forced to delegate the tasks to an
agent. More specifically, this is a model with two agents and two tasks: inflation
stabilization depends solely on the central bank while output stabilization depends
on both the fiscal and the monetary authority. I abstract however from analyzing
the fiscal authority and focus mainly on the central bank’s optimization problem in
the second part of this section.
3.3.1 Principal’s Optimization Problem
This is a model of monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity. Given the
former, output produced by monopolists is inefficiently low and leaves room for pol-
icymakers to increase the supply of goods through a production subsidy. Note, how-
ever, deadweight losses prevent fiscal authorities from fully subsidizing production
to its efficient outcome and, consequently generating an output gap. The monetary
authority is then responsible, in addition to price stabilization, for closing the output
gap through unanticipated monetary policies which have real effects due to staggered
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prices.
I follow Dixit and Lambertini (2003) in extending the Barro and Gordon (1983a)
model to include not only monetary but also fiscal policy in the analysis. The social
welfare loss minimization problem is specified as:
min
1
2
ˆ (
pi (z)− piF )2 + θF (y (z)− yF )2 + 2δx(z)
subject to
pie = Ez [pi(z)] ≡
ˆ
pi(z) ,
y(z) = y¯ + ax(z) + b [pi(z)− pie] ,
pi(z) = m(z) + cx(z) .
The interpretation of parameters is the following: y¯ is the natural rate of output
growth, a > 0 measures the direct effect of fiscal policy, b > 0 features the effect
of an unexpected increase in the inflation rate on GDP and c < 0 captures the
effect of fiscal policy on the price level. Monetary and fiscal policy instruments are
denoted m(z) and x(z) respectively. The former can represent either the monetary
base or the nominal interest rate while the latter is a production subsidy. piF is the
average level of pre-set prices in the economy, while yF is the average level of GDP
growth. Fiscal policy generates a deadweight loss measured by δ. Finally, θF is the
relative weight given to output fluctuations in the social loss function and represents
principal’s preferences.
The minimization problem can be rewritten (and simplified) to read as follows:
min
1
2
ˆ (
m (z) + cx(z)− piF )2 + θF (y¯ + ax(z) + b [m (z) + cx(z)− pie]− yF )2 + 2δx(z)
subject to
pie =
ˆ
m(z) + cx(z)
3.3.2 Solving the Principal’s Optimization Problem
As argued by Dixit and Lambertini (2003) plugging pie into the objective function
complicates the algebra substantially. I therefore follow their approach and assume
that society has an additional choice variable which is also subject to the constraint,
expected inflation pie. The corresponding first order conditions read:
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w.r.t x(z) : (pi (z)− piF )c+ θF (a+ bc)
(
y(z)− yF )+ δ + λc = 0 ,
w.r.t m(z) : (pi (z)− piF ) + θF b
(
y(z)− yF )+ λ = 0 ,
w.r.t pie : − λ−
ˆ
θF b
(
y(z)− yF ) = 0 .
After some rearrangements, the optimal inflation and output allocations are given
by:
y∗(z) = yF − δ
θFa
, (3.1)
pi∗ (z) = piF +
δb
a
−
ˆ
δb
a
. (3.2)
The optimal inflation rate and output growth can be written as a function of
exogenous variables. To solve for optimal monetary and fiscal policy, simply combine
the first order conditions with the constraints of the original optimization problem,
to get:
m(z) =
c
a
· (y¯ − y(z)) + (1 + c
a
)pi(z) +
b · c
a
pie ,
x(z) =
1
a
· (y(z)− y¯)− 1
c
· pi(z)− b
a
pie ,
and then substitute pi(z) and y(z) by the optimal values given in equations (3.1) and
(3.2).
This is the first best. Nevertheless, the model assumes that society cannot imple-
ment policy directly and instead is forced to delegate the job to the central banker
and the fiscal authority, the analysis of which follows next.
3.3.3 Agent’s Optimization Problem
For the benchmark model, I partially disregard the role of the fiscal authority and
focus exclusively on the central banker as the main agent. The monetary policymaker
has a dual mandate: to stabilize prices, on the one hand, and to foster economic
growth, on the other.2 Thus, the central banker undertakes both of these tasks by
choosing the level of effort epi and ey, producing qpi and qCBy correspondingly.
2Traditionally, the literature has viewed this second mandate as the full stabilization of the
output gap. However, given the framework I consider below, it is difficult to maintain this interpre-
tation of y because it would necessarily lead to the agent exerting negative effort in certain periods.
In order to reconcile the model with the mainstream interpretation of y, one should view e no longer
as the effort level but as the input chosen by the monetary authority who cannot choose perfectly its
implementation but is subject to some error. The analysis that would follow is, however, similar to
the one here presented. Thus, to avoid confusion and for the sake of simplicity, I shall assume that
the second objective of the central bank is to pursue sustained GDP growth, rather than closing
the output gap.
129
The agent optimization problem reads as follows:
max
qpi ,qCBy
u
[
w(qpi, q
CB
y )
]− ψ(epi, ey)
subject to
qpi = epi + νpi ,
qCBy = ey + νy ,
where the agent features a utility function, which is separable in income and effort
as it is standard in the moral hazard literature. Note further that w(qpi, qy) is the
reward scheme, in order words, compensation given by society for accomplishing
the job, and ψ(epi, ey) is the personal cost the central banker incurs when exerting
effort.3
Cost function specification I follow Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)’s basic
setup in their well-known multitask principal-agent analysis. They assume the
agent’s cost function adopts a flexible functional form that allows for different degrees
of substitutability among the tasks undertaken by the agent:
ψ(epi, ey) =
1
2
(
cpie
2
pi + cye
2
y
)
+ ρepiey with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ √cpicy .
There are three possible cases. At one extreme, suppose ρ = 0 , implying that
the two efforts are technologically independent. At the other extreme, ρ = √cpicy,
meaning that the two efforts are perfect substitutes. Anything in between, ρ ≥ 0, is
referred to as the effort substitution problem, whereby increasing the effort on one
of the tasks raises the marginal cost of effort on the other task. In order to formalize
the existing trade-off faced by the agent when deciding whether to prioritize inflation
targeting or output stabilization and to what extent, I consider the latter case.
Reward scheme specification The design of the reward scheme is the core as-
sumption in this paper given that it shapes the incentives of the central banker to
exert the effort required to achieve the first-best solution. In this sense, the reward is
taken to be inversely proportional to the dispersion between society’s desired value
and its perception of agents’ actions. In the case of inflation, society observes qpi
directly while in the case of output society observes a combined measure of what
both the central banker and the fiscal authority are implementing in order to pursue
stable output growth.4
3To keep the analysis as simple as possible, I here consider an economic compensation i.e. wage,
however, it is possible to build a dynamic model in which the central banker does not (only) care
about the wage but is concerned about her chances of remaining in her position during the following
period. This would involve incorporating career concerns incentives.
4The interpretation of the outcome of effort here deviates slightly from the standard principal
agent problem. I shall not regard qpi as the resulting inflation rate in the economy but rather as
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Thus, consider the following specification:
w(qpi, qy) = λ
[
−1
2
(qpi − pi∗(z))2
]
+ (1− λ)
[
−1
2
(qy − y∗(z))2
]
,
where qy = Q(q
CB
y , q
FA
y ) .
Given the above expression, instead of considering a central banker who receives
a monetary incentive for accomplishing tasks, I present an agent who is punished for
not performing her tasks correctly. Therefore, when optimizing, the central banker
shall now consider the disutility of the punishment, instead of the utility of the
compensation.
Next, consider Q(qCBy , qFAy ), which indirectly relates the agents’ efforts regarding
output stabilization and the resulting, observable, measure of output which society
uses to determine compensation. I assume that qCBy and qFAy are complements to
each other to some extent. This eliminates incentives to completely free ride on the
other agent and the possibility of assigning one task to one agent to achieve the first
best. This paper explores different degrees of complementarity and how it affects
model outcomes. In particular, I consider the general case of imperfect complements
such that Q(qCBy , qFAy ) is a Cobb-Douglas function.
Fiscal authority’s behavior A crucial assumption is the extent to which the
central banker knows policy choices made by the fiscal authority. For the benchmark
set of results, I assume that qFAy is known by the central banker at the time of
choosing monetary policy. This means that it has full information regarding the
fiscal’s authority behavior. I acknowledge that this assumption may be unrealistic
because it requires the fiscal authority being the first mover or the central bank
having full access to the fiscal authority’s decision making process while the opposite
does not hold. However, in such a context, the central banker does not need to form
expectations, simplifying the analysis considerably.
Income utility specification Traditionally, the literature specifies a risk neutral
agent which maximizes a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function.
The agent only has control over the mean, and not the riskiness, of its compensation.
In fact, the coefficient of risk aversion only affects how the principal designs the
incentive contract. Given that the reward scheme specification considered above is
not quadratic, for the sake of simplicity, I consider a risk neutral agent with a linear
utility function in income.
The agent maximization problem looks as follows:
an informative measure of what the central banker is doing in relation to price stabilization (the
central bank’s target for inflation).
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min
qpi ,qCBy
u
(
λ
[
1
2
(qpi − pi∗)2
]
+ (1− λ)
[
1
2
(Q(qCBy , q
FA
y )− y∗)2
])
+
1
2
(
cpie
2
pi + cye
2
y
)
+ ρepiey
subject to
qpi = epi + νpi ,
qCBy = ey + νy .
3.3.4 Solving the Agent’s Optimization Problem
Recall from above that qFAy is known by the central banker when she solves its opti-
mization problem, the utility function u(·) is linear and further simplify qi = ei ∀i ∈
{pi, y}. Suppose that the target that society observes is: qy = (qCBy )α(qFAy )1−α i.e.
imperfect complements case.
The central banker’s maximization problem becomes:
min
qpi , qCBy
λ
[
1
2
(qpi − pi∗)2
]
+ (1− λ)
[
1
2
((qCBy )
α(qFAy )
1−α − y∗)2
]
+
1
2
(
cpiq
2
pi + cy(q
CB
y )
2
)
+ ρqpiq
CB
y
such that the first order conditions read:
w.r.t qpi : λ[qpi − pi∗] + cpiqpi + ρqCBy = 0 , (3.3)
w.r.t qCBy : α · (1− λ)[qy − y∗]
(
qFAy
qCBy
)
1−α + cyqCBy + ρqpi = 0 . (3.4)
This is a system of non-linear equations with no closed-form solution, which
complicates the interpretation of results. In order to build intuition, instead of
solving for qCBy and qpi directly, I first consider and discuss the most extreme cases,
by evaluating the first order conditions at particular parameter values of λ and qFAy .
This will familiarize the reader with how the incentive mechanism works in the model.
Based on reward Suppose that society rewards the central banker based only
on the result of inflation. This implies that λ = 1. The corresponding results are
qpi =
pi∗
(1+cpi)− ρ2cy
> 0 and qCBy = − ρpi
∗
(1+cpi)cy−ρ2 < 0. It is difficult to rationalize the
resulting negative target for output growth. So it might be convenient to restrict
choice of qCBy to a value of at least zero, thus, obtaining qpi =
pi∗
(1+cpi)
and qCBy = 0. In
any case, the interpretation is straightforward. Whenever the monetary policymaker
is only rewarded for the task of inflation stabilization, she will completely prioritize
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the control of prices and will subordinate the choice of an output target i.e. the value
qCBy is found as a residual using the constraints the central banker faces.
An important characteristic of this result is that it will hold for any specification
of Q(qCBy , qFAy ). This is intuitive; if the central banker is not compensated for the
stabilization of output, from her point of view, the aggregation of individual output
targets is completely irrelevant for the optimization problem.
Based on fiscal authority’s behavior Let’s now consider the fiscal author-
ity’s set of choices and how the central bank reacts to this information. Without
formalizing the government’s optimization problem, I consider analytically the two
polar scenarios that are of interest from the central bank’s point of view and repre-
sent graphically results for the intermediate case, where the fiscal authority chooses
any value lying between the two extremes.
First, say the fiscal authority is well behaved. In other words, suppose the gov-
ernment or Treasury sets its target value exactly as the general public would i.e.
qFAy = y
∗. In this case, the first order conditions of the problem become:
w.r.t qpi : λ[qpi − pi∗] + cpiqpi + ρqCBy = 0 ,
w.r.t qCBy : α · (1− λ)[(qCBy )α(y∗)1−α − y∗]
(
y∗
qCBy
)
1−α + cyqCBy + ρqpi = 0 .
Even though the fiscal authority is exerting the maximum level of effort, the
central banker cannot fully free-ride on the government and free herself from its
growth responsibility given the complementarity assumption. Thus, although there
is some incentive to prioritize the first task over the second because a decent reward
is already guaranteed at the time of decision making, such incentive is not a strong
as one would initially expect.
Next, suppose the fiscal authority sits idle and completely fails to fulfill the task
for which she is responsible. This implies that the outcome is qFAy = 0. Given this
behavior, the central banker best responds by setting:
qpi =
λpi∗
λ+ cpi
,
qCBy = 0 .
Clearly, if the fiscal authority does not comply with its job and the reward de-
pends partly on what she does, there is no incentive for the central banker to devote
time, effort or energy, which is costly, in fostering economic activity given that, in
any case, the reward will ultimately depend on what is done relative to inflation.
What is key to this result, however, is that the targets of both agents are aggregated
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using a Cobb Douglas function (imperfect complements), so that one agent choosing
a zero target will lead to a zero aggregate target no matter what the second agent
does.
Note that this outcome closely resembles that of a model with a reward scheme
uniquely determined by the inflation outcome as discussed above. The intuition is
that in both cases there is effectively no compensation for stabilizing output. The
only difference lies in the role of parameter λ, which was set equal to one in the
former case. The larger the value assigned to λ, the closer the inflation outcome will
be to the optimal value.
Finally, let’s perform full comparative statics. The previous cases are extreme
and, therefore, difficult to reconcile with the real world. The next step to better
understand how the choices of the fiscal authority influence the decisions made by
the central banker is to evaluate the intermediate cases. I do this numerically by
making use of the Implicit Function Theorem together with equations (3.3) and (3.4)
to derive:
∂qCBy
∂qFAy
= −
α · (1− λ) · (1− α) ·
(
qCBy
qFAy
)
α
[(
qFAy
qCBy
)
1−α + [qy − y∗](qCBy )−1
]
α · (1− λ) ·
(
qCBy
qFAy
)
α−1
[
α
(
qFAy
qCBy
)
1−α − (1− α)[qy − y∗](qCBy )−1
]
− ρ2λ+cpi
.
(3.5)
While the above relationship is difficult to interpret, it can be shown that there is
a threshold at which the derivative above changes sign representing a clear change in
the incentive system. To show this graphically, Figures 3.1 to 3.4 plot the relationship
between the central bank’s optimal choice for qCBy and what the fiscal authority has
previously done qFAy for the range 0 ≤ qFAy ≤ y∗.
Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter Value
λ Inflation reward weight 0.6
α Cobb-Douglas parameter 0.4
y∗ Optimal output level 3.5%
pi∗ Optimal inflation rate 2%
cy Output effort cost 0.001
cpi Inflation effort cost 0.001
ρ Effort substitution parameter 0.4
To do this, Table 3.1 first presents the calibration of model parameters. Given
that the objective of this numerical exercise is not quantitative, parameters values
are not to be taken strictly.
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Figure 3.1: Benchmark case
Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the central bank’s optimal choice for qCBy and
what the fiscal authority has previously done qFAy for the range 0 ≤ qFAy ≤ y∗ using the benchmark
calibration.
The values of y∗ and pi∗ are implicitly given by the principal’s maximization
problem above, see equations (3.1) and (3.2). This involves assigning values to a
larger number of parameters and acknowledging any realized shocks. For simplicity,
I assume pi∗ is equal to 2%, consistent with the explicit inflation target of a large
number of central banks around the world. For y∗, I take the US average GDP growth
over the last sixty years. The costs are assumed to be small to minimize distortions
and the degree of effort substitution taken to be in line with the mechanism design
literature.
The two remaining parameters, λ and α, are key for the analysis. For the general
case, I assume that the monetary policymaker’s reward depends on the completion
of both the tasks to which she is entitled, although inflation targeting has a slightly
higher weight on the compensation scheme. This is relaxed in Figure 3.4. For
the Cobb-Douglas coefficient, α, I consider three different cases, the benchmark case
being that the target of the fiscal authority has a slightly higher weight in determining
the overall output target observed by the principal.
Figure 3.1 depicts an inverted U-shape relation between the choice of the fis-
cal authority and the subsequent choice by the monetary authority.5 The intuition
is straightforward. The central banker must balance two conflicting forces, while
5Note that the graph does not apply for the extreme case qFAy = 0 which I have already dis-
cussed. The reason is that the graph here presented is derived from the agent’s first order condition.
However, if qFAy = 0, then the minimization problem the monetary policymaker faces is different
and the results derived earlier apply. i.e. qCBy = 0
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Figure 3.2: Alternative scenario I
Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the central bank’s optimal choice for qCBy and
what the fiscal authority has previously done qFAy for the range 0 ≤ qFAy ≤ y∗ under the assumption
that α = 0.6. The remaining parameters are calibrated as summarized by Table 3.1.
putting effort in one task increases the reward on that task, it simultaneously raises
the cost of the other task. At the same time, she must coordinate with the govern-
ment. If the choice of the fiscal authority is very far or very close to the optimal value,
the central banker has less incentives to pursue economic growth, as the marginal
benefit from exerting more effort in the second task is smaller than focusing on the
first. In the former case, this occurs because the central banker’s effort has to make
up, in some way, for what the fiscal authority is not doing; the key being that ben-
efits of this extra effort are shared while the costs are completely burdened by the
monetary authority. In the latter case, the central banker is guaranteed a high com-
pensation irrespective of her actions, such that the extra compensation that might
be obtained by exerting extra effort is smaller than what would be obtained if the
extra effort is devoted to price stabilization.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that a similar pattern holds despite the change in
parameter values. The inverted U-shape is preserved, although the distribution is
shifted to the left, in the first case and to the right, in the second case. Finally Figure
3.4 shows the results derived above in the “based on reward” scenario. If there is
no reward to output stabilization, then the central banker will completely disregard
this task, no matter what the fiscal authority does.
In sum, the main result derived from the theoretical model is that excessive
hawkishness of central banks with a dual mandate can be driven by two different
factors: an unbalanced compensation scheme that prioritizes inflation over output
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Figure 3.3: Alternative scenario II
Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the central bank’s optimal choice for qCBy and
what the fiscal authority has previously done qFAy for the range 0 ≤ qFAy ≤ y∗ under the assumption
that α = 0.1. The remaining parameters are calibrated as summarized by Table 3.1.
stabilization when rewarding central bankers for completing their job and a strategic
response to the target decided by the fiscal authority with whom the central banker
shares the responsibility of encouraging economic growth.
3.4 Discussion
This section relaxes some model assumptions and briefly discusses potential exten-
sions. Formal analysis of such extensions, however, is left for future research. In
parallel, I also comment on the main caveats of the current set-up.
3.4.1 Model extensions
While the model is successful in capturing the underlying structure of incentive
interaction in policy making, it is a stripped-down representation of the decision
making process. The most straightforward extensions involve incorporating time
and uncertainty to the baseline framework.
First, the framework here considered is a one-period static model. A dynamic
version of this model would, among other things, allow the reward scheme to include
other motives in addition to the wage paid to the central banker. In other words, the
benefit the central banker derives from performing her tasks is not only the economic
compensation she receives, but also a higher probability of remaining in this position
in future periods. This would involve incorporating career-concerns and reputation
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Figure 3.4: Alternative scenario III
Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the central bank’s optimal choice for qCBy and
what the fiscal authority has previously done qFAy for the range 0 ≤ qFAy ≤ y∗ under the assumption
that λ = 1. The remaining parameters are calibrated as summarized by Table 3.1.
elements à la Holmström (1999) in which agents care about the public perception of
their talent because current performance affects future compensation. Note, however,
that results would remain to be qualitatively equal; if the probability of staying in
office is proportional to an evaluation of performance which gives a greater weight
to inflation stabilization, then the central banker will again focus predominantly on
this task.
The second and, possibly, most interesting extension incorporates uncertainty to
the model by assuming that both agents face the corresponding optimization problem
simultaneously. By dropping the full information assumption, the central banker is
forced to form expectations of the fiscal authority’s choice. In this context, the degree
of risk aversion of the monetary authority will play a key role.
Intuitively, the more unpredictable the government’s behavior is, the less the
central banker will want to rely on its support and, thus, the more she will focus on
the task that depends uniquely on her: inflation stabilization. The main conclusion
would then be modified: greater uncertainty regarding government’s decisions leads
to greater hawkishness given central bankers’ risk aversion. This extension is par-
ticularly relevant for the case of developing economies and its formalization would
allow to empirically measure the magnitude of its effect.
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3.4.2 Challenges
Before concluding, there are two unresolved challenges that are worth acknowledging.
First of all, the model disregards the incentives behind the fiscal authority’s deci-
sion. The paper takes the output target as given without formalizing the correspond-
ing agent’s optimization problem, which would possibly have to take into account
the target (or expectations of such) adopted by the central bank. This would yield
some sort of feedback loop that would complicate the analysis further. The current
approach is based on the assumption that among all the incentives that shape the
decisions made by a government, the behavior of the central bank does not play a
prominent role, and, thus, can be ignored without loss of generality.
Secondly, this is a purely descriptive model given that I withdraw from explicitly
designing the punishment that would induce the choice of the efficient outcome of
society. The theoretical framework is used to describe and formalize the motivations,
incentives and interactions that influence the implementation of monetary policy in
an intuitive way. A quantitative version of the model that would allow to take it to
the data is currently missing.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper looks at the incentives that determine how much weight policymakers
attach to the different targets in an economy with a dual mandate. Based on a
multitask principal-agent problem framework as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), I
construct a model of monetary policy where the central banker is viewed as an agent
that is entrusted with two conflicting tasks: inflation stabilization and economic
growth, the responsibility of which is shared with the government. The key to
the model is the design of the compensation scheme. More specifically, whether it
induces the monetary authority to divide its effort optimally among the two tasks.
Excessive hawkishness of central banks with a dual mandate is rationalized by this
framework. The central banker will tend to prioritize inflation stabilization in any of
two scenarios: on the one hand, whenever the compensation scheme is unbalanced, i.e
performance measures overstate inflation over output outcomes; on the other hand,
if the choices of the fiscal authority are either too close or too far from the optimal
target.
Extending the model to include uncertainty and risk aversion is an interesting
avenue for future research. This would involve policymakers forming expectations
over the government’s actions, bringing the model closer to reality, especially for the
case of developing economies. Empirical analysis relating the behavior of central
banks and the degree of transparency of governments should then follow.
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